Samar K. Mukhopadhyay
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Samar K. Mukhopadhyay has a total of 10 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Xuemei Su
College of Business Administration, California State University Long Beach, Long Beach, California 90840, USA
3 shared publications - Sanjoy Ghose
Sheldon B. Lubar School of Business University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee 3202 N. Maryland Ave. P.O. Box 742 53201-0742 Milwaukee WI USA
2 shared publications - Xiaohang Yue
Lubar College of Business, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, Milwaukee, WI 53202, USA
2 shared publications - Xiaowei Zhu
West Chester University of Pennsylvania
2 shared publications Mengru Ma
School of Management Science and Engineering, Dalian University of Technology, Dalian, China
1 shared publication- Ming-Zheng Wang
Dalian University of Technology
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 11 December 2013
- Published by Springer Nature in Annals of Operations Research
- Vol. 240 (2) , 731-760
A capacitated firm’s pricing strategies for strategic consumers with different search costs
- 11 December 2013
- Published by Springer Nature in Annals of Operations Research
- Vol. 240 (2) , 731-760
A capacitated firm’s pricing strategies for strategic consumers with different search costs
- 8 November 2013
- Published by Springer Nature in Annals of Operations Research
- Vol. 240 (2) , 683-707
Impact of taxation on international transfer pricing and offshoring decisions
- 8 November 2013
- Published by Springer Nature in Annals of Operations Research
- Vol. 240 (2) , 683-707
Impact of taxation on international transfer pricing and offshoring decisions
- 1 January 2013
- Published by Elsevier in IFAC Proceedings Volumes
- Vol. 46 (9) , 174-179
Managing Multiple Outsourcing: Service Quality and Volume Issues
- 1 January 2013
- Published by Elsevier in IFAC Proceedings Volumes
- Vol. 46 (9) , 174-179
Managing Multiple Outsourcing: Service Quality and Volume Issues
- 1 January 2012
- Published by SAGE Publications in Production and Operations Management
- Vol. 21 (1) , 145-160
Controlling Power Retailer's Gray Activities Through Contract Design
We develop a model that captures dynamic relationships of a supply chain populated by a dominant retailer and a number of fringe retailers. The two types of retailers are asymmetric in buying power, retailing cost, and the ability to service the manufacturer's product. The wholesale prices offered through a quantity discount (QD) schedule can coordinate such a supply chain, but invite channel flow diversion type of gray trading between the dominant retailer and the fringe retailers. Our analysis is focused on how such a channel can be coordinated and the gray market activities be prevented. We propose a dynamic QD contract or a revenue‐sharing contract that the manufacturer can use to fight the gray market activity. The performance of the supply chain and the manufacturer's profit under each of the two contract forms are compared and managerial guidelines are provided to help the manufacturer make a judicious choice.
- 1 January 2012
- Published by SAGE Publications in Production and Operations Management
- Vol. 21 (1) , 145-160
Controlling Power Retailer's Gray Activities Through Contract Design
We develop a model that captures dynamic relationships of a supply chain populated by a dominant retailer and a number of fringe retailers. The two types of retailers are asymmetric in buying power, retailing cost, and the ability to service the manufacturer's product. The wholesale prices offered through a quantity discount (QD) schedule can coordinate such a supply chain, but invite channel flow diversion type of gray trading between the dominant retailer and the fringe retailers. Our analysis is focused on how such a channel can be coordinated and the gray market activities be prevented. We propose a dynamic QD contract or a revenue‐sharing contract that the manufacturer can use to fight the gray market activity. The performance of the supply chain and the manufacturer's profit under each of the two contract forms are compared and managerial guidelines are provided to help the manufacturer make a judicious choice.
- 31 December 2011
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Production Economics
- Vol. 134 (2) , 424-433
A Stackelberg model of pricing of complementary goods under information asymmetry
- 31 December 2011
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Production Economics
- Vol. 134 (2) , 424-433
A Stackelberg model of pricing of complementary goods under information asymmetry
- 30 May 2011
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 165-188
Value-Added Retailer in a Mixed Channel: Asymmetric Information and Contract Design
- 30 May 2011
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 165-188
Value-Added Retailer in a Mixed Channel: Asymmetric Information and Contract Design
- 30 May 2011
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 255-280
Use of Supply Chain Contract to Motivate Selling Effort
- 30 May 2011
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 255-280
Use of Supply Chain Contract to Motivate Selling Effort
- 13 January 2011
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of Production Research
- Vol. 49 (17) , 5317-5332
Return policy in product reuse under uncertainty
One complicating factor in a reverse logistics activity is the uncertainty in the volume of the reverse product flow coupled with uncertain demand. These uncertainties are creating a problem for the reuse businesses because, in order to have a profitable business, their plants need some minimum number of used products to operate efficiently. Several researches have indicated that there is a significant quantity of used products that failed to enter the reverse channel. Therefore finding a way to ensure supply of used products is essential for the viability of the plant. In this paper, we propose the use of financial incentives (also referred to as ‘return policy’) so that adequate supply of the used products is ensured. We present a profit-maximisation model to obtain the optimal return policy. We also obtain a number of managerial guidelines for using marketing and operational strategy variables to influence the reaction parameters so as to obtain the maximum benefit from the market.
- 13 January 2011
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of Production Research
- Vol. 49 (17) , 5317-5332
Return policy in product reuse under uncertainty
One complicating factor in a reverse logistics activity is the uncertainty in the volume of the reverse product flow coupled with uncertain demand. These uncertainties are creating a problem for the reuse businesses because, in order to have a profitable business, their plants need some minimum number of used products to operate efficiently. Several researches have indicated that there is a significant quantity of used products that failed to enter the reverse channel. Therefore finding a way to ensure supply of used products is essential for the viability of the plant. In this paper, we propose the use of financial incentives (also referred to as ‘return policy’) so that adequate supply of the used products is ensured. We present a profit-maximisation model to obtain the optimal return policy. We also obtain a number of managerial guidelines for using marketing and operational strategy variables to influence the reaction parameters so as to obtain the maximum benefit from the market.
- 1 March 2009
- Published by SAGE Publications in Production and Operations Management
- Vol. 18 (2) , 197-211
Motivating Retail Marketing Effort: Optimal Contract Design
We study a distribution channel where a manufacturer relies on a sales agent for selling the product, and for investing in the most appropriate marketing effort. The agent's effort is hard to monitor. In addition, the cost of effort is the agent's private information. These impose challenges to the manufacturer in its endeavor to influence the agent's marketing effort provisions and to allocate profit between the two parties. We propose two contract forms. The franchise fee contract is a two‐part price schedule specifying a variable wholesale price and a fixed franchise fee. The retail price maintenance contract links the allowed retail price that the agent charges customers with total payment to the manufacturer and sales level. Under information asymmetry, for implementing either contract form, the manufacturer needs to offer a menu of contracts, hoping to invoke the “revelation principle” when the agent picks a certain contract from that menu. We show that the two contract forms perform differently, and each party's preference toward a particular contract form is linked with the total reservation profit level and/or the sales agent's cost type. We provide managerial guidelines for the manufacturer in selecting a better contract form under different conditions.
- 1 March 2009
- Published by SAGE Publications in Production and Operations Management
- Vol. 18 (2) , 197-211
Motivating Retail Marketing Effort: Optimal Contract Design
We study a distribution channel where a manufacturer relies on a sales agent for selling the product, and for investing in the most appropriate marketing effort. The agent's effort is hard to monitor. In addition, the cost of effort is the agent's private information. These impose challenges to the manufacturer in its endeavor to influence the agent's marketing effort provisions and to allocate profit between the two parties. We propose two contract forms. The franchise fee contract is a two‐part price schedule specifying a variable wholesale price and a fixed franchise fee. The retail price maintenance contract links the allowed retail price that the agent charges customers with total payment to the manufacturer and sales level. Under information asymmetry, for implementing either contract form, the manufacturer needs to offer a menu of contracts, hoping to invoke the “revelation principle” when the agent picks a certain contract from that menu. We show that the two contract forms perform differently, and each party's preference toward a particular contract form is linked with the total reservation profit level and/or the sales agent's cost type. We provide managerial guidelines for the manufacturer in selecting a better contract form under different conditions.
- 30 June 1993
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Promotion Management
- Vol. 1 (4) , 89-102
Promotional Strategies of Brand Leaders, Challengers, and Followers
- 30 June 1993
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Promotion Management
- Vol. 1 (4) , 89-102
Promotional Strategies of Brand Leaders, Challengers, and Followers