Morten Egeberg
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Morten Egeberg has a total of 3 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Jarle Trondal
University of Agder
7 shared publications - Jarle Trondal
University of Agder and ARENA – Centre of European Studies, University of Oslo, Norway
1 shared publication Åse Gornitzka
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 20 September 2018
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
Political Steering and Bureaucratic Autonomy
This chapter draws attention to the effects of vertical specialization of organizations and how it affects public governance. The chapter documents that agency officials pay significantly less attention to signals from executive politicians than their counterparts within ministerial (cabinet-level) departments. This finding also holds when controlling for variation in tasks, the political salience of issue areas, and officials’ rank. In addition, it is documented that the greater the organizational capacity available within the respective ministerial departments, the more agency personnel tend to assign weight to signals from the political leadership. Expert concerns are strongly emphasized at both levels; however, agency personnel are more sensitive to the influence of affected parties. The chapter applies large-N questionnaire data at four points in time (1986, 1996, 2006, and 2016) that spans three decades and shifting administrative doctrines: New Public Management as well as post-New Public Management.
- 20 September 2018
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
Political Steering and Bureaucratic Autonomy
This chapter draws attention to the effects of vertical specialization of organizations and how it affects public governance. The chapter documents that agency officials pay significantly less attention to signals from executive politicians than their counterparts within ministerial (cabinet-level) departments. This finding also holds when controlling for variation in tasks, the political salience of issue areas, and officials’ rank. In addition, it is documented that the greater the organizational capacity available within the respective ministerial departments, the more agency personnel tend to assign weight to signals from the political leadership. Expert concerns are strongly emphasized at both levels; however, agency personnel are more sensitive to the influence of affected parties. The chapter applies large-N questionnaire data at four points in time (1986, 1996, 2006, and 2016) that spans three decades and shifting administrative doctrines: New Public Management as well as post-New Public Management.
- 20 September 2018
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
Organization Structure, Demographic Background, and Actual Behaviour
This chapter offers a ‘critical case’ on the influence of organizational structure in public governance. By examining organizational members who have ambiguous and temporary affiliations to organizations, it shows how organizational structure trumps demographic background when explaining decision-making behaviour. Survey and interview data on temporary staff in the European Commission support an organizational perspective in two ways. First, temporary Commission officials tend to evoke a tripartite representational repertoire consisting of departmental, epistemic, and supranational roles. Second, more importantly, the composite mix of these representational roles is systematically biased by the organizational structures embedding them: (i) the formal organization of the Commission, (ii) the multiple organizational embeddedness of the staff, (iii) their degrees of organizational affiliation towards the Commission, (iv) their modes of interaction within the Commission, but also (v) their educational backgrounds. Thus, a key demographic background factor like nationality seems to have only modest impact on temporary officials’ behaviour.
- 20 September 2018
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
Organization Structure, Demographic Background, and Actual Behaviour
This chapter offers a ‘critical case’ on the influence of organizational structure in public governance. By examining organizational members who have ambiguous and temporary affiliations to organizations, it shows how organizational structure trumps demographic background when explaining decision-making behaviour. Survey and interview data on temporary staff in the European Commission support an organizational perspective in two ways. First, temporary Commission officials tend to evoke a tripartite representational repertoire consisting of departmental, epistemic, and supranational roles. Second, more importantly, the composite mix of these representational roles is systematically biased by the organizational structures embedding them: (i) the formal organization of the Commission, (ii) the multiple organizational embeddedness of the staff, (iii) their degrees of organizational affiliation towards the Commission, (iv) their modes of interaction within the Commission, but also (v) their educational backgrounds. Thus, a key demographic background factor like nationality seems to have only modest impact on temporary officials’ behaviour.
- 20 September 2018
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
How Organizational Structure Affects Actual Power Relationships between Territorial Levels of Government
This chapter opens by clarifying some main organizational structures within which multilevel public governance takes place. As argued, each organization structure tends to privilege certain interests and this seems to hold as regards ‘upstream’ (policy formulation) processes as well as ‘downstream’ (implementation) processes. Theoretically, the chapter builds on some classic insights from organizational research. Empirically, it draws on studies of international organizations, the European Union, and federal as well as unitary states. The chapter shows how the power of lower-level territories to shape these processes depends on the extent to which organizational structures are arranged according to a territorial principle. In the same vein, higher levels of government tend to strengthen their position when non-territorial principles of specialization prevail.
- 20 September 2018
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
How Organizational Structure Affects Actual Power Relationships between Territorial Levels of Government
This chapter opens by clarifying some main organizational structures within which multilevel public governance takes place. As argued, each organization structure tends to privilege certain interests and this seems to hold as regards ‘upstream’ (policy formulation) processes as well as ‘downstream’ (implementation) processes. Theoretically, the chapter builds on some classic insights from organizational research. Empirically, it draws on studies of international organizations, the European Union, and federal as well as unitary states. The chapter shows how the power of lower-level territories to shape these processes depends on the extent to which organizational structures are arranged according to a territorial principle. In the same vein, higher levels of government tend to strengthen their position when non-territorial principles of specialization prevail.
- 20 September 2018
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
Organizing Public Governance
Chapter 9 concludes the volume by offering the contours of a design approach in political science. The ambition is to use insights from the volume to set out design implications from an organizational approach to public governance. The chapter thus draws a middle ground in an old turf war in organization studies and public administration between science and craft. Insights into how organizational factors affect public governance is a necessary precondition for using organization theory to meta-govern. This concluding chapter advocates that organization theory as craft requires organization theory as science. Understanding and design are thus complementary and not opposed, as is too often assumed.
- 20 September 2018
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
Organizing Public Governance
Chapter 9 concludes the volume by offering the contours of a design approach in political science. The ambition is to use insights from the volume to set out design implications from an organizational approach to public governance. The chapter thus draws a middle ground in an old turf war in organization studies and public administration between science and craft. Insights into how organizational factors affect public governance is a necessary precondition for using organization theory to meta-govern. This concluding chapter advocates that organization theory as craft requires organization theory as science. Understanding and design are thus complementary and not opposed, as is too often assumed.
- 20 September 2018
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
Colliding Coordination Structures in Multilevel Systems of Government (and How to Live with It)
This chapter discusses governance dilemmas that are often overlooked in studies that do not encompass the ecology of organization in public governance. The chapter discusses how coordination structures may counteract each other in multilevel systems of government. The ambition of the chapter is twofold: Firstly, a coordination dilemma is theoretically and empirically illustrated by the seeming incompatibility between a more direct (interconnected) and sectorally specialized implementation structure in the multilevel EU administrative system and trends towards strengthening coordination and control within nation states. Secondly, the chapter discusses organizational arrangements that may enable governance systems to live with the coordination dilemma in practice. This coordination dilemma seems to have been largely ignored in the literature on EU network governance and national ‘joined-up government’ respectively.
- 20 September 2018
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
Colliding Coordination Structures in Multilevel Systems of Government (and How to Live with It)
This chapter discusses governance dilemmas that are often overlooked in studies that do not encompass the ecology of organization in public governance. The chapter discusses how coordination structures may counteract each other in multilevel systems of government. The ambition of the chapter is twofold: Firstly, a coordination dilemma is theoretically and empirically illustrated by the seeming incompatibility between a more direct (interconnected) and sectorally specialized implementation structure in the multilevel EU administrative system and trends towards strengthening coordination and control within nation states. Secondly, the chapter discusses organizational arrangements that may enable governance systems to live with the coordination dilemma in practice. This coordination dilemma seems to have been largely ignored in the literature on EU network governance and national ‘joined-up government’ respectively.
- 20 September 2018
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
The Logic of Supranational Organization
This chapter discusses ‘experiments’ in building supranational organization. Classical international organizations are formally governed by ministers who have their primary institutional affiliation at the national level. The European Commission, on the other hand, represents a notable organizational innovation in the way that executive politicians at the top, i.e. the commissioners, have their primary organizational affiliation at the supranational level. Thus, the Commission constitutes a ‘laboratory’ for experiments in supranational organization-building. The chapter asks what the relative importance is of nationality and organizational position as regards explaining organizational behaviour. The chapter shows that nationality plays a minor role among Commission officials. Nationality matters somewhat more regarding commissioners’ behaviour, but makes up only one of several components of their highly compound role, thus making behaviour at the top of the Commission qualitatively different from behaviour in e.g. the European Council.
- 20 September 2018
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
The Logic of Supranational Organization
This chapter discusses ‘experiments’ in building supranational organization. Classical international organizations are formally governed by ministers who have their primary institutional affiliation at the national level. The European Commission, on the other hand, represents a notable organizational innovation in the way that executive politicians at the top, i.e. the commissioners, have their primary organizational affiliation at the supranational level. Thus, the Commission constitutes a ‘laboratory’ for experiments in supranational organization-building. The chapter asks what the relative importance is of nationality and organizational position as regards explaining organizational behaviour. The chapter shows that nationality plays a minor role among Commission officials. Nationality matters somewhat more regarding commissioners’ behaviour, but makes up only one of several components of their highly compound role, thus making behaviour at the top of the Commission qualitatively different from behaviour in e.g. the European Council.
- 15 May 2014
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Integration
- Vol. 36 (7) , 659-675
People Who Run the European Parliament: Staff Demography and Its Implications
With few exceptions, parliament administrations, including secretariat officials and party group staff, have been relatively unexplored. However, a small, but growing, literature on the administration of the European Parliament (EP) indicates that officials play a role in the policy process that goes beyond technical and procedural questions. On this background, this article therefore aims at, first, finding out who the people working in the EP secretariat and group secretariats are, and, second, investigating whether it matters who these people are. Based on an online survey, we unveil the bureaucrats’ nationality, gender, educational background and former and future career (plans). However, none of the background factors display statistically significant (controlled) associations with staff decision behaviour. Thus, individual processes of pre-socialization outside the EP is not a significant explanation of staff decision behaviour. What matters is whether officials are employed by the EP secretariat or by the political groups (‘organizational affiliation’) and their length of service in EU institutions (‘organizational re-socialization’). It is argued that demography may still play a symbolic role.
- 15 May 2014
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Integration
- Vol. 36 (7) , 659-675
People Who Run the European Parliament: Staff Demography and Its Implications
With few exceptions, parliament administrations, including secretariat officials and party group staff, have been relatively unexplored. However, a small, but growing, literature on the administration of the European Parliament (EP) indicates that officials play a role in the policy process that goes beyond technical and procedural questions. On this background, this article therefore aims at, first, finding out who the people working in the EP secretariat and group secretariats are, and, second, investigating whether it matters who these people are. Based on an online survey, we unveil the bureaucrats’ nationality, gender, educational background and former and future career (plans). However, none of the background factors display statistically significant (controlled) associations with staff decision behaviour. Thus, individual processes of pre-socialization outside the EP is not a significant explanation of staff decision behaviour. What matters is whether officials are employed by the EP secretariat or by the political groups (‘organizational affiliation’) and their length of service in EU institutions (‘organizational re-socialization’). It is argued that demography may still play a symbolic role.
- 12 August 2011
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Public Policy
- Vol. 18 (6) , 868-887
EU-level agencies: new executive centre formation or vehicles for national control?
The jury is still out with respect to whether European Union (EU)-level agencies act primarily as tools of national governments or not, although parts of the literature as well as the legal framework of EU agencies seem to favour the former interpretation. We argue that EU agencies which might be able to act relatively independently of national governments and the Council, but not necessarily independently from the Commission, would contribute to executive centre formation at the European level and thus to further transformation of the current political-administrative order. By measuring along several dimensions, we demonstrate that the Commission constitutes by far the most important partner of EU agencies. EU agencies deal (somewhat surprisingly) to a considerable extent with (quasi-) regulatory and politicized issues. When engaging in such areas, national ministries and the Council tend to strengthen their position, however, not to the detriment of the Commission. In addition to the Commission, national agencies make up the closest interlocutors in the daily life of EU agencies, indicating how EU-level agencies become building blocks in a multilevel Union administration, partly bypassing national ministries. We build our analysis on an on-line survey among senior officials in EU agencies.
- 12 August 2011
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Public Policy
- Vol. 18 (6) , 868-887
EU-level agencies: new executive centre formation or vehicles for national control?
The jury is still out with respect to whether European Union (EU)-level agencies act primarily as tools of national governments or not, although parts of the literature as well as the legal framework of EU agencies seem to favour the former interpretation. We argue that EU agencies which might be able to act relatively independently of national governments and the Council, but not necessarily independently from the Commission, would contribute to executive centre formation at the European level and thus to further transformation of the current political-administrative order. By measuring along several dimensions, we demonstrate that the Commission constitutes by far the most important partner of EU agencies. EU agencies deal (somewhat surprisingly) to a considerable extent with (quasi-) regulatory and politicized issues. When engaging in such areas, national ministries and the Council tend to strengthen their position, however, not to the detriment of the Commission. In addition to the Commission, national agencies make up the closest interlocutors in the daily life of EU agencies, indicating how EU-level agencies become building blocks in a multilevel Union administration, partly bypassing national ministries. We build our analysis on an on-line survey among senior officials in EU agencies.
- 1 January 2006
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Public Policy
- Vol. 13 (1) , 1-15
Executive politics as usual: role behaviour and conflict dimensions in the College of European Commissioners
While role behaviour and conflict dimensions in the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union have been fairly well documented, studies on the internal functioning of the College of the European Commission have been almost lacking. Thus, highly inconsistent images exist; ranging from portraying Commissioners as mainly independent Europeanists on the one hand, to seeing them as primarily national ‘ambassadors’ on the other. Although the main purpose of this article is to theorize College behaviour, some exploratory data indicate that Commissioners first and foremost champion their sectoral portfolio interests, while at the same time, although variably, being attentive to their collective responsibility within the Commission, their country of origin as well as their political party. Theoretically, Commissioners' decision behaviour is accounted for by considering the organizational structure, demography, locus and culture within which they are embedded, as well as the type of policy they are dealing with. It seems as if politics in the College has much in common with politics within national cabinets.
- 1 January 2006
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Public Policy
- Vol. 13 (1) , 1-15
Executive politics as usual: role behaviour and conflict dimensions in the College of European Commissioners
While role behaviour and conflict dimensions in the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union have been fairly well documented, studies on the internal functioning of the College of the European Commission have been almost lacking. Thus, highly inconsistent images exist; ranging from portraying Commissioners as mainly independent Europeanists on the one hand, to seeing them as primarily national ‘ambassadors’ on the other. Although the main purpose of this article is to theorize College behaviour, some exploratory data indicate that Commissioners first and foremost champion their sectoral portfolio interests, while at the same time, although variably, being attentive to their collective responsibility within the Commission, their country of origin as well as their political party. Theoretically, Commissioners' decision behaviour is accounted for by considering the organizational structure, demography, locus and culture within which they are embedded, as well as the type of policy they are dealing with. It seems as if politics in the College has much in common with politics within national cabinets.
- 1 April 2005
- Published by Springer Nature in Comparative European Politics
- Vol. 3 (1) , 102-117
EU Institutions and the Transformation of European-Level Politics: How to Understand Profound Change (If It Occurs)
- 1 April 2005
- Published by Springer Nature in Comparative European Politics
- Vol. 3 (1) , 102-117
EU Institutions and the Transformation of European-Level Politics: How to Understand Profound Change (If It Occurs)