Jean-Christophe Vergnaud
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Jean-Christophe Vergnaud has a total of 78 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Olivier Chanel
Aix-Marseille Univ, CNRS, EHESS, AMSE, Marseille Cedex 01, France
8 shared publications - Sébastien Massoni
Université de Lorraine, Université de Strasbourg, CNRS, BETA, Nancy, France
7 shared publications - Vincent de Gardelle
CNRS and Paris School of Economics, 75013 Paris, France
6 shared publications - Guillaume Hollard
CREST -Ecole Polytechnique -IP Paris
3 shared publications - Jean-Marc Tallon
Paris School of Economics, CNRS, Paris, France
3 shared publications - Quentin Cavalan
Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, CNRS
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 1 September 2023
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
- Vol. 152 (9) , 2544-2558
From local to global estimations of confidence in perceptual decisions.
Perceptual confidence has been an important topic recently. However, one key limitation in current approaches is that most studies have focused on confidence judgments made for single decisions. In three experiments, we investigate how these local confidence judgments relate and contribute to global confidence judgments, by which observers summarize their performance over a series of perceptual decisions. We report two main results. First, we find that participants exhibit more overconfidence in their local than in their global judgments of performance, an observation mirroring the aggregation effect in knowledge-based decisions. We further show that this effect is specific to confidence judgments and does not reflect a calculation bias. Second, we document a novel effect by which participants' global confidence is larger for sets which are more heterogeneous in terms of difficulty, even when actual performance is controlled for. Surprisingly, we find that this effect of variability also occurs at the level of local confidence judgments, in a manner that fully explains the effect at the global level. Overall, our results indicate that global confidence is based on local confidence, although these two processes can be partially dissociated. We discuss possible theoretical accounts to relate and empirical investigations of how observers develop and use a global sense of perceptual confidence. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).
- 1 September 2023
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
- Vol. 152 (9) , 2544-2558
From local to global estimations of confidence in perceptual decisions.
Perceptual confidence has been an important topic recently. However, one key limitation in current approaches is that most studies have focused on confidence judgments made for single decisions. In three experiments, we investigate how these local confidence judgments relate and contribute to global confidence judgments, by which observers summarize their performance over a series of perceptual decisions. We report two main results. First, we find that participants exhibit more overconfidence in their local than in their global judgments of performance, an observation mirroring the aggregation effect in knowledge-based decisions. We further show that this effect is specific to confidence judgments and does not reflect a calculation bias. Second, we document a novel effect by which participants' global confidence is larger for sets which are more heterogeneous in terms of difficulty, even when actual performance is controlled for. Surprisingly, we find that this effect of variability also occurs at the level of local confidence judgments, in a manner that fully explains the effect at the global level. Overall, our results indicate that global confidence is based on local confidence, although these two processes can be partially dissociated. We discuss possible theoretical accounts to relate and empirical investigations of how observers develop and use a global sense of perceptual confidence. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).
- Open Access
- 17 April 2023
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
From local to global estimations of confidence in perceptual decisions
Perceptual confidence has been an important topic recently. However, one key limitation in current approaches is that most studies have focused on confidence judgments made for single decisions. In three experiments, we investigate how these local confidence judgments relate and contribute to global confidence judgments, by which observers summarize their performance over a series of perceptual decisions. We report two main results. First, we find that participants exhibit more overconfidence in their local than in their global judgments of performance, an observation mirroring the aggregation effect in knowledge-based decisions. We further show that this effect is specific to confidence judgments and does not reflect a calculation bias. Second, we document a novel effect by which participants’ global confidence is larger for sets which are more heterogeneous in terms of difficulty, even when actual performance is controlled for. Surprisingly, we find that this effect of variability also occurs at the level of local confidence judgments, in a manner that fully explains the effect at the global level. Overall, our results indicate that global confidence is based on local confidence, although these two processes can be partially dissociated. We discuss possible theoretical accounts to relate and empirical investigations of how observers develop and use a global sense of perceptual confidence.
- 17 April 2023
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessFrom local to global estimations of confidence in perceptual decisions
Perceptual confidence has been an important topic recently. However, one key limitation in current approaches is that most studies have focused on confidence judgments made for single decisions. In three experiments, we investigate how these local confidence judgments relate and contribute to global confidence judgments, by which observers summarize their performance over a series of perceptual decisions. We report two main results. First, we find that participants exhibit more overconfidence in their local than in their global judgments of performance, an observation mirroring the aggregation effect in knowledge-based decisions. We further show that this effect is specific to confidence judgments and does not reflect a calculation bias. Second, we document a novel effect by which participants’ global confidence is larger for sets which are more heterogeneous in terms of difficulty, even when actual performance is controlled for. Surprisingly, we find that this effect of variability also occurs at the level of local confidence judgments, in a manner that fully explains the effect at the global level. Overall, our results indicate that global confidence is based on local confidence, although these two processes can be partially dissociated. We discuss possible theoretical accounts to relate and empirical investigations of how observers develop and use a global sense of perceptual confidence.
- 1 April 2023
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance
- Vol. 49 (4) , 537-548
How overconfidence bias influences suboptimality in perceptual decision making.
In perceptual decision making, it is often found that human observers combine sensory information and prior knowledge suboptimally. Typically, in detection tasks, when an alternative is a priori more likely to occur, observers choose it more frequently to account for the unequal base rate but not to the extent they should, a phenomenon referred to as "conservative decision bias" (i.e., observers do not shift their decision criterion enough). One theoretical explanation of this phenomenon is that observers are overconfident in their ability to interpret sensory information, resulting in overweighting the sensory information relative to prior knowledge. Here, we derived formally this candidate model, and we tested it in a visual discrimination task in which we manipulated the prior probabilities of occurrence of the stimuli. We measured confidence in decisions and decision criterion placement in two separate experimental sessions for the same participants (N = 69). Both overconfidence bias and conservative decision bias were found in our data, but critically the link that was predicted between these two quantities was absent. Our data suggested instead that when informed about the a priori probability, overconfident participants put less effort into processing sensory information. These findings offer new perspectives on the role of overconfidence bias to explain suboptimal decisions. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).
- 1 April 2023
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance
- Vol. 49 (4) , 537-548
How overconfidence bias influences suboptimality in perceptual decision making.
In perceptual decision making, it is often found that human observers combine sensory information and prior knowledge suboptimally. Typically, in detection tasks, when an alternative is a priori more likely to occur, observers choose it more frequently to account for the unequal base rate but not to the extent they should, a phenomenon referred to as "conservative decision bias" (i.e., observers do not shift their decision criterion enough). One theoretical explanation of this phenomenon is that observers are overconfident in their ability to interpret sensory information, resulting in overweighting the sensory information relative to prior knowledge. Here, we derived formally this candidate model, and we tested it in a visual discrimination task in which we manipulated the prior probabilities of occurrence of the stimuli. We measured confidence in decisions and decision criterion placement in two separate experimental sessions for the same participants (N = 69). Both overconfidence bias and conservative decision bias were found in our data, but critically the link that was predicted between these two quantities was absent. Our data suggested instead that when informed about the a priori probability, overconfident participants put less effort into processing sensory information. These findings offer new perspectives on the role of overconfidence bias to explain suboptimal decisions. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).
- 1 October 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Psychology
- Vol. 93
I did most of the work! Three sources of bias in bargaining with joint production
- 1 October 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Psychology
- Vol. 93
I did most of the work! Three sources of bias in bargaining with joint production
- 5 March 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Defence and Peace Economics
- Vol. 34 (5) , 660-683
Does Affective Forecasting Error Induce Changes in Preferences? Lessons from Danish Soldiers Anticipating Combat in Afghanistan
This paper investigates how affective forecasting errors (A.F.E.s), the difference between anticipated emotion and the emotion actually experienced, may induce changes in preferences on time, risk and occupation after combat. Building on psychological theories incorporating the role of emotion in decision-making, we designed a before-and-after-mission survey for Danish soldiers deployed to Afghanistan in 2011. Our hypothesis of an effect from A.F.E.s is tested by controlling for other mechanisms that may also change preferences: immediate emotion, trauma effect – proxied by post-traumatic stress disorder (P.T.S.D.) – and changes in wealth and risk perception. At the aggregate level, results show stable preferences before and after mission. We find positive A.F.E.s for all three emotions studied (fear, anxiety and excitement), with anticipated emotions stronger than those actually experienced. We provide evidence that positive A.F.E.s regarding fear significantly increase risk tolerance and impatience, while positive A.F.E.s regarding excitement strengthen the will to stay in the military. Trauma has no impact on these preferences.
- 5 March 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Defence and Peace Economics
- Vol. 34 (5) , 660-683
Does Affective Forecasting Error Induce Changes in Preferences? Lessons from Danish Soldiers Anticipating Combat in Afghanistan
This paper investigates how affective forecasting errors (A.F.E.s), the difference between anticipated emotion and the emotion actually experienced, may induce changes in preferences on time, risk and occupation after combat. Building on psychological theories incorporating the role of emotion in decision-making, we designed a before-and-after-mission survey for Danish soldiers deployed to Afghanistan in 2011. Our hypothesis of an effect from A.F.E.s is tested by controlling for other mechanisms that may also change preferences: immediate emotion, trauma effect – proxied by post-traumatic stress disorder (P.T.S.D.) – and changes in wealth and risk perception. At the aggregate level, results show stable preferences before and after mission. We find positive A.F.E.s for all three emotions studied (fear, anxiety and excitement), with anticipated emotions stronger than those actually experienced. We provide evidence that positive A.F.E.s regarding fear significantly increase risk tolerance and impatience, while positive A.F.E.s regarding excitement strengthen the will to stay in the military. Trauma has no impact on these preferences.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2021
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Judgment and Decision Making
- Vol. 16 (4) , 932-949
How economic success shapes redistribution: The role of self-serving beliefs, in-group bias and justice principles
In the face of economic inequalities, redistribution of wealth is a key debate for society, and understanding the reasons why individuals may support more or less redistribution can inform this debate. Here we investigate the mechanisms by which experiencing success in a task decreases the support for redistribution of the wealth generated by the task, such that overachievers favor less redistribution than underachievers. In a laboratory experiment, we replicate this effect and explore how it that may be mediated by an in-group bias, or by changes in individuals’ principles of redistributive justice. Critically, both in-group favoritism and self-serving adjustments of justice principles partially accounted for the effect of status on redistribution choices. Our study thus sheds new light on the various ways by which economic experience affects support for redistribution.
- 1 January 2021
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Judgment and Decision Making
- Vol. 16 (4) , 932-949
Open AccessHow economic success shapes redistribution: The role of self-serving beliefs, in-group bias and justice principles
In the face of economic inequalities, redistribution of wealth is a key debate for society, and understanding the reasons why individuals may support more or less redistribution can inform this debate. Here we investigate the mechanisms by which experiencing success in a task decreases the support for redistribution of the wealth generated by the task, such that overachievers favor less redistribution than underachievers. In a laboratory experiment, we replicate this effect and explore how it that may be mediated by an in-group bias, or by changes in individuals’ principles of redistributive justice. Critically, both in-group favoritism and self-serving adjustments of justice principles partially accounted for the effect of status on redistribution choices. Our study thus sheds new light on the various ways by which economic experience affects support for redistribution.
- Open Access
Confidence in perceptual decision-making is preserved in schizophrenia
Metacognition is the set of reflexive processes allowing humans to evaluate the accuracy of their mental operations. Deficits in synthetic metacognition have been described in schizophrenia using mostly narrative assessment and linked to several key symptoms. Here, we assessed metacognitive performance by asking individuals with schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder (N=20) and matched healthy participants (N = 21) to perform a visual discrimination task and subsequently report confidence in their performance. Metacognitive performance was defined as the adequacy between visual discrimination performance and confidence. Bayesian analyses revealed equivalent metacognitive performance in the two groups despite a weaker association between confidence and trajectory tracking during task execution among patients. These results were reproduced using a bounded evidence accumulation model which showed similar decisional processes in the two groups. The inability to accurately attune confidence to perceptual decisions in schizophrenia remains to be experimentally demonstrated, along with the way such impairments may underpin functional deficits.
Open AccessConfidence in perceptual decision-making is preserved in schizophrenia
Metacognition is the set of reflexive processes allowing humans to evaluate the accuracy of their mental operations. Deficits in synthetic metacognition have been described in schizophrenia using mostly narrative assessment and linked to several key symptoms. Here, we assessed metacognitive performance by asking individuals with schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder (N=20) and matched healthy participants (N = 21) to perform a visual discrimination task and subsequently report confidence in their performance. Metacognitive performance was defined as the adequacy between visual discrimination performance and confidence. Bayesian analyses revealed equivalent metacognitive performance in the two groups despite a weaker association between confidence and trajectory tracking during task execution among patients. These results were reproduced using a bounded evidence accumulation model which showed similar decisional processes in the two groups. The inability to accurately attune confidence to perceptual decisions in schizophrenia remains to be experimentally demonstrated, along with the way such impairments may underpin functional deficits.
- 1 January 2016
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 553-575
Exploring the Role of Emotions in Decisions Involving Catastrophic Risks: Lessons from a Double Investigation
- 1 January 2016
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 553-575
Exploring the Role of Emotions in Decisions Involving Catastrophic Risks: Lessons from a Double Investigation
- Open Access
- 1 January 2016
- Published by OpenEdition in VertigO
- Vol. Hors-série (Hors-série)
Au sujet du besoin d’un niveau de preuve robuste pour évaluer le risque
La méthode quantitative d’évaluation des risques sanitaires caractérise le risque sur la base de relations de cause à effet établies scientifiquement et d’une quantification de l’exposition établie par des mesures ou issue de modélisation. Dès lors, prouver l’existence d’un risque est directement lié à la disponibilité d’études scientifiques et/ou la capacité des experts à dégager un consensus. Cependant, cette démarche linéaire repose sur la possibilité d’établir les preuves du risque, ce qui s’avère délicat pour certains risques émergents ou nouveaux risques. Non seulement les connaissances scientifiques disponibles ne favorisent plus une prise de décision, mais elles sont parfois à l’origine de controverses. La subjectivité des experts s’introduit alors parfois de manière forte dans l’évaluation du risque.
- 1 January 2016
- Published by OpenEdition in VertigO
- Vol. Hors-série (Hors-série)
Open AccessAu sujet du besoin d’un niveau de preuve robuste pour évaluer le risque
La méthode quantitative d’évaluation des risques sanitaires caractérise le risque sur la base de relations de cause à effet établies scientifiquement et d’une quantification de l’exposition établie par des mesures ou issue de modélisation. Dès lors, prouver l’existence d’un risque est directement lié à la disponibilité d’études scientifiques et/ou la capacité des experts à dégager un consensus. Cependant, cette démarche linéaire repose sur la possibilité d’établir les preuves du risque, ce qui s’avère délicat pour certains risques émergents ou nouveaux risques. Non seulement les connaissances scientifiques disponibles ne favorisent plus une prise de décision, mais elles sont parfois à l’origine de controverses. La subjectivité des experts s’introduit alors parfois de manière forte dans l’évaluation du risque.