Chabela de la Torre
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Chabela de la Torre has a total of 5 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Julio Pindado
IME and Business Administration Department University of Salamanca Salamanca Spain
6 shared publications - Ignacio Requejo
Department of Business Administration and IME, University of Salamanca, Salamanca, Spain
2 shared publications - Valdoceu de Queiroz
National Treasury Secretariat Ministry of Finance of Brazil Esplanada dos Ministerios 70048‐900 Brasilia Brazil
2 shared publications - Alberto de Miguel Hidalgo1 shared publication
- David Hillier
Univ Strathclyde, Strathclyde Business Sch, Glasgow, Scotland
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 6 February 2015
- Published by Wiley in R&D Management
- Vol. 45 (5) , 515-526
How do country‐level governance characteristics impact the relationship between R&D and firm value?
This article addresses the question of how country‐level governance characteristics moderate the market valuation of research and development (R&D). Using a valuation model and panel data from companies in the European Union, United States, and Japan, we find that effective corporate governance allows the market to better assess a firm's R&D investments. This finding is the conjunction with the effect of the legal system, the financial system, and mechanisms of control. First, as effectiveness of investor protection increases, the market valuation of R&D projects also increases. Second, more developed financial systems do a better job assessing R&D. Third, effective control mechanisms reinforce the positive effect of R&D on a firm's market value. In sum, our findings shed light on how policymakers can increase the benefits from firms' R&D spending and thus foster economic growth and social welfare using these country‐level governance characteristics.
- 6 February 2015
- Published by Wiley in R&D Management
- Vol. 45 (5) , 515-526
How do country‐level governance characteristics impact the relationship between R&D and firm value?
This article addresses the question of how country‐level governance characteristics moderate the market valuation of research and development (R&D). Using a valuation model and panel data from companies in the European Union, United States, and Japan, we find that effective corporate governance allows the market to better assess a firm's R&D investments. This finding is the conjunction with the effect of the legal system, the financial system, and mechanisms of control. First, as effectiveness of investor protection increases, the market valuation of R&D projects also increases. Second, more developed financial systems do a better job assessing R&D. Third, effective control mechanisms reinforce the positive effect of R&D on a firm's market value. In sum, our findings shed light on how policymakers can increase the benefits from firms' R&D spending and thus foster economic growth and social welfare using these country‐level governance characteristics.
- Open Access
- 15 December 2011
- Published by University of Leon in Pecvnia : Revista de la Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, Universidad de León
- No. 2011,p. 111-131
Concentración de propiedad y valor de mercado en la empresa familiar : un enfoque de gobierno corporativo
Concentración de propiedad y valor de mercado en la empresa familiar : un enfoque de gobierno corporativo
- 15 December 2011
- Published by University of Leon in Pecvnia : Revista de la Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, Universidad de León
- No. 2011,p. 111-131
Open AccessConcentración de propiedad y valor de mercado en la empresa familiar : un enfoque de gobierno corporativo
Concentración de propiedad y valor de mercado en la empresa familiar : un enfoque de gobierno corporativo
- Open Access
- 1 October 2011
- Published by University of Leon in Pecvnia : Revista de la Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, Universidad de León
- No. Monogr,p. 111-131
Concentración de propiedad y valor de mercado en la empresa familiar : un enfoque de gobierno corporativo
Dada la importancia de las empresas familiares en todo el mundo, nuestro principal objetivo en este trabajo es investigar la relación entre concentración de propiedad y valor de mercado en elcaso particular de las compañías familiares. Además, estudiamos si las empresas familiares obtienen mejores resultados que las no familiares. Para lograr este objetivo, adoptamos un enfoque de gobierno corporativo. La estimación de nuestros modelos mediante el método generalizado de los momentos proporciona nueva evidencia empírica. Nuestros resultados revelan que la propiedad familiar influye positivamente en el valor empresarial. No obstante, cuando laconcentración de propiedad en manos de la familia es demasiado elevada, el valor de la compañía disminuye; dando lugar a un relación no lineal entre concentración de propiedad familiar y valor de mercado. Finalmente, demostramos que las empresas familiares obtienen mejores resultados que las no familiares, incluso cuando se tiene en cuenta la mencionada no linealidad. En general, losresultados obtenidos indican que el control familiar de las empresas puede ser beneficioso para los accionistas minoritarios.Given the importance of family firms all over the world, our main objective in this paper is to investigate the relation between ownership concentration and the market value of the company inthe particular case of family firms. Additionally, we study whether family firms outperform nonfamily corporations. To this aim, we adopt a corporate governance approach. The estimation of ourmodels by using the generalized method of moments provides new empirical evidence. Our results show that family ownership impacts positively on firm value. Nevertheless, when ownership concentration in the hands of the family is too high, firm value decreases; thus giving rise to a nonlinear relation between family ownership concentration and firm value. Finally, we find that familyfirms perform better than non-family ones, even when nonlinearities are taken into account. Overall, our findings suggest that family control of corporations may be beneficial to minority shareholders.
- 1 October 2011
- Published by University of Leon in Pecvnia : Revista de la Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, Universidad de León
- No. Monogr,p. 111-131
Open AccessConcentración de propiedad y valor de mercado en la empresa familiar : un enfoque de gobierno corporativo
Dada la importancia de las empresas familiares en todo el mundo, nuestro principal objetivo en este trabajo es investigar la relación entre concentración de propiedad y valor de mercado en elcaso particular de las compañías familiares. Además, estudiamos si las empresas familiares obtienen mejores resultados que las no familiares. Para lograr este objetivo, adoptamos un enfoque de gobierno corporativo. La estimación de nuestros modelos mediante el método generalizado de los momentos proporciona nueva evidencia empírica. Nuestros resultados revelan que la propiedad familiar influye positivamente en el valor empresarial. No obstante, cuando laconcentración de propiedad en manos de la familia es demasiado elevada, el valor de la compañía disminuye; dando lugar a un relación no lineal entre concentración de propiedad familiar y valor de mercado. Finalmente, demostramos que las empresas familiares obtienen mejores resultados que las no familiares, incluso cuando se tiene en cuenta la mencionada no linealidad. En general, losresultados obtenidos indican que el control familiar de las empresas puede ser beneficioso para los accionistas minoritarios.Given the importance of family firms all over the world, our main objective in this paper is to investigate the relation between ownership concentration and the market value of the company inthe particular case of family firms. Additionally, we study whether family firms outperform nonfamily corporations. To this aim, we adopt a corporate governance approach. The estimation of ourmodels by using the generalized method of moments provides new empirical evidence. Our results show that family ownership impacts positively on firm value. Nevertheless, when ownership concentration in the hands of the family is too high, firm value decreases; thus giving rise to a nonlinear relation between family ownership concentration and firm value. Finally, we find that familyfirms perform better than non-family ones, even when nonlinearities are taken into account. Overall, our findings suggest that family control of corporations may be beneficial to minority shareholders.
- 25 November 2010
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of International Business Studies
- Vol. 42 (1) , 76-98
The impact of country-level corporate governance on research and development
- 25 November 2010
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of International Business Studies
- Vol. 42 (1) , 76-98
The impact of country-level corporate governance on research and development
- 20 October 2006
- Published by Wiley in European Financial Management
- Vol. 12 (5) , 661-687
The Role of Investment, Financing and Dividend Decisions in Explaining Corporate Ownership Structure: Empirical Evidence from Spain
- 20 October 2006
- Published by Wiley in European Financial Management
- Vol. 12 (5) , 661-687
The Role of Investment, Financing and Dividend Decisions in Explaining Corporate Ownership Structure: Empirical Evidence from Spain
- Open Access
- 1 January 2005
- Published by Virtus Interpress in Corporate Ownership and Control
- Vol. 2 (4) , 76-85
Ownership structure and performance: A comparison of different corporate governance systems
This paper analyses how the main institutional factors characterizing corporate governance systems around the world affect the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance. Our analysis gives rise to the following remarks. First, ownership concentration and insider ownership levels are determined by several institutional features such as investor protection, development of capital markets, activity of the market for corporate control, and effectiveness of boards. Second, the relationship between ownership concentration and performance is not directly affected by these institutional factors. Third, there is, however, a direct influence of corporate governance characteristics on the relationship between insider ownership and performance.
- 1 January 2005
- Published by Virtus Interpress in Corporate Ownership and Control
- Vol. 2 (4) , 76-85
Open AccessOwnership structure and performance: A comparison of different corporate governance systems
This paper analyses how the main institutional factors characterizing corporate governance systems around the world affect the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance. Our analysis gives rise to the following remarks. First, ownership concentration and insider ownership levels are determined by several institutional features such as investor protection, development of capital markets, activity of the market for corporate control, and effectiveness of boards. Second, the relationship between ownership concentration and performance is not directly affected by these institutional factors. Third, there is, however, a direct influence of corporate governance characteristics on the relationship between insider ownership and performance.