Olivier Spanjaard
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Olivier Spanjaard has a total of 27 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Bruno Escoffier
Sorbonne Université, CNRS, LIP6
5 shared publications - Hugo Gilbert
UMR 7606 Sorbonne Universités UPMC Univ Paris 06 CNRS 4 place Jussieu LIP6 75005 Paris
2 shared publications - Hugo Gilbert
Gran Sasso Science Institute (GSSI) L'Aquila Italy
2 shared publications - Magdaléna Tydrichová
Sorbonne Université, CNRS, LIP6, Paris, France
2 shared publications - Magdaléna Tydrichová
CentraleSupélec, Paris Saclay University
2 shared publications - Baris Kaftancioglu
Sorbonne Université, CNRS, LIP6
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 13 November 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 375-390
Efficient Solution Algorithms for the Ordinal Biobjective Unconstrained Combinatorial Optimization Problem
- 13 November 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 375-390
Efficient Solution Algorithms for the Ordinal Biobjective Unconstrained Combinatorial Optimization Problem
- Open Access
- 24 July 2024
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Operational Research
- Vol. 320 (1) , 146-159
Robust ordinal regression for subsets comparisons with interactions
- 24 July 2024
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Operational Research
- Vol. 320 (1) , 146-159
Open AccessRobust ordinal regression for subsets comparisons with interactions
- 3 May 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Social Choice and Welfare
- Vol. 63 (1) , 125-169
Euclidean preferences in the plane under $\varvec{\ell _1},$ $\varvec{\ell _2}$ and $\varvec{\ell _\infty }$ norms- 3 May 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Social Choice and Welfare
- Vol. 63 (1) , 125-169
Euclidean preferences in the plane under $\varvec{\ell _1},$ $\varvec{\ell _2}$ and $\varvec{\ell _\infty }$ norms- Open Access
- 23 February 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Discrete Applied Mathematics
- Vol. 348, 301-319
Recognizing single-peaked preferences on an arbitrary graph: Complexity and algorithms
- 23 February 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Discrete Applied Mathematics
- Vol. 348, 301-319
Open AccessRecognizing single-peaked preferences on an arbitrary graph: Complexity and algorithms
- Open Access
- 28 September 2023
- Published by IOS Press
- p. 637-644
Algorithmic Recognition of 2-Euclidean Preferences
A set of voters' preferences on a set of candidates is 2-Euclidean if candidates and voters can be mapped to the plane so that the preferences of each voter decrease with the Euclidean distance between her position and the positions of candidates. Based on geometric properties, we propose a recognition algorithm, that returns either "yes" (together with a planar positioning of candidates and voters) if the preferences are 2-Euclidean, or "no" if it is able to find a concise certificate that they are not, or "unknown" if a time limit is reached. Our algorithm outperforms a quadratically constrained programming solver achieving the same task, both in running times and the percentage of instances it is able to recognize. In the numerical tests conducted on the PrefLib library of preferences, 91.5% (resp. 4.5%) of the available sets of complete strict orders are proven not to be (resp. to be) 2-Euclidean, and the status of only 4.5% of them could not be decided. Furthermore, for instances involving 5 (resp. 6, 7) candidates, we were able to find planar representations that are compatible with 87.4% (resp. 58.1%, 60.1%) of voters' preferences.
- 28 September 2023
- Published by IOS Press
- p. 637-644
Open AccessAlgorithmic Recognition of 2-Euclidean Preferences
A set of voters' preferences on a set of candidates is 2-Euclidean if candidates and voters can be mapped to the plane so that the preferences of each voter decrease with the Euclidean distance between her position and the positions of candidates. Based on geometric properties, we propose a recognition algorithm, that returns either "yes" (together with a planar positioning of candidates and voters) if the preferences are 2-Euclidean, or "no" if it is able to find a concise certificate that they are not, or "unknown" if a time limit is reached. Our algorithm outperforms a quadratically constrained programming solver achieving the same task, both in running times and the percentage of instances it is able to recognize. In the numerical tests conducted on the PrefLib library of preferences, 91.5% (resp. 4.5%) of the available sets of complete strict orders are proven not to be (resp. to be) 2-Euclidean, and the status of only 4.5% of them could not be decided. Furthermore, for instances involving 5 (resp. 6, 7) candidates, we were able to find planar representations that are compatible with 87.4% (resp. 58.1%, 60.1%) of voters' preferences.
- 10 October 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 157-171
A Non-utilitarian Discrete Choice Model for Preference Aggregation
- 10 October 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 157-171
A Non-utilitarian Discrete Choice Model for Preference Aggregation
- 2 June 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Discrete Applied Mathematics
- Vol. 318, 6-12
Weighted majority tournaments and Kemeny ranking with 2-dimensional Euclidean preferences
- 2 June 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Discrete Applied Mathematics
- Vol. 318, 6-12
Weighted majority tournaments and Kemeny ranking with 2-dimensional Euclidean preferences
- Open Access
Beyond Pairwise Comparisons in Social Choice: A Setwise Kemeny Aggregation Problem
In this paper, we advocate the use of setwise contests for aggregating a set of input rankings into an output ranking. We propose a generalization of the Kemeny rule where one minimizes the number of k-wise disagreements instead of pairwise disagreements (one counts 1 disagreement each time the top choice in a subset of alternatives of cardinality at most k differs between an input ranking and the output ranking). After an algorithmic study of this k-wise Kemeny aggregation problem, we introduce a k-wise counterpart of the majority graph. This graph reveals useful to divide the aggregation problem into several sub-problems, which enables to speed up the exact computation of a consensus ranking. By introducing a k-wise counterpart of the Spearman distance, we also provide a 2-approximation algorithm for the k-wise Kemeny aggregation problem. We conclude with numerical tests.
Open AccessBeyond Pairwise Comparisons in Social Choice: A Setwise Kemeny Aggregation Problem
In this paper, we advocate the use of setwise contests for aggregating a set of input rankings into an output ranking. We propose a generalization of the Kemeny rule where one minimizes the number of k-wise disagreements instead of pairwise disagreements (one counts 1 disagreement each time the top choice in a subset of alternatives of cardinality at most k differs between an input ranking and the output ranking). After an algorithmic study of this k-wise Kemeny aggregation problem, we introduce a k-wise counterpart of the majority graph. This graph reveals useful to divide the aggregation problem into several sub-problems, which enables to speed up the exact computation of a consensus ranking. By introducing a k-wise counterpart of the Spearman distance, we also provide a 2-approximation algorithm for the k-wise Kemeny aggregation problem. We conclude with numerical tests.
- 1 February 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Theoretical Computer Science
- Vol. 904, 27-47
Beyond pairwise comparisons in social choice: A setwise Kemeny aggregation problem
- 1 February 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Theoretical Computer Science
- Vol. 904, 27-47
Beyond pairwise comparisons in social choice: A setwise Kemeny aggregation problem
- 27 October 2021
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 19-34
Measuring Nearly Single-Peakedness of an Electorate: Some New Insights
- 27 October 2021
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 19-34
Measuring Nearly Single-Peakedness of an Electorate: Some New Insights