Mohamed G. Gouda
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Mohamed G. Gouda has a total of 14 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Amitanand S. Aiyer
University of Texas, Austin
1 shared publication - Anish Arora
The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, USA
1 shared publication - Chris Edmondson-Yurkanan
The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX 78712, USA
1 shared publication - Douglas H. Steves
The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX 78712, USA
1 shared publication - Eunjin (Ej) Jung
Department of Computer Science, The University of Iowa, 201L MacLean Hall, Iowa City, IA 52242
1 shared publication - Eunjin Jung
Department of Computer Science, University of Iowa
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 3 August 2014
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 1-8
Keynote Talk: Communication Without Repudiation: The Unanswered Question
- 3 August 2014
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 1-8
Keynote Talk: Communication Without Repudiation: The Unanswered Question
- 1 November 2012
- Published by Elsevier in Theoretical Computer Science
- Vol. 458, 61-75
A state-based model of sensor protocols
- 1 November 2012
- Published by Elsevier in Theoretical Computer Science
- Vol. 458, 61-75
A state-based model of sensor protocols
- 11 October 2008
- Published by Elsevier in Theoretical Computer Science
- Vol. 410 (6-7) , 467-480
Hop chains: Secure routing and the establishment of distinct identities
- 11 October 2008
- Published by Elsevier in Theoretical Computer Science
- Vol. 410 (6-7) , 467-480
Hop chains: Secure routing and the establishment of distinct identities
- 1 November 2006
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- No. 10921648,p. 178-186
Key Grids: A Protocol Family for Assigning Symmetric Keys
We describe a family of log n protocols for assigning symmetric keys to n processes in a network so that each process can use its assigned keys to communicate securely with every other process. The k-th protocol in our protocol family, where 1 les k les log n, assigns O(k2 kradicn) symmetric keys to each process in the network. (Thus, our (log n)-th protocol assigns O(log2 n) symmetric keys to each process. This is not far from the lower bound of O(log n) symmetric keys which we show is needed for each process to communicate securely with every other process in the network.) The protocols in our protocol family can be used to assign symmetric keys to the processes in a sensor network, or ad-hoc or mobile network, where each process has a small memory to store its assigned keys. We also discuss the vulnerability of our protocols to "collusion". In particular, we show that kradicn colluding processes can compromise the security of the k-th protocol in our protocol family.
- 1 November 2006
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- No. 10921648,p. 178-186
Key Grids: A Protocol Family for Assigning Symmetric Keys
We describe a family of log n protocols for assigning symmetric keys to n processes in a network so that each process can use its assigned keys to communicate securely with every other process. The k-th protocol in our protocol family, where 1 les k les log n, assigns O(k2 kradicn) symmetric keys to each process in the network. (Thus, our (log n)-th protocol assigns O(log2 n) symmetric keys to each process. This is not far from the lower bound of O(log n) symmetric keys which we show is needed for each process to communicate securely with every other process in the network.) The protocols in our protocol family can be used to assign symmetric keys to the processes in a sensor network, or ad-hoc or mobile network, where each process has a small memory to store its assigned keys. We also discuss the vulnerability of our protocols to "collusion". In particular, we show that kradicn colluding processes can compromise the security of the k-th protocol in our protocol family.
- 1 October 2006
- Published by American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA) in Journal of Aerospace Information Systems
- Vol. 3 (10) , 487-497
Stabilizing Certificate Dispersal
- 1 October 2006
- Published by American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA) in Journal of Aerospace Information Systems
- Vol. 3 (10) , 487-497
Stabilizing Certificate Dispersal
- 1 October 2006
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in Proceedings of 15th International Conference on Computer Communications and Networks
- No. 10952055,p. 449-454
Rating Certificates
We consider a system where each user has a public key and a private key. In this system, a certificate is a data item that is issued by one user u and contains the public key of another user v. A third user w that knows the public key of u can verify that this certificate has not been corrupted (by an adversary) since it was issued by u, and so can accept the public key in the certificate as the correct public key of v. User w can use this accepted public key of v in two ways. First, w can securely communicate with v. Second, w can obtain more public keys of other users, as it used the public key of u to obtain the public key of v. However, the safety of the second use is questionable if u, the issuer of the certificate, has concluded that it cannot trust v enough to accept a public key merely because v accepts it. To solve this problem, we propose that each certificate should have a "rating". The rating of a certificate describes how much trust the issuer puts on the subject concerning key acceptance. We present an algorithm for computing a subgraph G.dst(src) of a certificate graph G, for a user src to find the correct public key of another user dst in G. The time complexity of this algorithm is 0(e), where e is the number of certificates in the system. This algorithm meets the lower bound of the worst case complexity.
- 1 October 2006
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in Proceedings of 15th International Conference on Computer Communications and Networks
- No. 10952055,p. 449-454
Rating Certificates
We consider a system where each user has a public key and a private key. In this system, a certificate is a data item that is issued by one user u and contains the public key of another user v. A third user w that knows the public key of u can verify that this certificate has not been corrupted (by an adversary) since it was issued by u, and so can accept the public key in the certificate as the correct public key of v. User w can use this accepted public key of v in two ways. First, w can securely communicate with v. Second, w can obtain more public keys of other users, as it used the public key of u to obtain the public key of v. However, the safety of the second use is questionable if u, the issuer of the certificate, has concluded that it cannot trust v enough to accept a public key merely because v accepts it. To solve this problem, we propose that each certificate should have a "rating". The rating of a certificate describes how much trust the issuer puts on the subject concerning key acceptance. We present an algorithm for computing a subgraph G.dst(src) of a certificate graph G, for a user src to find the correct public key of another user dst in G. The time complexity of this algorithm is 0(e), where e is the number of certificates in the system. This algorithm meets the lower bound of the worst case complexity.
- 1 May 2006
- Published by American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA) in Journal of Aerospace Information Systems
- Vol. 3 (5) , 214-233
Stabilization of Grid Routing in Sensor Networks
- 1 May 2006
- Published by American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA) in Journal of Aerospace Information Systems
- Vol. 3 (5) , 214-233
Stabilization of Grid Routing in Sensor Networks
- 30 November 1997
- Published by Elsevier in Computer Networks and ISDN Systems
- Vol. 29 (15) , 1809-1821
Properties of secure transaction protocols
- 30 November 1997
- Published by Elsevier in Computer Networks and ISDN Systems
- Vol. 29 (15) , 1809-1821
Properties of secure transaction protocols
- 1 April 1995
- Published by Wiley in Software: Practice and Experience
- Vol. 25 (4) , 373-387
Implementation of the sentry system
The sentry of a concurrent program P is a program that observes the execution of P, and issues a warning if P does not behave correctly with respect to a given set of logical properties (owing to a programming error or a failure). The synchronization between the program and sentry is such that the program never waits for the sentry, the shared storage between them is very small (in fact linear in the number of program variables being observed), and the snapshots read by the sentry are consistent. To satisfy these three requirements, some snapshots may be overwritten by the program before being read by the sentry. We develop a family of algorithms that preserve these requirements for properties involving scalar variables, then extend the algorithms to permit the observation of large data structures without additional overhead. We describe in detail the annotation language with which the properties can be expressed, and a prototype system that we have implemented to generate the sentry automatically for any given concurrent C program. Finally, we present experimental results that show that the overhead incurred by the sentry is on average no worse than ten per cent for snapshots of up to six variables, and that the loss of snapshots prevents the sentry's detection of an single violation in less than four per cent of the cases. Recurring errors are detected at a rate of 100 per cent.
- 1 April 1995
- Published by Wiley in Software: Practice and Experience
- Vol. 25 (4) , 373-387
Implementation of the sentry system
The sentry of a concurrent program P is a program that observes the execution of P, and issues a warning if P does not behave correctly with respect to a given set of logical properties (owing to a programming error or a failure). The synchronization between the program and sentry is such that the program never waits for the sentry, the shared storage between them is very small (in fact linear in the number of program variables being observed), and the snapshots read by the sentry are consistent. To satisfy these three requirements, some snapshots may be overwritten by the program before being read by the sentry. We develop a family of algorithms that preserve these requirements for properties involving scalar variables, then extend the algorithms to permit the observation of large data structures without additional overhead. We describe in detail the annotation language with which the properties can be expressed, and a prototype system that we have implemented to generate the sentry automatically for any given concurrent C program. Finally, we present experimental results that show that the overhead incurred by the sentry is on average no worse than ten per cent for snapshots of up to six variables, and that the loss of snapshots prevents the sentry's detection of an single violation in less than four per cent of the cases. Recurring errors are detected at a rate of 100 per cent.