David Plunkett
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
David Plunkett has a total of 11 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Tristram McPherson
The Ohio State University
3 shared publications Daniel Wodak
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA
2 shared publicationsTimothy Sundell
University of Kentucky
2 shared publications- Timothy Sundell
Philosophy, University of Kentucky, Lexington, USA
2 shared publications - Tristram McPherson
Ohio State University
2 shared publications Alexis Burgess
Alcove Learning Cooperative 321 1/2 E 1st St #206 Los Angeles CA 90012 USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 2 September 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 183 (10) , 2989-3019
Supervenience, reliability, and the explanatory limitations of conciliatory expressivism
- 2 September 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 183 (10) , 2989-3019
Supervenience, reliability, and the explanatory limitations of conciliatory expressivism
- Open Access
- 14 August 2025
- Published by University of Michigan Library in Philosophers' Imprint
- Vol. 25
After Metaethics
In recent work, several philosophers have begun to explicitly explore the conceptual ethics of normativity. Put roughly, this is a kind of normative and evaluative inquiry that aims to assess the normative words and concepts that we currently use, as well as salient possible alternative normative words and concepts that we might choose to adopt. One important question about this project is how it relates to more familiar metaethical or metanormative inquiries. This paper helps to illustrate the deep ways in which metanormative and conceptual ethics inquiries can interact, and why it is valuable for practitioners of these projects to attend to the relationships between them. The paper begins by introducing a powerful (although not exhaustive) model for thinking about this interaction, which generalizes on the recent “after error theory” literature. We argue that this model allows us to identify important and neglected views about the normative, and to better understand the argumentative burdens that philosophers take on in defending such views. We conclude by briefly discussing another way that thinking about error theory can be important for understanding the relationship between the conceptual ethics of normativity and metanormative inquiry: by complicating how we can understand the project of conceptual ethics itself.
- 14 August 2025
- Published by University of Michigan Library in Philosophers' Imprint
- Vol. 25
Open AccessAfter Metaethics
In recent work, several philosophers have begun to explicitly explore the conceptual ethics of normativity. Put roughly, this is a kind of normative and evaluative inquiry that aims to assess the normative words and concepts that we currently use, as well as salient possible alternative normative words and concepts that we might choose to adopt. One important question about this project is how it relates to more familiar metaethical or metanormative inquiries. This paper helps to illustrate the deep ways in which metanormative and conceptual ethics inquiries can interact, and why it is valuable for practitioners of these projects to attend to the relationships between them. The paper begins by introducing a powerful (although not exhaustive) model for thinking about this interaction, which generalizes on the recent “after error theory” literature. We argue that this model allows us to identify important and neglected views about the normative, and to better understand the argumentative burdens that philosophers take on in defending such views. We conclude by briefly discussing another way that thinking about error theory can be important for understanding the relationship between the conceptual ethics of normativity and metanormative inquiry: by complicating how we can understand the project of conceptual ethics itself.
- Open Access
- 9 July 2025
- Published by Universidade Federal de Pernambuco in Perspectiva Filosófica
- Vol. 52 (1)
Desacordo e a semântica de termos normativos e avaliativos
Argumentamos que muitas divergências sobre a ética conceitual não são expressas explicitamente. As negociações metalinguísticas são as instâncias mais importantes desse tipo implícito ou tácito. À primeira vista, essas disputas podem não parecer - nem para os próprios falantes nem para o teórico - refletir discordâncias sobre a escolha do conceito. Mas, de fato, elas refletem discordâncias sobre a escolha de conceitos. Muitas disputas que os teóricos pensaram que deveriam ser analisadas em termos do conteúdo literal compartilhado são, portanto, melhor analisadas como falantes que usam suas palavras de maneiras diferentes, defendendo (metalinguisticamente) seu uso preferido.
- 9 July 2025
- Published by Universidade Federal de Pernambuco in Perspectiva Filosófica
- Vol. 52 (1)
Open AccessDesacordo e a semântica de termos normativos e avaliativos
Argumentamos que muitas divergências sobre a ética conceitual não são expressas explicitamente. As negociações metalinguísticas são as instâncias mais importantes desse tipo implícito ou tácito. À primeira vista, essas disputas podem não parecer - nem para os próprios falantes nem para o teórico - refletir discordâncias sobre a escolha do conceito. Mas, de fato, elas refletem discordâncias sobre a escolha de conceitos. Muitas disputas que os teóricos pensaram que deveriam ser analisadas em termos do conteúdo literal compartilhado são, portanto, melhor analisadas como falantes que usam suas palavras de maneiras diferentes, defendendo (metalinguisticamente) seu uso preferido.
- 23 January 2024
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Applied Philosophy
- Vol. 41 (1) , 16-29
How Does Human Agency Actually Work? On Bratman's ‘Core Capacity Thesis’ and the Relation between Philosophy of Action and the Empirical Sciences
- 23 January 2024
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Applied Philosophy
- Vol. 41 (1) , 16-29
How Does Human Agency Actually Work? On Bratman's ‘Core Capacity Thesis’ and the Relation between Philosophy of Action and the Empirical Sciences
- 5 August 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Topoi
- Vol. 42 (4) , 983-999
Varieties of Metalinguistic Negotiation
- 5 August 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Topoi
- Vol. 42 (4) , 983-999
Varieties of Metalinguistic Negotiation
- 30 January 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 201 (2) , 1-46
Generics and metalinguistic negotiation
- 30 January 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 201 (2) , 1-46
Generics and metalinguistic negotiation
- 13 December 2022
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
- p. 23-42
Legal antipositivism and the reliability challenge in metaethics
Many legal positivists have argued that legal antipositivists, due to the central explanatory role they grant authoritatively normative facts, end up saddled with deep problems in their proposed epistemology about how we learn about the law, problems which positivists (and especially "exclusive" legal positivists) can avoid. In this chapter, I put forward a version of this kind of argument. I argue that there is an explanatory challenge tied to the epistemology of law that positivist theories are, in general, better equipped to deal with than antipositivist theories. This issue concerns explaining how people (including not only legal officials, such as judges, but also legal anthropologists, legal historians, and ordinary citizens etc.) are reliable in forming the correct judgments about legal content that they do in fact form. Reflection on this issue about reliability in our legal judgments lends support to positivism. It also, I argue, suggests reasons to favor exclusive legal positivism over inclusive legal positivism.
- 13 December 2022
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
- p. 23-42
Legal antipositivism and the reliability challenge in metaethics
Many legal positivists have argued that legal antipositivists, due to the central explanatory role they grant authoritatively normative facts, end up saddled with deep problems in their proposed epistemology about how we learn about the law, problems which positivists (and especially "exclusive" legal positivists) can avoid. In this chapter, I put forward a version of this kind of argument. I argue that there is an explanatory challenge tied to the epistemology of law that positivist theories are, in general, better equipped to deal with than antipositivist theories. This issue concerns explaining how people (including not only legal officials, such as judges, but also legal anthropologists, legal historians, and ordinary citizens etc.) are reliable in forming the correct judgments about legal content that they do in fact form. Reflection on this issue about reliability in our legal judgments lends support to positivism. It also, I argue, suggests reasons to favor exclusive legal positivism over inclusive legal positivism.
- Open Access
- 1 September 2022
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Legal Theory
- Vol. 28 (3) , 235-267
THE DISUNITY OF LEGAL REALITY
Take “legal reality” to be the part of reality that actual legal thought and talk is distinctively about, such as legal institutions, legal obligations, and legal norms. Our goal is to explore whether legal reality is disunified. To illustrate the issue, consider the possibility that an important metaphysical thesis such as positivism is true of one part of legal reality (legal institutions), but not another (legal norms). We offer two arguments that suggest that legal reality is disunified: one concerns the heterogeneity of different entities that are part of legal reality; the other concerns variation within legal thought and talk. We then show that taking the possibility of the disunity of legal reality seriously has important upshots for how we think about the positivist and antipositivist traditions, the debate between them, and their relation to other parts of legal theory, such as critical legal theory and legal realism.
- 1 September 2022
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Legal Theory
- Vol. 28 (3) , 235-267
Open AccessTHE DISUNITY OF LEGAL REALITY
Take “legal reality” to be the part of reality that actual legal thought and talk is distinctively about, such as legal institutions, legal obligations, and legal norms. Our goal is to explore whether legal reality is disunified. To illustrate the issue, consider the possibility that an important metaphysical thesis such as positivism is true of one part of legal reality (legal institutions), but not another (legal norms). We offer two arguments that suggest that legal reality is disunified: one concerns the heterogeneity of different entities that are part of legal reality; the other concerns variation within legal thought and talk. We then show that taking the possibility of the disunity of legal reality seriously has important upshots for how we think about the positivist and antipositivist traditions, the debate between them, and their relation to other parts of legal theory, such as critical legal theory and legal realism.
- 3 July 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Jurisprudence
- Vol. 13 (3) , 317-348
Legal positivism and the real definition of law
We explore an underappreciated tension at the heart of the debate over legal positivism. On the one hand, many legal philosophers aspire for the debate to tell us what law is, and the nature of law. But on the other hand, the positions in the debate are generally formulated such that they're about something else: what law is necessarily connected to or dependent on. This is a genuine tension, because theses about what law is necessarily connected to or dependent on do not by themselves state or automatically settle what law is or the nature of law. This tension prompts us to propose a new approach to formulating positivism and antipositivism as theses about the real definition of law. Our proposal is simple, but fruitful. We argue that it better insulates and unifies the debate: that is, it prevents orthogonal theses from trivially vindicating or falsifying positivism and antipositivism, and it explains how different threads of the existing debate contribute to a single topic. We close by briefly considering two recent arguments about exclusive positivism (one against, by Scott Hershovitz, and one for, by Scott Shapiro), to illustrate how our discussion bears on contemporary jurisprudential debates.
- 3 July 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Jurisprudence
- Vol. 13 (3) , 317-348
Legal positivism and the real definition of law
We explore an underappreciated tension at the heart of the debate over legal positivism. On the one hand, many legal philosophers aspire for the debate to tell us what law is, and the nature of law. But on the other hand, the positions in the debate are generally formulated such that they're about something else: what law is necessarily connected to or dependent on. This is a genuine tension, because theses about what law is necessarily connected to or dependent on do not by themselves state or automatically settle what law is or the nature of law. This tension prompts us to propose a new approach to formulating positivism and antipositivism as theses about the real definition of law. Our proposal is simple, but fruitful. We argue that it better insulates and unifies the debate: that is, it prevents orthogonal theses from trivially vindicating or falsifying positivism and antipositivism, and it explains how different threads of the existing debate contribute to a single topic. We close by briefly considering two recent arguments about exclusive positivism (one against, by Scott Hershovitz, and one for, by Scott Shapiro), to illustrate how our discussion bears on contemporary jurisprudential debates.