Philippe Solal
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Previous Organizations / Institutes
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Philippe Solal has a total of 19 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Sylvain Béal
Université Marie et Louis Pasteur, CRESE (UR 3190)
25 shared publications - Eric Rémila
Université Jean Monnet, Saint-Etienne, France
17 shared publications - Sylvain Ferrières
CNRS UMR 5824 GATE Lyon Saint-Etienne, Université de Saint-Etienne, Saint-Etienne, France
4 shared publications - Encarnación Algaba
Matemática Aplicada II and Instituto de Matemáticas de la Universidad de Sevilla (IMUS), Escuela Superior de Ingenieros, Sevilla, Spain
3 shared publications - Eric Rémila
Laboratoire de l'Informatique du Parallélisme, UMR 5668 CNRS-INRIA-ENS Lyon-Univ. Lyon 1, 46 Allée d'Italie, 69364 Lyon Cedex 07, France
3 shared publications André Casajus
HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management, Leipzig, Germany
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 20 July 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications
- Vol. 207 (2) , 1-40
Flow Methods for Cooperative Games with Generalized Coalition Configuration
A cooperative game with a coalition structure is formed by a TU-game and a partition of the agent set. For this class of games, the Owen value is computed as a two-step procedure where the relevant coalitions are those formed by the union of some elements of the partition and a coalition of another element of the partition. In this paper, we consider a broader class of games where the partition is replaced by a collection of (not necessarily pairwise disjoint) coalitions over the agent set and where, in each element of this collection, cooperation among the agents is restricted. Agents then organize themselves into a profile of feasible coalitions. This class of games can be applied to several situations such as the problem of allocating aircraft landing fees in the presence of airlines and codeshare flights. We begin by defining and axiomatically characterizing the class of flow methods, which are marginal values whose coefficients induce a unit flow on the graph of feasible coalition profiles. We then define Owen-type values constructed from flow methods. We show that these values are flow methods whose flow is decomposable into two flows. Finally, we introduce two axioms from which we characterize the flows that can be decomposed in this way, and hence the flow methods constructed by our Owen-type procedure. The last part of the paper studies some special cases.
- 20 July 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications
- Vol. 207 (2) , 1-40
Open AccessFlow Methods for Cooperative Games with Generalized Coalition Configuration
A cooperative game with a coalition structure is formed by a TU-game and a partition of the agent set. For this class of games, the Owen value is computed as a two-step procedure where the relevant coalitions are those formed by the union of some elements of the partition and a coalition of another element of the partition. In this paper, we consider a broader class of games where the partition is replaced by a collection of (not necessarily pairwise disjoint) coalitions over the agent set and where, in each element of this collection, cooperation among the agents is restricted. Agents then organize themselves into a profile of feasible coalitions. This class of games can be applied to several situations such as the problem of allocating aircraft landing fees in the presence of airlines and codeshare flights. We begin by defining and axiomatically characterizing the class of flow methods, which are marginal values whose coefficients induce a unit flow on the graph of feasible coalition profiles. We then define Owen-type values constructed from flow methods. We show that these values are flow methods whose flow is decomposable into two flows. Finally, we introduce two axioms from which we characterize the flows that can be decomposed in this way, and hence the flow methods constructed by our Owen-type procedure. The last part of the paper studies some special cases.
- Open Access
Flow methods for cooperative games with generalized coalition configuration
This paper introduces the class of cooperative games with generalized coalition configuration. This new class of games corresponds to cooperative games with coalition configuration and restricted cooperation. A coalition configuration is a collection of coalitions covering the agent set. The restriction of cooperation between agents is represented by a set system on each element of the coalition configuration. A coalition profile is a list of feasible coalitions, one for each element of the coalition configuration. A coalition profile function associates a worth with each coalition profile. Based on this framework, we define and axiomatically characterize marginal values whose coefficients induce a unitary flow on the product digraph obtained from these set systems. Next, we propose a two-step procedure, inspired by Owen's procedure, to construct flow methods as above. Then, we show that the associated flow is decomposable into two flows. Finally, we use two axioms to characterize the flows that can be decomposed in this way, and hence the flow methods constructed using our procedure.
Open AccessFlow methods for cooperative games with generalized coalition configuration
This paper introduces the class of cooperative games with generalized coalition configuration. This new class of games corresponds to cooperative games with coalition configuration and restricted cooperation. A coalition configuration is a collection of coalitions covering the agent set. The restriction of cooperation between agents is represented by a set system on each element of the coalition configuration. A coalition profile is a list of feasible coalitions, one for each element of the coalition configuration. A coalition profile function associates a worth with each coalition profile. Based on this framework, we define and axiomatically characterize marginal values whose coefficients induce a unitary flow on the product digraph obtained from these set systems. Next, we propose a two-step procedure, inspired by Owen's procedure, to construct flow methods as above. Then, we show that the associated flow is decomposable into two flows. Finally, we use two axioms to characterize the flows that can be decomposed in this way, and hence the flow methods constructed using our procedure.
- 10 May 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Group Decision and Negotiation
- Vol. 32 (4) , 965-985
A Core-Partition Ranking Solution to Coalitional Ranking Problems
- 10 May 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Group Decision and Negotiation
- Vol. 32 (4) , 965-985
A Core-Partition Ranking Solution to Coalitional Ranking Problems
- 26 January 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Game Theory
- Vol. 52 (3) , 687-701
Axiomatic characterizations of the core without consistency
- 26 January 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Game Theory
- Vol. 52 (3) , 687-701
Axiomatic characterizations of the core without consistency
- Open Access
A characterization of the family of Weighted priority values
We introduce a new family of values for TU-games with a priority structure. This family both contains the Priority value recently introduced by B´eal et al. (2021) and the Weighted Shapley values (Kalai and Samet, 1987). Each value of this family is called a Weighted priority value and is constructed as follows. A strictly positive weight is associated with each agent and the agents are partially ordered according to a binary relation. An agent is a priority agent with respect to a coalition if it is maximal in this coalition with respect to the partial order. A Weighted priority value distributes the dividend of each coalition among the priority agents of this coalition in proportion to their weights. We provide an axiomatic characterization of the family of the Weighted Shapley values without the additivity axiom. To this end, we borrow the Priority agent out axiom from B´eal et al. (2021), which is used to axiomatize the Priority value. We also reuse, in our domain, the principle of Super weak differential marginality introduced by Casajus (2018) to axiomatize the Positively weighted Shapley values (Shapley, 1953a). We add a new axiom of Independence of null agent position which indicates that the position of a null agent in the partialorder does not affect the payoff of the other agents. Together with Efficiency, the above axioms characterize the Weighted Shapley values. Finally, we show that this axiomatic characterization holds on the subdomain where the partial order is structured by levels. This entails an alternative characterization of the Weighted Shapley values.
Open AccessA characterization of the family of Weighted priority values
We introduce a new family of values for TU-games with a priority structure. This family both contains the Priority value recently introduced by B´eal et al. (2021) and the Weighted Shapley values (Kalai and Samet, 1987). Each value of this family is called a Weighted priority value and is constructed as follows. A strictly positive weight is associated with each agent and the agents are partially ordered according to a binary relation. An agent is a priority agent with respect to a coalition if it is maximal in this coalition with respect to the partial order. A Weighted priority value distributes the dividend of each coalition among the priority agents of this coalition in proportion to their weights. We provide an axiomatic characterization of the family of the Weighted Shapley values without the additivity axiom. To this end, we borrow the Priority agent out axiom from B´eal et al. (2021), which is used to axiomatize the Priority value. We also reuse, in our domain, the principle of Super weak differential marginality introduced by Casajus (2018) to axiomatize the Positively weighted Shapley values (Shapley, 1953a). We add a new axiom of Independence of null agent position which indicates that the position of a null agent in the partialorder does not affect the payoff of the other agents. Together with Efficiency, the above axioms characterize the Weighted Shapley values. Finally, we show that this axiomatic characterization holds on the subdomain where the partial order is structured by levels. This entails an alternative characterization of the Weighted Shapley values.
- Open Access
Axiomatic characterizations of the core without consistency
A TU game is totally positive if it is a linear combination of unanimity games with nonnegative coefficients. We show that the core on each cone of convex games that contains the set of totally positive games is characterized by the traditional properties Pareto efficiency, additivity (ADD), individual rationality, and the null-player property together with one new property, called unanimity requiring that the solution, when applied to a unanimity gameon an arbitrary coalition, allows to distribute the entire available amount of money to each player of this coalition. We also show that the foregoing characterization can be generalized to the domain of balanced games by replacing ADD by “ADD on the set of totally positive games plus super-additivity (SUPA) in general”. Adding converse SUPA allows to characterize the core on arbitrary domains of TU games that contain the set of all totallypositive games. Converse SUPA requires a vector to be a member of the solution to a game whenever, when adding a totally positive game such that the sum becomes totally additive, the sum of the vector and each solution element of the totally positive game belongs to the solution of the aggregate game. Unlike in traditional characterizations of the core, our results do not use consistency properties.
Open AccessAxiomatic characterizations of the core without consistency
A TU game is totally positive if it is a linear combination of unanimity games with nonnegative coefficients. We show that the core on each cone of convex games that contains the set of totally positive games is characterized by the traditional properties Pareto efficiency, additivity (ADD), individual rationality, and the null-player property together with one new property, called unanimity requiring that the solution, when applied to a unanimity gameon an arbitrary coalition, allows to distribute the entire available amount of money to each player of this coalition. We also show that the foregoing characterization can be generalized to the domain of balanced games by replacing ADD by “ADD on the set of totally positive games plus super-additivity (SUPA) in general”. Adding converse SUPA allows to characterize the core on arbitrary domains of TU games that contain the set of all totallypositive games. Converse SUPA requires a vector to be a member of the solution to a game whenever, when adding a totally positive game such that the sum becomes totally additive, the sum of the vector and each solution element of the totally positive game belongs to the solution of the aggregate game. Unlike in traditional characterizations of the core, our results do not use consistency properties.
- 18 October 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Game Theory
- Vol. 51 (2) , 431-450
The priority value for cooperative games with a priority structure
- 18 October 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Game Theory
- Vol. 51 (2) , 431-450
The priority value for cooperative games with a priority structure
- 27 September 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Combinatorial Optimization
- Vol. 43 (4) , 818-849
Allocation rules for cooperative games with restricted communication and a priori unions based on the Myerson value and the average tree solution
- 27 September 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Combinatorial Optimization
- Vol. 43 (4) , 818-849
Allocation rules for cooperative games with restricted communication and a priori unions based on the Myerson value and the average tree solution
- 7 June 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Social Choice and Welfare
- Vol. 57 (4) , 817-849
Lexicographic solutions for coalitional rankings
In many real world situations, the design of social rankings over agents or items from a given raking over groups or coalitions, to which these agents or items belong to, is of big interest. With this aim, we revise the lexicographic excellence solution and introduce two novel solutions which, moreover, take into account the size of the groups. We present some desirable axioms which are interpreted in this context. Next, a comparable axiomatization of these three solutions is established, revealing the main differences among the two new social rankings and the lexicographic excellence solution. Finally, we apply the three social rankings under study to a real scenario. Specifically, the performance of some football players of Paris Saint-Germain during the UEFA Champions League according to these three rules is analyzed.
- 7 June 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Social Choice and Welfare
- Vol. 57 (4) , 817-849
Lexicographic solutions for coalitional rankings
In many real world situations, the design of social rankings over agents or items from a given raking over groups or coalitions, to which these agents or items belong to, is of big interest. With this aim, we revise the lexicographic excellence solution and introduce two novel solutions which, moreover, take into account the size of the groups. We present some desirable axioms which are interpreted in this context. Next, a comparable axiomatization of these three solutions is established, revealing the main differences among the two new social rankings and the lexicographic excellence solution. Finally, we apply the three social rankings under study to a real scenario. Specifically, the performance of some football players of Paris Saint-Germain during the UEFA Champions League according to these three rules is analyzed.
- 8 March 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Annals of Operations Research
- Vol. 302 (1) , 23-47
Cohesive efficiency in TU-games: axiomatizations of variants of the Shapley value, egalitarian values and their convex combinations
- 8 March 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Annals of Operations Research
- Vol. 302 (1) , 23-47
Cohesive efficiency in TU-games: axiomatizations of variants of the Shapley value, egalitarian values and their convex combinations