SKSaul M. Kassin

Saul M. Kassin

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

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Saul M. Kassin has a total of 13 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Top Cited Papers

    "I'd Know a False Confession if I Saw One": A Comparative Study of College Students and Police Investigators.

    by Saul M. Kassin, Christian A. Meissner, Rebecca J. Norwick

    College students and police investigators watched or listened to 10 prison inmates confessing to crimes. Half the confessions were true accounts; half were false--concocted for the study. Consistent with much recent research, students were generally more accurate than police, and accuracy rates were higher among those presented with audiotaped than videotaped confessions. In addition, investigators were significantly more confident in their judgments and also prone to judge confessors guilty. To determine if police accuracy would increase if this guilty response bias were neutralized, participants in a second experiment were specifically informed that half the confessions were true and half were false. This manipulation eliminated the investigator response bias, but it did not increase accuracy or lower confidence. These findings are discussed for what they imply about the post-interrogation risks to innocent suspects who confess.


  • Top Cited Papers

    The Psychology of Confessions

    by Saul M. Kassin, Gisli H. Gudjonsson

    Recently, in a number of high-profile cases, defendants who were prosecuted, convicted, and sentenced on the basis of false confessions have been exonerated through DNA evidence. As a historical matter, confession has played a prominent role in religion, in psychotherapy, and in criminal law—where it is a prosecutor's most potent weapon. In recent years, psychologists from the clinical, personality, developmental, cognitive, and social areas have brought their theories and research methods to bear on an analysis of confession evidence, how it is obtained, and what impact it has on judges, juries, and other people. Drawing on individual case studies, archival reports, correlational studies, and laboratory and field experiments, this monograph scrutinizes a sequence of events during which confessions may be obtained from criminal suspects and used as evidence. First, we examine the preinterrogation interview, a process by which police target potential suspects for interrogation by making demeanor-based judgments of whether they are being truthful. Consistent with the literature showing that people are poor lie detectors, research suggests that trained and experienced police investigators are prone to see deception at this stage and to make false-positive errors, disbelieving people who are innocent, with a great deal of confidence. Second, we examine the Miranda warning and waiver, a process by which police apprise suspects of their constitutional rights to silence and to counsel. This important procedural safeguard is in place to protect the accused, but researchers have identified reasons why it may have little impact. One reason is that some suspects do not have the capacity to understand and apply these rights. Another is that police have developed methods of obtaining waivers. Indeed, innocent people in particular tend to waive their rights, naively believing that they have nothing to fear or hide and that their innocence will set them free. Third, we examine the modern police interrogation, a guilt-presumptive process of social influence during which trained police use strong, psychologically oriented techniques involving isolation, confrontation, and minimization of blame to elicit confessions. Fourth, we examine the confession itself, discussing theoretical perspectives and research on why people confess during interrogation. In particular, we focus on the problem of false confessions and their corrupting influence in cases of wrongful convictions. We distinguish among voluntary, compliant, and internalized false confessions. We describe personal risk factors for susceptibility to false confessions, such as dispositional tendencies toward compliance and suggestibility, youth, mental retardation, and psychopathology. We then examine situational factors related to the processes of interrogation and show that three common interrogation tactics—isolation; the presentation of false incriminating evidence; and minimization, which implies leniency will follow—can substantially increase the risk that ordinary people will confess to crimes they did not commit, sometimes internalizing the belief in their own culpability. Fifth, we examine the consequences of confession evidence as evaluated by police and prosecutors, followed by judges and juries in court. Research shows that confession evidence is inherently prejudicial, that juries are influenced by confessions despite evidence of coercion and despite a lack of corroboration, and that the assumption that “I'd know a false confession if I saw one” is an unsubstantiated myth. Finally, we address the role of psychologists as expert witnesses and suggest a number of possible safeguards. In particular, we argue that there is a need to reform interrogation practices that increase the risk of false confessions and recommend a policy of mandatory videotaping of all interviews and interrogations.


  • Why People Waive Their Miranda Rights: The Power of Innocence.

    by Saul M. Kassin, Rebecca J. Norwick

    In a laboratory experiment, 72 participants who were guilty or innocent of a mock theft were apprehended for investigation. Motivated to avoid prosecution and trial, they were confronted by a neutral, sympathetic, or hostile male "detective" who sought a waiver of their Miranda rights. Later, 72 other participants watched videotapes of these sessions and answered questions about the detective and suspect. Strikingly, results showed that although the detective's demeanor had no effect, participants who were truly innocent were significantly more likely to sign a waiver than those who were guilty. Naively believing in the power of their innocence to set them free, most waived their rights even in the hostile detective condition, where the risk of interrogation was apparent. The conceptual and policy implications of these results are discussed.


  • Top Cited Papers

    Behavioral confirmation in the interrogation room: On the dangers of presuming guilt.

    by Saul M. Kassin, Christine C. Goldstein, Kenneth Savitsky

    A two-phased experiment tested the hypothesis that the presumption of guilt that underlies police interrogations activates a process of behavioral confirmation. In Phase I, 52 suspects guilty or innocent of a mock theft were questioned by 52 interrogators led to believe that most suspects were guilty or innocent. Interrogators armed with guilty as opposed to innocent expectations selected more guilt-presumptive questions, used more interrogation techniques, judged the suspect to be guilty, and exerted more pressure to get a confession--particularly when paired with innocent suspects. In Phase II, neutral observers listened to audiotapes of the suspect, interrogator, or both. They perceived suspects in the guilty expectations condition as more defensive--and as somewhat more guilty. Results indicate that a presumption of guilt sets in motion a process of behavioral confirmation by which expectations influence the interrogator's behavior, the suspect's behavior, and ultimately the judgments of neutral observers.


    • 1 May 2002
      • Vol. 57  (5) , 378-9

    Eyewitness researchers as experts in court: responsive to change in a dynamic and rational process.

    by Saul M Kassin, V Anne Tubb, Harmon M Hosch, Amina Memon

  • On the Many Impacts of Inadmissible Testimony: Selective Compliance, Need for Cognition, and the Overcorrection Bias

    by Samuel R. Sommers, Saul M. Kassin

    A mock juror study tested three hypotheses: (a) Jurors comply selectively with instructions to disregard inadmissible testimony, (b) this effect is greater among jurors who are high rather than low in the need for cognition (NC), and (c) high-NC decision makers sometimes overcorrect against the perceived biasing agent of inadmissible testimony. Participants read a trial summary in which the admissibility of an incriminating wiretap and the basis for this ruling were manipulated. Consistent with the prediction that jurors would be motivated to reach a “just” verdict, participants disregarded an inadmissible wiretap when it was deemed unreliable but not when it violated due process. This pattern of selective compliance was found only among high-NC jurors. High-NC participants also exhibited signs of bias overcorrection, estimating the probability of the defendant’s guilt to be lower in the inadmissible-unreliable condition than in the no-wiretap control. The theoretical and practical implications of these results are discussed.


  • On the "general acceptance" of eyewitness testimony research: A new survey of the experts.

    by Saul M. Kassin, V. Anne Tubb, Harmon M. Hosch, Amina Memon

    In light of recent advances, this study updated a prior survey of eyewitness experts (S. M. Kassin, P. C. Ellsworth, & V. L. Smith, 1989). Sixty-four psychologists were asked about their courtroom experiences and opinions on 30 eyewitness phenomena. By an agreement rate of at least 80%, there was a strong consensus that the following phenomena are sufficiently reliable to present in court: the wording of questions, lineup instructions, confidence malleability, mug-shot-induced bias, postevent information, child witness suggestibility, attitudes and expectations, hypnotic suggestibility, alcoholic intoxication, the crossrace bias, weapon focus, the accuracy-confidence correlation, the forgetting curve, exposure time, presentation format, and unconscious transference. Results also indicate that these experts set high standards before agreeing to testify. Despite limitations, these results should help to shape expert testimony so that it more accurately represents opinions in the scientific community.


  • On the power of confession evidence: An experimental test of the fundamental difference hypothesis.

    by Saul M. Kassin, Katherine Neumann

    In Arizona v. Fulminante (1991), a U.S. Supreme Court majority stated that confessions are similar to, not fundamentally different from, other types of evidence. To evaluate this claim, three mock juror studies compared the impact of confessions to other common forms of evidence. In Experiment 1, participants read summaries of four criminal trials (murder, rape, assault, theft), each of which contained a confession, an eyewitness identification, character testimony, or none of the above. Significantly, the confessions produced the highest conviction rates. In Experiments 2 and 3, participants read a murder or assault trial containing all three types of evidence and made a series of midtrial judgments. Results indicated that the confession was seen as the most incriminating, followed by the eyewitness and character testimony. Although the comparisons we made are limited in certain respects, our findings suggest that confessions are uniquely potent.


  • Inadmissible Testimony, Instructions to Disregard, and the Jury: Substantive Versus Procedural Considerations

    by Saul M. Kassin, Samuel R. Sommers

    The present study tested the hypothesis that jurors comply selectively with instructions to disregard inadmissible evidence. A total of 81 mock jurors read a murder trial summary in which a wiretap was ruled admissible, inadmissible because it was not reliable, or inadmissible because it was illegally obtained (there was also a no-wiretap control group). As predicted, participants were more likely to vote guilty and interpret subsequent evidence as more incriminating in the admissible and inadmissible/due-process conditions than in the admissible/unreliable and control groups. These results suggest that jurors are influenced not by the judge's ruling per se but by the causal basis for that ruling. Conceptual and practical implications are discussed.