Chung-Hua Shen
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Chung-Hua Shen has a total of 33 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Chih-Yung Lin
Department of Information Management and Finance, National Yang Ming Chiao Tung University, Hsinchu, Taiwan
3 shared publications Chin‐Hwa Lu
Associate Professor, Department of Finance, China University of Technology, Chinese Taipei
2 shared publications- Jun-Guo Shi
College of Finance and Statistics Hunan University Changsha 410079 People's Republic of China
2 shared publications Meng-Fen Hsieh
Department of Finance , National Taichung Institute of Technology , No. 129, Sanmin Road, Sec. 3, Taichung City 404, Taiwan, ROC
2 shared publications- Meng-Wen Wu
Department of Business Administration, National Taipei University, Taipei, Taiwan
2 shared publications - Meng‐Wen Wu
Assistant Professor, Department of Finance, Ming Chuan University, Chinese Taipei
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 1 August 2019
- Published by Wiley in Pacific Economic Review
- Vol. 25 (4) , 539-573
Do networks or performance impact the promotion of Chinese officials? Evidence from prefecture‐level cities
This study examines the effects of connections and economic performance on the promotion of Chinese city mayors. Our study differs from the published literature in four respects. First, this study covers a comprehensive data set, including 1,422 mayors from 284 prefecture‐level cities. The use of a large data set helps resolve mixed results of past studies. Second, we use a broader range of top leaders. Third, we apply a more comprehensive definition of connections than earlier studies. Finally, we examine the effects of the policy shift of the 11th 5‐year plan on promotion of mayors. Our results reveal that the performance of a city mayor assisted his/her promotion to party secretary before 2006 but not afterwards. However, a mayor's connection with five types of top leaders is helpful. Among the four types of connection, colleagueship is the most effective in expediting the promotion of mayors. Graduating from the same university and department is also helpful but to a lesser extent. Township connection is not useful.
- 1 August 2019
- Published by Wiley in Pacific Economic Review
- Vol. 25 (4) , 539-573
Do networks or performance impact the promotion of Chinese officials? Evidence from prefecture‐level cities
This study examines the effects of connections and economic performance on the promotion of Chinese city mayors. Our study differs from the published literature in four respects. First, this study covers a comprehensive data set, including 1,422 mayors from 284 prefecture‐level cities. The use of a large data set helps resolve mixed results of past studies. Second, we use a broader range of top leaders. Third, we apply a more comprehensive definition of connections than earlier studies. Finally, we examine the effects of the policy shift of the 11th 5‐year plan on promotion of mayors. Our results reveal that the performance of a city mayor assisted his/her promotion to party secretary before 2006 but not afterwards. However, a mayor's connection with five types of top leaders is helpful. Among the four types of connection, colleagueship is the most effective in expediting the promotion of mayors. Graduating from the same university and department is also helpful but to a lesser extent. Township connection is not useful.
- 18 July 2019
- Published by Wiley in China & World Economy
- Vol. 27 (4) , 29-52
Motivations for Loan Herding by Chinese Banks and Its Impact on Bank Performance
This study uses a dynamic herding model that considers intertemporal and cross‐sectional correlation to confirm that loan herding occurs among joint‐stock commercial banks (JSCBs) and city commercial banks (CCBs). We clarify the motivations for bank loan herding. We find that loan herding by both JSCBs and CCBs results more from following the behavior of other same‐type banks than different‐type banks because of characteristic herding or reputational concerns. Loan herding by JSCBs is motivated by investigative herding, whereas loan herding by CCBs results from informational cascades. Moreover, loan herding has a significantly harmful impact on the operating performance of CCBs but not JSCBs, which may be explained by the irrational behavior of CCBs. Our results will help Chinese bank supervisors develop appropriate policies for handling loan herding.
- 18 July 2019
- Published by Wiley in China & World Economy
- Vol. 27 (4) , 29-52
Motivations for Loan Herding by Chinese Banks and Its Impact on Bank Performance
This study uses a dynamic herding model that considers intertemporal and cross‐sectional correlation to confirm that loan herding occurs among joint‐stock commercial banks (JSCBs) and city commercial banks (CCBs). We clarify the motivations for bank loan herding. We find that loan herding by both JSCBs and CCBs results more from following the behavior of other same‐type banks than different‐type banks because of characteristic herding or reputational concerns. Loan herding by JSCBs is motivated by investigative herding, whereas loan herding by CCBs results from informational cascades. Moreover, loan herding has a significantly harmful impact on the operating performance of CCBs but not JSCBs, which may be explained by the irrational behavior of CCBs. Our results will help Chinese bank supervisors develop appropriate policies for handling loan herding.
- Open Access
- 13 August 2018
- Published by MDPI AG in Preprints.org
Comparing Performances of Internet and Non-Internet Banks
In this study, we aim to compare the profit and risk performances of Internet and click-and-mortar banks, where the latter is also referred to as non-Internet banks. We adopt matching methods to conduct the comparison. After matching the sample, Internet banks outperform non-Internet banks in terms of profitability measures, such as return on asset (ROA) and return of equity (ROE). However, they perform equally well in non-interest revenue and nonperforming loans.
- 13 August 2018
- Published by MDPI AG in Preprints.org
Open AccessComparing Performances of Internet and Non-Internet Banks
In this study, we aim to compare the profit and risk performances of Internet and click-and-mortar banks, where the latter is also referred to as non-Internet banks. We adopt matching methods to conduct the comparison. After matching the sample, Internet banks outperform non-Internet banks in terms of profitability measures, such as return on asset (ROA) and return of equity (ROE). However, they perform equally well in non-interest revenue and nonperforming loans.
- 26 July 2018
- Published by Wiley in European Financial Management
- Vol. 25 (4) , 978-1012
Is finance a veil? Lead‐and‐lag relationship between financial and business cycles: The case of China
This study examines the lead‐and‐lag relationship between financial cycles (FCs) and business cycles (BCs) by using Chinese provincial data. We construct FCs of the financial sector on the basis of three financial variables: credit‐to‐GDP (gross domestic product) ratios, house prices, and equity prices. We use the panel dynamic logit model to investigate the lead‐and‐lag effect between two sectors. Results show that each province has its own unique FCs and BCs. Hence, financial policies should be different in dissimilar provinces. Next, we find that FCs lead BCs and not vice versa. Furthermore, the leading effect is stronger in rich provinces than in poor areas.
- 26 July 2018
- Published by Wiley in European Financial Management
- Vol. 25 (4) , 978-1012
Is finance a veil? Lead‐and‐lag relationship between financial and business cycles: The case of China
This study examines the lead‐and‐lag relationship between financial cycles (FCs) and business cycles (BCs) by using Chinese provincial data. We construct FCs of the financial sector on the basis of three financial variables: credit‐to‐GDP (gross domestic product) ratios, house prices, and equity prices. We use the panel dynamic logit model to investigate the lead‐and‐lag effect between two sectors. Results show that each province has its own unique FCs and BCs. Hence, financial policies should be different in dissimilar provinces. Next, we find that FCs lead BCs and not vice versa. Furthermore, the leading effect is stronger in rich provinces than in poor areas.
- 8 November 2016
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Emerging Markets Finance and Trade
- Vol. 53 (5) , 1045-1071
Credit Ratings and Bank Affiliation to Financial Holding Companies: Effects of Government Ownership and Financial Crisis
This study compares credit ratings between FHC affiliated banks and independent banks using Taiwan bank and FHC data. The results show banks that join Insurance- or Security-FHCs obtain better ratings than those that join Bank-FHCs. Second, banks that join FHCs with higher activity diversification can obtain better credit ratings. Third, joining government-owned FHCs enhances bank credit ratings and mitigates bank default risk compared to joining non-government-owned FHCs. Fourth, prior to the financial crisis, banks joining FHCs can obtain better credit ratings and reduce the cost of debt. However, during the financial crisis, rating agencies stopped regarding banks joining privately owned bank-based FHCs as risk diversification and assigning better credit ratings on this basis.
- 8 November 2016
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Emerging Markets Finance and Trade
- Vol. 53 (5) , 1045-1071
Credit Ratings and Bank Affiliation to Financial Holding Companies: Effects of Government Ownership and Financial Crisis
This study compares credit ratings between FHC affiliated banks and independent banks using Taiwan bank and FHC data. The results show banks that join Insurance- or Security-FHCs obtain better ratings than those that join Bank-FHCs. Second, banks that join FHCs with higher activity diversification can obtain better credit ratings. Third, joining government-owned FHCs enhances bank credit ratings and mitigates bank default risk compared to joining non-government-owned FHCs. Fourth, prior to the financial crisis, banks joining FHCs can obtain better credit ratings and reduce the cost of debt. However, during the financial crisis, rating agencies stopped regarding banks joining privately owned bank-based FHCs as risk diversification and assigning better credit ratings on this basis.
- 20 June 2016
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting
- Vol. 49 (1) , 29-63
Application of multi-level matching between financial performance and corporate social responsibility in the banking industry
- 20 June 2016
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting
- Vol. 49 (1) , 29-63
Application of multi-level matching between financial performance and corporate social responsibility in the banking industry
- 14 February 2015
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting
- Vol. 47 (2) , 343-368
Political connections, financial constraints, and corporate investment
- 14 February 2015
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting
- Vol. 47 (2) , 343-368
Political connections, financial constraints, and corporate investment
- 30 January 2014
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Financial Services Research
- Vol. 47 (3) , 341-379
The Sovereign Effect on Bank Credit Ratings
- 30 January 2014
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Financial Services Research
- Vol. 47 (3) , 341-379
The Sovereign Effect on Bank Credit Ratings
- 9 May 2013
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Financial Services Research
- Vol. 45 (3) , 307-340
The Government’s Role in Government-owned Banks
- 9 May 2013
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Financial Services Research
- Vol. 45 (3) , 307-340
The Government’s Role in Government-owned Banks
- 6 April 2013
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Financial Services Research
- Vol. 45 (3) , 287-305
The Benefits of Political Connection: Evidence from Individual Bank-Loan Contracts
- 6 April 2013
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Financial Services Research
- Vol. 45 (3) , 287-305
The Benefits of Political Connection: Evidence from Individual Bank-Loan Contracts