Arnold Polanski
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Arnold Polanski has a total of 20 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Evarist Stoja
University of Bristol
10 shared publications Fernando Vega-Redondo
Bocconi University; Italy
3 shared publications- Daniel Cardona
Universitat de les Illes Balears and CREB
2 shared publications Evarist Stoja
2 shared publicationsRen Zhang
School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK
2 shared publicationsAleksandr Pereverzin
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 24 February 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Public Economics
- Vol. 256
Stability and resilience of alliances: A network approach
- 24 February 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Public Economics
- Vol. 256
Open AccessStability and resilience of alliances: A network approach
- Open Access
- 26 June 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Computational Economics
- Vol. 67 (6) , 4511-4551
What Can We Learn from Applying Machine Learning to Bargaining?
We collect a unique dataset from an online experiment on bilateral distributive bargaining. Using machine learning techniques, we construct a probabilistic model that predicts the share demands made by human participants. This model forms the basis for two bargaining algorithms: one that imitates human behavior, and another that optimally responds to the former. We then simulate additional bargaining games between these agents and estimate a range of models to analyze how structural features and past interactions influence agents’ decisions and bargaining outcomes. This approach yields new insights into the strategies employed by both human negotiators and artificial agents.
- 26 June 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Computational Economics
- Vol. 67 (6) , 4511-4551
Open AccessWhat Can We Learn from Applying Machine Learning to Bargaining?
We collect a unique dataset from an online experiment on bilateral distributive bargaining. Using machine learning techniques, we construct a probabilistic model that predicts the share demands made by human participants. This model forms the basis for two bargaining algorithms: one that imitates human behavior, and another that optimally responds to the former. We then simulate additional bargaining games between these agents and estimate a range of models to analyze how structural features and past interactions influence agents’ decisions and bargaining outcomes. This approach yields new insights into the strategies employed by both human negotiators and artificial agents.
- 19 December 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 215
Close-knit neighborhoods: Stability of cooperation in networks
- 19 December 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 215
Close-knit neighborhoods: Stability of cooperation in networks
- Open Access
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
The Taxonomy of Tail Risk
We use tail events at different levels of severity to define an asset’s tail risk and to decompose the latter into a systematic and an idiosyncratic component. The systematic component captures an asset's tendency to experience joint tail losses with the market and generalizes a classic tail dependence coefficient. The idiosyncratic component, on the other hand, consists of two parts: idiosyncratic tail risk that leads to asset-specific tail losses and tail risk cushioning that dampens the tail losses emanating from the market. Tail risk cushioning is a novel concept that arises naturally in our framework, is consistent with the previous two and completes the taxonomy of tail risk. We examine the performance of our tail risk decomposition on a large dataset, confirming some previous results on tail risk and uncovering new theoretical and empirical findings.
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessThe Taxonomy of Tail Risk
We use tail events at different levels of severity to define an asset’s tail risk and to decompose the latter into a systematic and an idiosyncratic component. The systematic component captures an asset's tendency to experience joint tail losses with the market and generalizes a classic tail dependence coefficient. The idiosyncratic component, on the other hand, consists of two parts: idiosyncratic tail risk that leads to asset-specific tail losses and tail risk cushioning that dampens the tail losses emanating from the market. Tail risk cushioning is a novel concept that arises naturally in our framework, is consistent with the previous two and completes the taxonomy of tail risk. We examine the performance of our tail risk decomposition on a large dataset, confirming some previous results on tail risk and uncovering new theoretical and empirical findings.
- Open Access
- 12 December 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money
- Vol. 82
Does systematic tail risk matter?
- 12 December 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money
- Vol. 82
Open AccessDoes systematic tail risk matter?
- Open Access
- 29 November 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Game Theory
- Vol. 52 (2) , 463-483
The battle of opinion: dynamic information revelation by ideological senders
Two informed and interested parties (senders) repeatedly send messages to an uninformed party (public). Senders face a trade-off between propagating their favoured opinions, possibly by lying, and maintaining a high audience (or market share), as the state is occasionally revealed and lies cause audiences to switch to the competitor. We fully characterize a focal Markov perfect equilibrium of this game and discuss the impact of exogenous parameters on the truthfulness of equilibrium reporting. In particular, we find that senders’ lying propensities are strategic complements so that increasing one sender’s bias decreases both senders’ truthfulness. We also analyse the role of polarization across senders.
- 29 November 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Game Theory
- Vol. 52 (2) , 463-483
Open AccessThe battle of opinion: dynamic information revelation by ideological senders
Two informed and interested parties (senders) repeatedly send messages to an uninformed party (public). Senders face a trade-off between propagating their favoured opinions, possibly by lying, and maintaining a high audience (or market share), as the state is occasionally revealed and lies cause audiences to switch to the competitor. We fully characterize a focal Markov perfect equilibrium of this game and discuss the impact of exogenous parameters on the truthfulness of equilibrium reporting. In particular, we find that senders’ lying propensities are strategic complements so that increasing one sender’s bias decreases both senders’ truthfulness. We also analyse the role of polarization across senders.
- 1 September 2020
- Published by Wiley in International Journal of Finance & Economics
- Vol. 26 (4) , 5499-5511
Tail risk interdependence
- 1 September 2020
- Published by Wiley in International Journal of Finance & Economics
- Vol. 26 (4) , 5499-5511
Tail risk interdependence
- Open Access
- 26 July 2020
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Close-Knit Neighborhoods: Stability of Cooperation in Networks
Agents connected in a network face a binary choice whether to "contribute" or to "free-ride". The former action is costly but benefits the agent and her neighbors, while the latter is free but does not provide any benefits. Who will contribute if agents react to actions of their neighbors and anticipate their reactions? I adapt the concepts of consistent sets and farsightedly stable sets to answer this question. When benefits to an agent are linear in the number of her contributing neighbors, the optimal decision will depend on the cohesion of her neighborhood as captured by the graph-theoretical concepts of cores and collapsible subgraphs.
- 26 July 2020
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessClose-Knit Neighborhoods: Stability of Cooperation in Networks
Agents connected in a network face a binary choice whether to "contribute" or to "free-ride". The former action is costly but benefits the agent and her neighbors, while the latter is free but does not provide any benefits. Who will contribute if agents react to actions of their neighbors and anticipate their reactions? I adapt the concepts of consistent sets and farsightedly stable sets to answer this question. When benefits to an agent are linear in the number of her contributing neighbors, the optimal decision will depend on the cohesion of her neighborhood as captured by the graph-theoretical concepts of cores and collapsible subgraphs.
- Open Access
- 8 May 2019
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
The Battle of Opinion: Dynamic Information Revelation by Ideological Senders
Two informed and interested parties (senders) repeatedly send messages to an uninformed party (public). Senders face a trade-off between propagating their favoured opinions, possibly by lying, and maintaining a high audience (or market share), as the state is occasionally revealed and lies cause audiences to switch to the competitor. We fully characterize the unique equilibrium (in linear strategies) of this game and discuss the impact of exogenous parameters on the truthfulness of equilibrium reporting. We also analyse the role of polarization and extremism of favoured opinions.
- 8 May 2019
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessThe Battle of Opinion: Dynamic Information Revelation by Ideological Senders
Two informed and interested parties (senders) repeatedly send messages to an uninformed party (public). Senders face a trade-off between propagating their favoured opinions, possibly by lying, and maintaining a high audience (or market share), as the state is occasionally revealed and lies cause audiences to switch to the competitor. We fully characterize the unique equilibrium (in linear strategies) of this game and discuss the impact of exogenous parameters on the truthfulness of equilibrium reporting. We also analyse the role of polarization and extremism of favoured opinions.
- 4 April 2019
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 50 (2) , 481-502
Communication networks, externalities, and the price of information
- 4 April 2019
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 50 (2) , 481-502
Communication networks, externalities, and the price of information