Neil. F. Johnson

Proponents of Complexity Science believe that the huge variety of emergent phenomena observed throughout nature, are generated by relatively few microscopic mechanisms. Skeptics however point to the lack of concrete examples in which a single mechanistic model manages to capture relevant macroscopic and microscopic properties for two or more distinct systems operating across radically different length and time scales. Here we show how a single complexity model built around cluster coalescence and fragmentation, can cross the fundamental divide between many-body quantum physics and social science. It simultaneously (i) explains a mysterious recent finding of Fratini et al. concerning quantum many-body effects in cuprate superconductors (i.e. scale of 10^{-9} - 10^{-4} meters and 10^{-12} - 10^{-6} seconds), (ii) explains the apparent universality of the casualty distributions in distinct human insurgencies and terrorism (i.e. scale of 10^3 - 10^6 meters and 10^4 - 10^8 seconds), (iii) shows consistency with various established empirical facts for financial markets, neurons and human gangs and (iv) makes microscopic sense for each application. Our findings also suggest that a potentially productive shift can be made in Complexity research toward the identification of equivalent many-body dynamics in both classical and quantum regimes.Comment: 9 pages, 3 figures; version published in AIP Advance

We pursue a general theory of quantum games. We show that quantum games are more efficient than classical games, and provide a saturated upper bound for this efficiency. We demonstrate that the set of finite classical games is a strict subset of the set of finite quantum games. We also deduce the quantum version of the Minimax Theorem and the Nash Equilibrium Theorem.

We report a remarkable universality in the patterns of violence arising in three high-profile ongoing wars, and in global terrorism. Our results suggest that these quite different conflict arenas currently feature a common type of enemy, i.e. the various insurgent forces are beginning to operate in a similar way regardless of their underlying ideologies, motivations and the terrain in which they operate. We provide a microscopic theory to explain our main observations. This theory treats the insurgent force as a generic, self-organizing system which is dynamically evolving through the continual coalescence and fragmentation of its constituent groups.

We analyze the effects of agents' decisions on the creation of congestion on a centralized network with ring-and-hub topology. We show that there are two classes of agents each displaying a distinct set of behaviours. The dynamics of the system are driven by an interplay between the formation of, and transition between, unique stable states that arise as the network is varied. We show how the flow of objects across the network can be understood in terms of the ordering and allocation of strategies. Our results show that the existence of congestion in a network is a dynamic process that is as much dependent on the agents' decisions as it is on the structure of the network itself.

We present a simple model for the formation of pairs in multi-agent populations of type A and B which move freely on a spatial network. Each agent of population A (and B) is labeled as Ai (and Bj) with i=1,.. NA (and j=1,..NB) and carries its own individual list of characteristics or 'phenotype'. When agents from opposite populations encounter one another on the network, they can form a relationship if not already engaged in one. The length of time for which any given pair stays together depends on the compatibility of the two constituent agents. Possible applications include the human dating scenario, and the commercial domain where two types of businesses A and B have members of each type looking for a business partner, i.e. Ai+Bj-->Rij. The pair Rij then survives for some finite time before dissociating Rij-->Ai+Bj. There are many possible generalizations of this basic setup. Here we content ourselves with some initial numerical results for the simplest of network topologies, together with some accompanying analytic analysis.

Reply to Comment quant-ph/0506207 by J.G.Brankov et al.

Even before 9/11 there were claims that the nature of war had changed fundamentally. The 9/11 attacks created an urgent need to understand contemporary wars and their relationship to older conventional and terrorist wars, both of which exhibit remarkable regularities. The frequency-intensity distribution of fatalities in "old wars", 1816-1980, is a power-law with exponent 1.80. Global terrorist attacks, 1968-present, also follow a power-law with exponent 1.71 for G7 countries and 2.5 for non-G7 countries. Here we analyze two ongoing, high-profile wars on opposite sides of the globe - Colombia and Iraq. Our analysis uses our own unique dataset for killings and injuries in Colombia, plus publicly available data for civilians killed in Iraq. We show strong evidence for power-law behavior within each war. Despite substantial differences in contexts and data coverage, the power-law coefficients for both wars are tending toward 2.5, which is a value characteristic of non-G7 terrorism as opposed to old wars. We propose a plausible yet analytically-solvable model of modern insurgent warfare, which can explain these observations.

We investigate the complex relationships between countries in the Eurovision Song Contest, by recasting past voting data in terms of a dynamical network. Despite the British tendency to feel distant from Europe, our analysis shows that the U.K. is remarkably compatible, or 'in tune', with other European countries. Equally surprising is our finding that some other core countries, most notably France, are significantly 'out of tune' with the rest of Europe. In addition, our analysis enables us to confirm a widely-held belief that there are unofficial cliques of countries -- however these cliques are not always the expected ones, nor can their existence be explained solely on the grounds of geographical proximity. The complexity in this system emerges via the group 'self-assessment' process, and in the absence of any central controller. One might therefore speculate that such complexity is representative of many real-world situations in which groups of 'agents' establish their own inter-relationships and hence ultimately decide their own fate. Possible examples include groups of individuals, societies, political groups or even governments.