Jonathan P. Caulkins
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Jonathan P. Caulkins has a total of 16 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
G. Tragler
Department of Mathematical Methods in Economics, Vienna University of Technology, Argentinierstrasse 8/105-4, A-1040 Vienna, Austria
2 shared publicationsBenjamin Gurga
Qatar Campus and H. John Heinz III School of Public Policy and Management, Carnegie Mellon University , 5000 Forbes Ave, Pittsburgh, United States
1 shared publication- Caius Gavrila
Department of Biology, University of Rome Tor Vergata, Via della Ricerca Scientifica, Rome, Italy
1 shared publication Christopher Little
Qatar Campus and H. John Heinz III School of Public Policy and Management, Carnegie Mellon University , 5000 Forbes Ave, Pittsburgh, United States
1 shared publicationD. Grass
1 shared publicationEdward Leslie
Qatar Campus and H. John Heinz III School of Public Policy & Management, Carnegie Mellon University , 5000 Forbes Ave, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, United States
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 April 2011
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 78 (1-2) , 60-73
Optimal control of interacting systems with DNSS property: The case of illicit drug use
- 1 April 2011
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 78 (1-2) , 60-73
Optimal control of interacting systems with DNSS property: The case of illicit drug use
- 1 January 2010
- Published by Elsevier in IFAC Proceedings Volumes
- Vol. 43 (25) , 25-28
Optimizing counter-terror operations
- 1 January 2010
- Published by Elsevier in IFAC Proceedings Volumes
- Vol. 43 (25) , 25-28
Optimizing counter-terror operations
- 1 February 2009
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Global Crime
- Vol. 10 (1-2) , 94-112
Economic analysis of drug transaction ‘cycles’ described by incarcerated UK drug dealers
The fundamental activity of most drug dealers is buying drugs from a supplier and selling them on, usually in smaller lot sizes to multiple customers at a lower market level. Data on such ‘cycles’ of purchase and resale are derived from interviews with 65 dealers incarcerated in UK prisons. A power function relationship between price and transaction size is confirmed. Analyses reveal great consistency in proportional price markups across drugs and time, high cycle frequencies (typically weekly or more often) and importers who vertically integrate into the highest level of domestic distribution, so that an important share of their net revenues effectively derives from domestic distribution inside the UK, as opposed to importation per se.
- 1 February 2009
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Global Crime
- Vol. 10 (1-2) , 94-112
Economic analysis of drug transaction ‘cycles’ described by incarcerated UK drug dealers
The fundamental activity of most drug dealers is buying drugs from a supplier and selling them on, usually in smaller lot sizes to multiple customers at a lower market level. Data on such ‘cycles’ of purchase and resale are derived from interviews with 65 dealers incarcerated in UK prisons. A power function relationship between price and transaction size is confirmed. Analyses reveal great consistency in proportional price markups across drugs and time, high cycle frequencies (typically weekly or more often) and importers who vertically integrate into the highest level of domestic distribution, so that an important share of their net revenues effectively derives from domestic distribution inside the UK, as opposed to importation per se.
- 1 February 2009
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Global Crime
- Vol. 10 (1-2) , 66-93
How illegal drugs enter an island country: insights from interviews with incarcerated smugglers
A typology of drug smuggling ‘technologies’ is developed based on interviews with 110 inmates incarcerated in UK prisons for importing illegal drugs. Approximately three-quarters were involved in courier-based operations. The other 30 collectively accounted for substantially greater smuggling throughput capacity and fell into five groups: operations employing ‘bent’ lorry drivers; shipping drugs intermingled with legitimate commerce; transporting drugs on commercial airlines with assistance from corrupt officials; mailing drugs into the UK; and smuggling via boats landing between ports of entry. A Pareto Law seems to apply, with a minority of respondents being responsible for the majority of the smuggling. Most participated in smuggling to make money, but more than a few couriers reported being coerced and/or tricked into carrying drugs. Perhaps not coincidentally, rough calculations suggest that, when balancing profits against prison risk, crime does not pay for couriers but can for organizations employing bent lorry drivers.
- 1 February 2009
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Global Crime
- Vol. 10 (1-2) , 66-93
How illegal drugs enter an island country: insights from interviews with incarcerated smugglers
A typology of drug smuggling ‘technologies’ is developed based on interviews with 110 inmates incarcerated in UK prisons for importing illegal drugs. Approximately three-quarters were involved in courier-based operations. The other 30 collectively accounted for substantially greater smuggling throughput capacity and fell into five groups: operations employing ‘bent’ lorry drivers; shipping drugs intermingled with legitimate commerce; transporting drugs on commercial airlines with assistance from corrupt officials; mailing drugs into the UK; and smuggling via boats landing between ports of entry. A Pareto Law seems to apply, with a minority of respondents being responsible for the majority of the smuggling. Most participated in smuggling to make money, but more than a few couriers reported being coerced and/or tricked into carrying drugs. Perhaps not coincidentally, rough calculations suggest that, when balancing profits against prison risk, crime does not pay for couriers but can for organizations employing bent lorry drivers.
- 1 September 2007
- Published by Elsevier in Drug and Alcohol Dependence
- Vol. 90, S61-S68
Price and purity analysis for illicit drug: Data and conceptual issues
- 1 September 2007
- Published by Elsevier in Drug and Alcohol Dependence
- Vol. 90, S61-S68
Price and purity analysis for illicit drug: Data and conceptual issues
- 1 March 2005
- Published by Springer Nature in Mathematical Methods of Operations Research
- Vol. 61 (1) , 1-22
Managing the reputation of an award to motivate performance
- 1 March 2005
- Published by Springer Nature in Mathematical Methods of Operations Research
- Vol. 61 (1) , 1-22
Managing the reputation of an award to motivate performance
- 1 August 2004
- Published by Wiley in Risk Analysis
- Vol. 24 (4) , 921-924
CAPPS II: A Risky Choice Concerning an Untested Risk Detection Technology
- 1 August 2004
- Published by Wiley in Risk Analysis
- Vol. 24 (4) , 921-924
CAPPS II: A Risky Choice Concerning an Untested Risk Detection Technology
- 31 March 2004
- Published by Elsevier in Socio-Economic Planning Sciences
- Vol. 38 (1) , 1-6
Dynamic drug policy: an introduction and overview
- 31 March 2004
- Published by Elsevier in Socio-Economic Planning Sciences
- Vol. 38 (1) , 1-6
Dynamic drug policy: an introduction and overview
- 1 March 2004
- Published by Wiley in Drug and Alcohol Review
- Vol. 23 (1) , 79-87
What we can—and cannot—expect from school‐based drug prevention
School‐based drug prevention is a central component of drug control strategies. This paper assesses quantitatively its contributions in the United States from a social policy perspective. The social benefits per participant stemming from reduced drug use (∼ $840 from tobacco, alcohol, cocaine and marijuana) appear to exceed the economic costs of running the programs (∼ $150 per participant); while the benefits associated with reduced cocaine use alone (∼ $300) exceed the costs, the corresponding figure for marijuana (∼ $20) is small. Even if prevention reduced the use of other illicit drugs (e.g. heroin) by as much as it reduced use of cocaine, the majority of benefits would still stem from reductions in use of tobacco and alcohol, which has implications for how school‐based drug prevention is funded and whether it is perceived more as a weapon in the war on illicit drugs or as a public health measure. Specific numeric results are subject to considerable uncertainty, but the basic character of the conclusions appears to be robust with respect to parameter uncertainty. The greatest uncertainties concern the permanence of prevention's effects and how to value instances of initiation being deferred but not completely prevented.
- 1 March 2004
- Published by Wiley in Drug and Alcohol Review
- Vol. 23 (1) , 79-87
What we can—and cannot—expect from school‐based drug prevention
School‐based drug prevention is a central component of drug control strategies. This paper assesses quantitatively its contributions in the United States from a social policy perspective. The social benefits per participant stemming from reduced drug use (∼ $840 from tobacco, alcohol, cocaine and marijuana) appear to exceed the economic costs of running the programs (∼ $150 per participant); while the benefits associated with reduced cocaine use alone (∼ $300) exceed the costs, the corresponding figure for marijuana (∼ $20) is small. Even if prevention reduced the use of other illicit drugs (e.g. heroin) by as much as it reduced use of cocaine, the majority of benefits would still stem from reductions in use of tobacco and alcohol, which has implications for how school‐based drug prevention is funded and whether it is perceived more as a weapon in the war on illicit drugs or as a public health measure. Specific numeric results are subject to considerable uncertainty, but the basic character of the conclusions appears to be robust with respect to parameter uncertainty. The greatest uncertainties concern the permanence of prevention's effects and how to value instances of initiation being deferred but not completely prevented.