John A. Edwards
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
John A. Edwards has a total of 11 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Gifford Weary
Ohio State University
2 shared publications Aaron L. Wichman
1 shared publicationAngela Templeton
1 shared publicationDavid M. Hamby
Department of Psychology, Oregon State University, Corvallis, OR, USA . 2 School of Public Health, Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA . 3 Department of Human Development and Family Science, Oregon State University, Corvallis, OR, USA . 4 Department of Radiation and Health Physics, Oregon State University, Corvallis, OR, USA
1 shared publicationFrank J. Snyder
Department of Psychology, Oregon State University, Corvallis, OR, USA . 2 School of Public Health, Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA . 3 Department of Human Development and Family Science, Oregon State University, Corvallis, OR, USA . 4 Department of Radiation and Health Physics, Oregon State University, Corvallis, OR, USA
1 shared publicationGifford Weary
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 22 May 2012
- Published by Wiley in Risk Analysis
- Vol. 32 (12) , 2055-2070
Decision Making for Risk Management: A Comparison of Graphical Methods for Presenting Quantitative Uncertainty
Previous research has shown that people err when making decisions aided by probability information. Surprisingly, there has been little exploration into the accuracy of decisions made based on many commonly used probabilistic display methods. Two experiments examined the ability of a comprehensive set of such methods to effectively communicate critical information to a decision maker and influence confidence in decision making. The second experiment investigated the performance of these methods under time pressure, a situational factor known to exacerbate judgmental errors. Ten commonly used graphical display methods were randomly assigned to participants. Across eight scenarios in which a probabilistic outcome was described, participants were asked questions regarding graph interpretation (e.g., mean) and made behavioral choices (i.e., act; do not act) based on the provided information indicated that decision‐maker accuracy differed by graphical method; error bars and boxplots led to greatest mean estimation and behavioral choice accuracy whereas complementary cumulative probability distribution functions were associated with the highest probability estimation accuracy. Under time pressure, participant performance decreased when making behavioral choices.
- 22 May 2012
- Published by Wiley in Risk Analysis
- Vol. 32 (12) , 2055-2070
Decision Making for Risk Management: A Comparison of Graphical Methods for Presenting Quantitative Uncertainty
Previous research has shown that people err when making decisions aided by probability information. Surprisingly, there has been little exploration into the accuracy of decisions made based on many commonly used probabilistic display methods. Two experiments examined the ability of a comprehensive set of such methods to effectively communicate critical information to a decision maker and influence confidence in decision making. The second experiment investigated the performance of these methods under time pressure, a situational factor known to exacerbate judgmental errors. Ten commonly used graphical display methods were randomly assigned to participants. Across eight scenarios in which a probabilistic outcome was described, participants were asked questions regarding graph interpretation (e.g., mean) and made behavioral choices (i.e., act; do not act) based on the provided information indicated that decision‐maker accuracy differed by graphical method; error bars and boxplots led to greatest mean estimation and behavioral choice accuracy whereas complementary cumulative probability distribution functions were associated with the highest probability estimation accuracy. Under time pressure, participant performance decreased when making behavioral choices.
- 13 September 2008
- Published by Wiley in European Journal of Social Psychology
- Vol. 39 (5) , 694-706
Causal uncertainty as a chronically accessible construct
Causal uncertainty refers to feelings that one may not understand the causes of events. A number of studies have shown that causal uncertainty has significant effects on people's processing of information and on important life outcomes. Weary and Edwards have postulated that causal uncertainty is, in part, a cognitive construct that can vary in its accessibility. This assumption has allowed for a variety of predictions to be made about the causes and consequences of causal uncertainty. However, this accessibility assumption has never been directly tested. To do this, in Study 1 an emotional Stroop procedure was used. Higher causal uncertainty was associated with longer latencies to name the color in which causal uncertainty‐related words were written compared to uncertainty‐irrelevant words. In Study 2, both manipulated and chronic causal uncertainty led to faster times to respond to causal uncertainty‐related stimuli in an attitude accessibility task. Both studies are consistent with the theoretically predicted chronic accessibility of causal uncertainty beliefs. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
- 13 September 2008
- Published by Wiley in European Journal of Social Psychology
- Vol. 39 (5) , 694-706
Causal uncertainty as a chronically accessible construct
Causal uncertainty refers to feelings that one may not understand the causes of events. A number of studies have shown that causal uncertainty has significant effects on people's processing of information and on important life outcomes. Weary and Edwards have postulated that causal uncertainty is, in part, a cognitive construct that can vary in its accessibility. This assumption has allowed for a variety of predictions to be made about the causes and consequences of causal uncertainty. However, this accessibility assumption has never been directly tested. To do this, in Study 1 an emotional Stroop procedure was used. Higher causal uncertainty was associated with longer latencies to name the color in which causal uncertainty‐related words were written compared to uncertainty‐irrelevant words. In Study 2, both manipulated and chronic causal uncertainty led to faster times to respond to causal uncertainty‐related stimuli in an attitude accessibility task. Both studies are consistent with the theoretically predicted chronic accessibility of causal uncertainty beliefs. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
- 15 November 2005
- Published by Wiley in European Journal of Social Psychology
- Vol. 35 (6) , 705-723
The structure of perceived qualities of situations
- 15 November 2005
- Published by Wiley in European Journal of Social Psychology
- Vol. 35 (6) , 705-723
The structure of perceived qualities of situations
- 1 April 2003
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Research in Personality
- Vol. 37 (2) , 89-99
The interactive effects of processing preference and motivation on information processing: Causal uncertainty and the MBTI in a persuasion context
- 1 April 2003
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Research in Personality
- Vol. 37 (2) , 89-99
The interactive effects of processing preference and motivation on information processing: Causal uncertainty and the MBTI in a persuasion context
- 1 January 2001
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
- Vol. 81 (2) , 206-219
Chronic and temporarily activated causal uncertainty beliefs and stereotype usage.
In 3 studies, we examined the hypothesis that the effects of stereotype usage on target judgments are moderated by causal uncertainty beliefs and related accuracy goal structures. In Study 1, we focused on the role of chronically accessible causal uncertainty beliefs as predictors of a target's level of guilt for an alleged academic misconduct offense. In Study 2, we examined the role of chronic causal uncertainty reduction goals and a manipulated accuracy goal; in Study 3, we investigated the role of primed causal uncertainty beliefs on guilt judgments. In all 3 studies, we found that activation of causal uncertainty beliefs and accuracy concerns was related to a reduced usage of stereotypes. Moreover, this reduction was not associated with participants' levels of perceived control, depression, state affect, need for cognition, or personal need for structure. Results are discussed in terms of their implications for the model of causal uncertainty and, more generally, in terms of the motivational processes underlying stereotype usage.
- 1 January 2001
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
- Vol. 81 (2) , 206-219
Chronic and temporarily activated causal uncertainty beliefs and stereotype usage.
In 3 studies, we examined the hypothesis that the effects of stereotype usage on target judgments are moderated by causal uncertainty beliefs and related accuracy goal structures. In Study 1, we focused on the role of chronically accessible causal uncertainty beliefs as predictors of a target's level of guilt for an alleged academic misconduct offense. In Study 2, we examined the role of chronic causal uncertainty reduction goals and a manipulated accuracy goal; in Study 3, we investigated the role of primed causal uncertainty beliefs on guilt judgments. In all 3 studies, we found that activation of causal uncertainty beliefs and accuracy concerns was related to a reduced usage of stereotypes. Moreover, this reduction was not associated with participants' levels of perceived control, depression, state affect, need for cognition, or personal need for structure. Results are discussed in terms of their implications for the model of causal uncertainty and, more generally, in terms of the motivational processes underlying stereotype usage.