RHRobert E. Hoskisson

Robert E. Hoskisson

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years


Robert E. Hoskisson has a total of 45 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Acquisitions, Stakeholder Economies of Scope, and Stakeholder Orientation

    by Douglas A. Bosse, Jeffrey S. Harrison, Robert E. Hoskisson

    An acquisition brings multiple stakeholder networks together into one combined firm, which inevitably results in changes to the relationships and value propositions the firm has with its stakeholders, and ultimately to the value the firm creates for them. In this paper, we argue that stakeholder economies of scope are possible through managing the stakeholder relationships of multiple business units in a way that creates more total economic value for stakeholders than if those businesses were each managed separately. For example, a broadly stakeholder-oriented acquiring firm can create a stakeholder economy of scope by expanding its broad stakeholder orientation to a newly acquired business unit. The increase in total economic value this generates for the combined network of stakeholders is not recognized in other types of economies of scope. Alternatively, we argue that when an acquiring firm with a narrow stakeholder orientation expands its orientation to a newly acquired division that is broadly stakeholder-oriented, the combined firm experiences a reduction of total economic value, all else equal, due to what we term stakeholder diseconomies of scope. Stakeholder economies and diseconomies of scope have the potential to help explain more of the large variance in the performance of acquiring firms than has been explained previously.


  • Geographic overlap and acquisition pairing

    by Zhuo Chen, Prashant Kale, Robert E. Hoskisson

    Research Summary : This study examines the role of geographic factors in explaining acquisition pairing using a novel conditional logic methodology. Drawing from information asymmetry arguments regarding acquisition decisions, we theorize that geographic overlap between the acquirer and potential targets’ businesses and operations enables the acquirer to collect more information about the potential target through its multiple business operations that are geographically proximate. We also demonstrate moderating boundary conditions. In particular, we examine acquiring firm characteristics, acquiring firm size and geographic dispersion, which both weaken the relationship between geographic overlap and acquisition pairing. Likewise, we examine two dyadic distance moderators, geographic distance and product dissimilarity, both of which increase information asymmetry between the acquirer and potential targets, which increases the effect of geographic overlap in facilitating acquisition pairing. Managerial Summary : Firms pursuing acquisition activities face severe information asymmetry when evaluating potential targets. This study investigates how acquiring firms leverage geographic conditions to overcome information asymmetry and choose targets that they can better evaluate. We find that acquirers are more likely to choose targets that have subsidiaries or business operations overlapping in the same states as the acquirers themselves. This is particularly true for small acquirers, which lack resources and capabilities to seek external assistance, and acquirers that have business operations in more concentrated locations. We also find that acquiring targets with geographically overlapped business operations is especially salient when the target's headquarters is distantly located from the acquirer or when the target offers dissimilar products from the acquirer.


  • Managerial Self-determination and Securities Fraud

    by Wei Shi, Robert E. Hoskisson, Brian L. Connelly, Laszlo Tihanyi, Jiwook Jung, Yin Lee, Stephanie Thomas Solansky, Hannele M J Seeck, Matti A. Vartiainen, Jussi Kulla, et al.

    Despite all the efforts to improve corporate governance, managers may not always act in the best interest of the owners of their firms. Their autonomy may give rise to behavior that is not approved by their firms’ owners or to behavior that is deemed fraudulent. Building on cognitive evaluation theory, we argue that monitoring and intervention by dedicated institutional investors and the pressure to meet analyst forecasts have an adverse influence on top managers’ perceived autonomy and perceived competence, decreasing their intrinsic motivation and increasing the likelihood of unethical behavior (measured by incidence of security fraud). In this regard we find that takeover defense provisions, as safeguard devices conducive to protecting top managers’ perceived autonomy, curtail the likelihood of committing securities fraud. In addition, we contend that high CEO power as a moderator reduces pressure from dedicated institutional investors and missed analyst forecasts to commit fraud. Such power also reinforces the negative influence of takeover defense provisions on fraud commitment. Using a sample of large U.S. companies, we find empirical support for most of our arguments.


  • Owner Influence on Exploratory and Exploitative Joint Ventures: A Multiple Agency Perspective

    by Wei Shi, Brian L. Connelly, Robert E. Hoskisson, H. Kevin Steensma, Jeffrey Q. Barden, Charles Dhanaraj, Marjorie Lyles, Paul W. Beamish, Nathaniel C. Lupton, C. Patrick Woodcock, et al.

    This study contributes to multiple agency theory by unpacking how different ownership profiles have unique influences on managerial choices between exploratory and exploitative joint ventures (JVs). Testing our ideas on a sample of 1008 joint ventures among S&P 500 firms, we find that firms with a strong presence of only dedicated institutional investors (i.e., investors with long time horizons and concentrated portfolios) are more likely to engage in exploratory JVs than firms with a strong presence of only transient institutional investors (i.e., investors with short time horizons and high portfolio turnovers). When both dedicated and transient institutional investors are both present, managers appear to attend more to the preferences of the dedicated owners by engaging in more exploratory joint ventures. Further, we examine the boundary conditions of multiple agency theory by investigating the contingency effects of firm attributes (i.e., performance feedback and absorptive capacity) and the competitive environment (environmental uncertainty). Our results suggest that each of these factors changes the nature of the relationships between institutional ownership profiles and executive choices of exploratory over exploitative JVs.

  • Revitalizing Entrepreneurship: The Search for New Research Opportunities

    by Robert E. Hoskisson, Jeffrey Covin, Henk W. Volberda, Richard A. Johnson

    Entrepreneurship research has traditionally focused on opportunity recognition and resource formation as processes that foster the emergence of new business ventures, through both the lens of the individual entrepreneur and corporate venturing. Although we observe that research is vibrant in these traditional areas, we also argue that the continued revitalization of the field of entrepreneurship can be fostered through examining opportunities for research in areas such as industry change and competition, inter‐organizational cooperation (which has proliferated more recently), university‐sponsored entrepreneurship, venture finance, institutional differences that foster entrepreneurship (primarily between different countries), and appropriability regime differences (including legal and regulatory frameworks) that foster entrepreneurial activities and profit appropriation. Besides pointing scholars to new promising directions, we argue for more attention to the transformational role of entrepreneurship itself by issuing a call for more multi‐level research efforts that connect the micro‐ and macro‐foundations of entrepreneurship and explore the revitalization‐related uncertainties such as the cost of creating an entrepreneurial orientation and whether there is an optimal level.


  • New perspectives on board research: changing the research agenda

    by Morten Huse, Robert Hoskisson, Alessandro Zattoni, Riccardo Viganò


  • VENTURE CAPITALISTS AND INFORMATION ASYMETRIES IN THE PRICING OF IPO SECURITIES.

    by Lowelll W. Busenitz, Jonathan D. Arthurs, Robert E. Hoskisson, Richard A. Johnson

    This article explores how venture capitalists (VC) add value to the ventures in which they invest through governance and reputation effects in the product market. Because VC are usually heavily involved in governance activities, experienced in aligning the goals of managers with owners, and experts at monitoring firms in their portfolio, they are likely to provide greater protection against entrepreneur opportunism compared to those ventures without venture capital backing. Significant experience in the industry allows outside directors to exercise strategic control and be very involved in firm operations. VC can make important contributions through their input via the board of directors and reputation effects for external constituents. VC appear intent on avoiding feelings of inequity among the management team and thus may develop a compensation scheme that deters shirking behavior or the purchasing of excessive perquisites. Because reputation is so important with investors as well as with firms in the product market, and because VC are seen as active contributors and governors of their ventures, they will act to ameliorate transaction problems.


  • Institutional Ownership Differences and International Diversification: The Effects of Boards of Directors and Technological Opportunity

    by Laszlo Tihanyi, Richard A. Johnson, Robert E. Hoskisson, Michael A. Hitt

    We examined the roles of institutional investors, boards of directors, and technological opportunity in relation to international diversification. Our research contributes to both agency and foreign direct investment theories. In data on 197 large U.S. firms, we found significant relationships between institutional ownership and international diversification. International diversification was favored by (1) professional investment funds along with outside board members and (2) pension funds along with inside board members. Also, pension funds' long-term orientation facilitated internationalization in industries with high technological opportunities. The results suggest that different institutional owners have different stakes in firms' international strategies, and the effects of boards of directors and technological opportunity accentuate these differences.