George A. Krause
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
George A. Krause has a total of 7 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Kristin Kanthak
University of Pittsburgh
5 shared publications - Daniel Carpenter
Harvard University
1 shared publication - David E. Lewis
Princeton University
1 shared publication Ian Palmer Cook
1 shared publication- J. Kevin Corder
Western Michigan University
1 shared publication - James W. Douglas
Department of Political Science & Public Administration University of North Carolina at Charlotte Charlotte North Carolina USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 4 November 2014
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Political Science Research and Methods
- Vol. 3 (2) , 243-264
Partisan Presidential Influence over US Federal Budgetary Outcomes: Evidence from a Stochastic Decomposition of Executive Budget Proposals
Can American presidents use their budget proposal authority to achieve their own partisan policy priorities? This is an important, yet challenging, question to answer since formal executive authority is ambiguous, and budgetary powers are shared in the US separation of powers system. Indeed, the question remains open since prior empirical designs conflate external constraints (arising from political and policy conditions) with those that reflect executive partisan policy priorities. This study advances a novel stochastic decomposition of executive budget proposals in order to analyze the extent to which presidents can shape the legislative funding of US federal agencies consistent with their own partisan policy priorities. Statistical evidence reveals that presidents exert partisan-based budgetary influence over appropriations that cannot be ascertained from previous empirical studies that rely on either the observed gap between presidential requests and congressional appropriations or standard instrumental variable estimation methods. The statistical evidence also indicates that presidents are marginally more effective at converting their partisan policy priorities into budgetary outcomes under divided party government. Contrary to theoretical predictions generated from bilateral veto bargaining models, presidents are also shown to exert effective partisan budgetary influence even when their budget requests exceed congressional appropriations.
- 4 November 2014
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Political Science Research and Methods
- Vol. 3 (2) , 243-264
Partisan Presidential Influence over US Federal Budgetary Outcomes: Evidence from a Stochastic Decomposition of Executive Budget Proposals
Can American presidents use their budget proposal authority to achieve their own partisan policy priorities? This is an important, yet challenging, question to answer since formal executive authority is ambiguous, and budgetary powers are shared in the US separation of powers system. Indeed, the question remains open since prior empirical designs conflate external constraints (arising from political and policy conditions) with those that reflect executive partisan policy priorities. This study advances a novel stochastic decomposition of executive budget proposals in order to analyze the extent to which presidents can shape the legislative funding of US federal agencies consistent with their own partisan policy priorities. Statistical evidence reveals that presidents exert partisan-based budgetary influence over appropriations that cannot be ascertained from previous empirical studies that rely on either the observed gap between presidential requests and congressional appropriations or standard instrumental variable estimation methods. The statistical evidence also indicates that presidents are marginally more effective at converting their partisan policy priorities into budgetary outcomes under divided party government. Contrary to theoretical predictions generated from bilateral veto bargaining models, presidents are also shown to exert effective partisan budgetary influence even when their budget requests exceed congressional appropriations.
- 4 June 2013
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Public Policy
- Vol. 33 (2) , 111-135
Representative democracy and policy-making in the administrative state: is agency policy-making necessarily better?
This study focuses on how voters and politicians rationally select a preferred policy-making venue (Politician or Agency), and its implications for the principal-agent relationship between voters and politicians in a representative democracy. This study allows for incomplete information, as well as solving for the comparative static conditions pertaining to the extent that a politician's policy-making venue choices mirror those preferred by a representative voter. The comparative static results highlight when a politician (1) chooses the representative voter's preferred policy-making venue (ActiveorPassive Political Responsiveness); (2) is able to choose freely either policy-making venue without committing agency loss (Political Discretion); and (3) willing to deviate from the representative voter's preferred policy-making venue (Political Shirking). In contrast to the study by Spence, this study analytically demonstrates that one cannot infer that the benefits accrued from agency policy-making will necessarily exceed those from electoral institutions.
- 4 June 2013
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Public Policy
- Vol. 33 (2) , 111-135
Representative democracy and policy-making in the administrative state: is agency policy-making necessarily better?
This study focuses on how voters and politicians rationally select a preferred policy-making venue (Politician or Agency), and its implications for the principal-agent relationship between voters and politicians in a representative democracy. This study allows for incomplete information, as well as solving for the comparative static conditions pertaining to the extent that a politician's policy-making venue choices mirror those preferred by a representative voter. The comparative static results highlight when a politician (1) chooses the representative voter's preferred policy-making venue (ActiveorPassive Political Responsiveness); (2) is able to choose freely either policy-making venue without committing agency loss (Political Discretion); and (3) willing to deviate from the representative voter's preferred policy-making venue (Political Shirking). In contrast to the study by Spence, this study analytically demonstrates that one cannot infer that the benefits accrued from agency policy-making will necessarily exceed those from electoral institutions.
- 13 August 2012
- Published by Wiley in American Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 57 (1) , 135-149
Organizational Structure and the Optimal Design of Policymaking Panels: Evidence from Consensus Group Commissions’ Revenue Forecasts in the American States
- 13 August 2012
- Published by Wiley in American Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 57 (1) , 135-149
Organizational Structure and the Optimal Design of Policymaking Panels: Evidence from Consensus Group Commissions’ Revenue Forecasts in the American States
- 1 June 2012
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 122-157
Can Organizational Mechanisms Solve Minority Group Coordination Problems? Logic, Lessons, and Evidence from Legislative Caucuses in the American States
This chapter explores the use of legislative member organizations, or caucuses, as catalysts for the type of coordination that was shown in the previous chapter to be beneficial for minority group members. The chapter posits the conditional coordination hypothesis, whereby minority groups receive the greatest benefits of coordination when their group size is neither too large nor too small. Drawing on a negative binomial regression estimation procedure, this chapter finds evidence that the presence of women’s caucuses in U.S. state legislatures are associated with a greater number of women serving as committee chairs. Specifically, having a formal women’s caucus unconditionally results in a greater number of committee chairs in lower chambers. In upper chambers, the results are conditioned on the group size: In keeping with the conditional coordination hypothesis, groups of moderate size receive the greatest benefit from having women’s caucuses, both of a formal and an informal nature.
- 1 June 2012
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 122-157
Can Organizational Mechanisms Solve Minority Group Coordination Problems? Logic, Lessons, and Evidence from Legislative Caucuses in the American States
This chapter explores the use of legislative member organizations, or caucuses, as catalysts for the type of coordination that was shown in the previous chapter to be beneficial for minority group members. The chapter posits the conditional coordination hypothesis, whereby minority groups receive the greatest benefits of coordination when their group size is neither too large nor too small. Drawing on a negative binomial regression estimation procedure, this chapter finds evidence that the presence of women’s caucuses in U.S. state legislatures are associated with a greater number of women serving as committee chairs. Specifically, having a formal women’s caucus unconditionally results in a greater number of committee chairs in lower chambers. In upper chambers, the results are conditioned on the group size: In keeping with the conditional coordination hypothesis, groups of moderate size receive the greatest benefit from having women’s caucuses, both of a formal and an informal nature.
- 1 June 2012
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 69-92
Testing the Unified Theory of Colleague Valuation in the U.S. House of Representatives
This chapter provides an empirical test of the formal model derived in the previous chapter, drawing on methods from the Empirical Implications of Theoretical Models (EITM) tradition. The dependent variable is member-to-member campaign contributions from legislators’ leadership PACs, which are PACs created for the sole purpose of channeling campaign contributions to other legislators. Although these contributions exist largely for electoral reasons, controlling for those reasons provides a measure of colleague valuation. The chapter describes a double-hurdle regression model, which is a generalization of the Tobit model that allows coefficients from the first and second stage to vary. The results show that as expected from the unified theory of colleague valuation, men devalue women more as the proportion of women increases. Contrary to the theory, women also devalue women as their proportion increases, a problem called asymmetric tokenism, which is addressed in more detail in the chapter that follows.
- 1 June 2012
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 69-92
Testing the Unified Theory of Colleague Valuation in the U.S. House of Representatives
This chapter provides an empirical test of the formal model derived in the previous chapter, drawing on methods from the Empirical Implications of Theoretical Models (EITM) tradition. The dependent variable is member-to-member campaign contributions from legislators’ leadership PACs, which are PACs created for the sole purpose of channeling campaign contributions to other legislators. Although these contributions exist largely for electoral reasons, controlling for those reasons provides a measure of colleague valuation. The chapter describes a double-hurdle regression model, which is a generalization of the Tobit model that allows coefficients from the first and second stage to vary. The results show that as expected from the unified theory of colleague valuation, men devalue women more as the proportion of women increases. Contrary to the theory, women also devalue women as their proportion increases, a problem called asymmetric tokenism, which is addressed in more detail in the chapter that follows.
- 1 June 2012
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 48-68
A Unified Theory of Colleague Valuation in Political Organizations
This chapter provides a unified theory of colleague valuation whereby individual legislators use diversity as a means to differentially discount colleagues whose policy preferences diverge from their own. That is, the tokenism logic advanced in the previous chapter is extended to account for the extent to which any pairwise set of colleagues that involve a ‘valuator’ (i.e., donor) and the ‘valuatee’ (i.e., the recipient) share policy perspectives. Drawing on the insights from Kanter’s tokenism framework, we construct a rational choice model of colleague valuation whereby ‘valuators’ receive utility from ‘valuatees,’ based on an interaction between group size and preference divergence. The chapter then outlines several testable implications of the formal model.
- 1 June 2012
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 48-68
A Unified Theory of Colleague Valuation in Political Organizations
This chapter provides a unified theory of colleague valuation whereby individual legislators use diversity as a means to differentially discount colleagues whose policy preferences diverge from their own. That is, the tokenism logic advanced in the previous chapter is extended to account for the extent to which any pairwise set of colleagues that involve a ‘valuator’ (i.e., donor) and the ‘valuatee’ (i.e., the recipient) share policy perspectives. Drawing on the insights from Kanter’s tokenism framework, we construct a rational choice model of colleague valuation whereby ‘valuators’ receive utility from ‘valuatees,’ based on an interaction between group size and preference divergence. The chapter then outlines several testable implications of the formal model.
- 1 June 2012
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 3-16
Diversity Dilemmas in Democratic Representation
This chapter outlines The Diversity Paradox - the notion that the power a minority group wields in a political organization may actually decrease as the group’s numbers increase. It explains the importance of this issue, since the Diversity Paradox challenges the conventional wisdom that increasing descriptive representation (numbers) will lead to increased substantive representation (outcomes). The chapter goes on to describe the five counterintuitive lessons of the Diversity Paradox, and to discuss why the book focuses on the cases of women in the U.S. House of Representatives, the U.S. Senate, and state legislatures. The chapter also outlines the structure of the remainder of the book.
- 1 June 2012
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 3-16
Diversity Dilemmas in Democratic Representation
This chapter outlines The Diversity Paradox - the notion that the power a minority group wields in a political organization may actually decrease as the group’s numbers increase. It explains the importance of this issue, since the Diversity Paradox challenges the conventional wisdom that increasing descriptive representation (numbers) will lead to increased substantive representation (outcomes). The chapter goes on to describe the five counterintuitive lessons of the Diversity Paradox, and to discuss why the book focuses on the cases of women in the U.S. House of Representatives, the U.S. Senate, and state legislatures. The chapter also outlines the structure of the remainder of the book.
- Top Cited Papers
- 15 November 2011
- Published by Wiley in Public Administration Review
- Vol. 72 (1) , 26-32
Reputation and Public Administration
This article examines the application of organizational reputation to public administration. Organizational reputation is defined as a set of beliefs about an organization’s capacities, intentions, history, and mission that are embedded in a network of multiple audiences. The authors assert that the way in which organizational reputations are formed and subsequently cultivated is fundamental to understanding the role of public administration in a democracy. A review of the basic assumptions and empirical work on organizational reputation in the public sector identifies a series of stylized facts that extends our understanding of the functioning of public agencies. In particular, the authors examine the relationship between organizational reputation and bureaucratic autonomy.
- 15 November 2011
- Published by Wiley in Public Administration Review
- Vol. 72 (1) , 26-32
Top Cited PapersReputation and Public Administration
This article examines the application of organizational reputation to public administration. Organizational reputation is defined as a set of beliefs about an organization’s capacities, intentions, history, and mission that are embedded in a network of multiple audiences. The authors assert that the way in which organizational reputations are formed and subsequently cultivated is fundamental to understanding the role of public administration in a democracy. A review of the basic assumptions and empirical work on organizational reputation in the public sector identifies a series of stylized facts that extends our understanding of the functioning of public agencies. In particular, the authors examine the relationship between organizational reputation and bureaucratic autonomy.
- 21 July 2010
- Published by Wiley in American Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 54 (4) , 839-854
Valuing Diversity in Political Organizations: Gender and Token Minorities in the U.S. House of Representatives
Political scientists are keenly interested in how diversity influences politics, yet we know little about how diverse groups of political actors interact. We advance a unified theory of colleague valuation to address this puzzle. The theory explains how minority group size affects how members of a political organization differentially value majority and minority group colleagues, predicting that the effect of preference divergence on individual‐level colleague valuation is greatest when the minority group is smallest. We test this prediction using member‐to‐member leadership political action committee (PAC) contributions in the U.S. House of Representatives. The results obtain strong, albeit not uniform, support for the theory, demonstrating that the gender gap in colleague valuations declines as preference divergence increases in all but one instance. In contrast to conventional wisdom, the theory and evidence indicate that women serving in the U.S. House of Representatives receive less support from men colleagues as their ranks increase.
- 21 July 2010
- Published by Wiley in American Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 54 (4) , 839-854
Valuing Diversity in Political Organizations: Gender and Token Minorities in the U.S. House of Representatives
Political scientists are keenly interested in how diversity influences politics, yet we know little about how diverse groups of political actors interact. We advance a unified theory of colleague valuation to address this puzzle. The theory explains how minority group size affects how members of a political organization differentially value majority and minority group colleagues, predicting that the effect of preference divergence on individual‐level colleague valuation is greatest when the minority group is smallest. We test this prediction using member‐to‐member leadership political action committee (PAC) contributions in the U.S. House of Representatives. The results obtain strong, albeit not uniform, support for the theory, demonstrating that the gender gap in colleague valuations declines as preference divergence increases in all but one instance. In contrast to conventional wisdom, the theory and evidence indicate that women serving in the U.S. House of Representatives receive less support from men colleagues as their ranks increase.
- 5 February 2007
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Political Science Review
- Vol. 101 (1) , 129-142
Explaining Bureaucratic Optimism: Theory and Evidence from U.S. Executive Agency Macroeconomic Forecasts
We offer a theory of intertemporal bureaucratic decision making which proposes that an agency's forecast optimism is related to the extent to which it discounts future reputation costs associated with bureaucratic incompetence. Agency forecasts of the distant future are more likely to be optimistic than short-term forecasts. We claim that unstable organizations will discount reputation costs at a steeper rate than stable organizations, and therefore will produce more optimistic forecasts. We test our theory using macroeconomic forecasts produced by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Social Security Administration (SSA) across six forecast horizons from 1979 to 2003. The statistical results are generally consistent with our theory: OMB generates more optimistic long-term forecasts than SSA. Further, differences in forecast optimism between these executive branch agencies widen as the forecast horizon increases. Our evidence suggests that more stable agencies place a premium on minimizing reputation costs. Conversely, less stable agencies are more likely to accommodate political pressures for forecast optimism. These findings underscore the importance of institutional design for understanding how executive agencies balance the conflicting goals of political responsiveness and bureaucratic competence within the administrative state.
- 5 February 2007
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Political Science Review
- Vol. 101 (1) , 129-142
Explaining Bureaucratic Optimism: Theory and Evidence from U.S. Executive Agency Macroeconomic Forecasts
We offer a theory of intertemporal bureaucratic decision making which proposes that an agency's forecast optimism is related to the extent to which it discounts future reputation costs associated with bureaucratic incompetence. Agency forecasts of the distant future are more likely to be optimistic than short-term forecasts. We claim that unstable organizations will discount reputation costs at a steeper rate than stable organizations, and therefore will produce more optimistic forecasts. We test our theory using macroeconomic forecasts produced by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Social Security Administration (SSA) across six forecast horizons from 1979 to 2003. The statistical results are generally consistent with our theory: OMB generates more optimistic long-term forecasts than SSA. Further, differences in forecast optimism between these executive branch agencies widen as the forecast horizon increases. Our evidence suggests that more stable agencies place a premium on minimizing reputation costs. Conversely, less stable agencies are more likely to accommodate political pressures for forecast optimism. These findings underscore the importance of institutional design for understanding how executive agencies balance the conflicting goals of political responsiveness and bureaucratic competence within the administrative state.