Michael A. Neblo
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Michael A. Neblo has a total of 16 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Kevin M. Esterling
University of California Riverside
18 shared publications David M. J. Lazer
11 shared publications- David Lazer
Northeastern University
3 shared publications David M.J. Lazer
3 shared publicationsAvery White
Ohio State University Institute for Democratic Engagement & Accountability (IDEA)
2 shared publications- Anand Edward Sokhey
University of Colorado
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 27 November 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The American Journal of Bioethics
- Vol. 23 (12) , 90-92
Varieties of Citizen Engagement in Deliberation about Biotechnology
- 27 November 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The American Journal of Bioethics
- Vol. 23 (12) , 90-92
Varieties of Citizen Engagement in Deliberation about Biotechnology
- 1 July 2022
- Published by American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) in Science
- Vol. 377 (6601) , 38
The digital citizen Dignity in a Digital Age Ro Khanna Simon & Schuster, 2022. 368 pp. The Digital Republic Jamie Susskind Pegasus, 2022. 304 pp.
Two new books advocate for technological agency
- 1 July 2022
- Published by American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) in Science
- Vol. 377 (6601) , 38
The digital citizen Dignity in a Digital Age Ro Khanna Simon & Schuster, 2022. 368 pp. The Digital Republic Jamie Susskind Pegasus, 2022. 304 pp.
Two new books advocate for technological agency
- Open Access
- 10 March 2022
- Published by University of Westminster Press in Journal of Deliberative Democracy
- Vol. 18 (2)
Active Is as Active Does: Deliberative and Non-Deliberative Political Communication in Context
The development of theories of citizens’ political communication has been hindered by a debate over whether such communication is best characterized as deliberative or non-deliberative. This article aims to overcome that impasse with a new account of citizens’ political communication informed by theories of message production and sense-making: the goals–sense-making–justification (GSJ) model. This model holds that citizens’ political-communicative behavior is influenced by multiple goals and cognitive plans, which generally vary in different contexts. This variation helps to explain why citizens’ informal political discussions during non-election periods rarely feature reason-giving—and so can be understood as non-deliberative—whereas such discussions during major-election campaigns often feature the reason-giving that is characteristic of deliberation. Moreover, the model demonstrates how cognitive plans developed in informal political discussions over repeated major-election cycles enable citizens to engage competently in reason-giving during formal deliberations.
- 10 March 2022
- Published by University of Westminster Press in Journal of Deliberative Democracy
- Vol. 18 (2)
Open AccessActive Is as Active Does: Deliberative and Non-Deliberative Political Communication in Context
The development of theories of citizens’ political communication has been hindered by a debate over whether such communication is best characterized as deliberative or non-deliberative. This article aims to overcome that impasse with a new account of citizens’ political communication informed by theories of message production and sense-making: the goals–sense-making–justification (GSJ) model. This model holds that citizens’ political-communicative behavior is influenced by multiple goals and cognitive plans, which generally vary in different contexts. This variation helps to explain why citizens’ informal political discussions during non-election periods rarely feature reason-giving—and so can be understood as non-deliberative—whereas such discussions during major-election campaigns often feature the reason-giving that is characteristic of deliberation. Moreover, the model demonstrates how cognitive plans developed in informal political discussions over repeated major-election cycles enable citizens to engage competently in reason-giving during formal deliberations.
- 5 July 2021
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Political Science Review
- Vol. 115 (4) , 1524-1529
A Plague on Politics? The COVID Crisis, Expertise, and the Future of Legitimation
Governments rely more and more on experts to manage the increasingly complex problems posed by a growing, diversifying, globalizing world. Surplus technocracy, however, usually comes with deficits of democracy. While especially true in liberal regimes, authoritarian states often face parallel dynamics. Recent trends illustrate how technocratic encroachment on civil society’s prerogatives can provoke populist backlash. Such cycles can build toward crises by eroding the legitimacy citizens invest in regimes. Surprisingly, by throwing both the need for and limits of expertise into sharp relief, the politics of COVID-19 create a novel opportunity to disrupt these trends. We assess how this opportunity may be unfolding in two crucial cases, the United States and China, and, more briefly, South Korea. We conclude by sketching some theoretical considerations to guide a geographically expanded and temporally extended research agenda on this important opportunity to slow or reverse a trend plaguing modern governance.
- 5 July 2021
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Political Science Review
- Vol. 115 (4) , 1524-1529
A Plague on Politics? The COVID Crisis, Expertise, and the Future of Legitimation
Governments rely more and more on experts to manage the increasingly complex problems posed by a growing, diversifying, globalizing world. Surplus technocracy, however, usually comes with deficits of democracy. While especially true in liberal regimes, authoritarian states often face parallel dynamics. Recent trends illustrate how technocratic encroachment on civil society’s prerogatives can provoke populist backlash. Such cycles can build toward crises by eroding the legitimacy citizens invest in regimes. Surprisingly, by throwing both the need for and limits of expertise into sharp relief, the politics of COVID-19 create a novel opportunity to disrupt these trends. We assess how this opportunity may be unfolding in two crucial cases, the United States and China, and, more briefly, South Korea. We conclude by sketching some theoretical considerations to guide a geographically expanded and temporally extended research agenda on this important opportunity to slow or reverse a trend plaguing modern governance.
- 7 December 2020
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in The Journal of Race, Ethnicity, and Politics
- Vol. 6 (1) , 144-156
The Civic Culture(s): Groups, Norms, and the Health of Democracy
Democratic institutions need a healthy “civic culture” to function well. Many worry that civic cultures today are decaying in the United States and other established democracies. We note two problems with these assessments. First, there are several ways to measure civic culture, but scholars typically focus only on their preferred approach. Second, most scholars assume a single civic culture, despite racial, ethnic, class, and other differences. So talk of “the” civic culture erases non-dominant groups. Without a framework to integrate different approaches and account for group variation, we cannot assess decline, nor specify for whom. And without those, we are unable to intervene to make things better. We introduce a theory of civic culture as a system of norms that integrates the main approaches to measuring civic culture and does so in a way that leads to a principled framework for understanding racial, ethnic, and other group variation within countries.
- 7 December 2020
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in The Journal of Race, Ethnicity, and Politics
- Vol. 6 (1) , 144-156
The Civic Culture(s): Groups, Norms, and the Health of Democracy
Democratic institutions need a healthy “civic culture” to function well. Many worry that civic cultures today are decaying in the United States and other established democracies. We note two problems with these assessments. First, there are several ways to measure civic culture, but scholars typically focus only on their preferred approach. Second, most scholars assume a single civic culture, despite racial, ethnic, class, and other differences. So talk of “the” civic culture erases non-dominant groups. Without a framework to integrate different approaches and account for group variation, we cannot assess decline, nor specify for whom. And without those, we are unable to intervene to make things better. We introduce a theory of civic culture as a system of norms that integrates the main approaches to measuring civic culture and does so in a way that leads to a principled framework for understanding racial, ethnic, and other group variation within countries.
- Top Cited Papers
- 11 May 2020
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Political Science Review
- Vol. 114 (3) , 923-927
Impassioned Democracy: The Roles of Emotion in Deliberative Theory
In ordinary language, people often treat emotion as the opposite of reason. Deliberative democrats, however, typically use “reason” in a rather different way. They regard arbitrary power, not emotion, as the opposite of reason. Emotion, then, is not at all contrary to reason. Critics who rely on ordinary language to claim that deliberative democrats denigrate emotion are likely to misconstrue how both reason and emotion are deployed. In fact, most deliberative democrats have always assigned emotion an indispensable role in their theories. That said, emotion’s role in deliberation needs more, and more systematic, elaboration. I identify twelve distinct roles for emotion in deliberative theory and practice, clearing the way for a more fruitful research agenda on the role of emotion in democratic deliberation.
- 11 May 2020
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Political Science Review
- Vol. 114 (3) , 923-927
Top Cited PapersImpassioned Democracy: The Roles of Emotion in Deliberative Theory
In ordinary language, people often treat emotion as the opposite of reason. Deliberative democrats, however, typically use “reason” in a rather different way. They regard arbitrary power, not emotion, as the opposite of reason. Emotion, then, is not at all contrary to reason. Critics who rely on ordinary language to claim that deliberative democrats denigrate emotion are likely to misconstrue how both reason and emotion are deployed. In fact, most deliberative democrats have always assigned emotion an indispensable role in their theories. That said, emotion’s role in deliberation needs more, and more systematic, elaboration. I identify twelve distinct roles for emotion in deliberative theory and practice, clearing the way for a more fruitful research agenda on the role of emotion in democratic deliberation.
- 17 August 2018
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- p. 1-22
Introduction
- 17 August 2018
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- p. 53-68
Half of Democracy
- 17 August 2018
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- p. 69-83
Rational Ignorance and Reasonable Learning
- 17 August 2018
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- p. 69-83
Rational Ignorance and Reasonable Learning
- 17 August 2018
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- p. 113-125
Scaling Up and Scaling Out