JDJacqueline H. R. DeMeritt

Jacqueline H. R. DeMeritt

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Jacqueline H. R. DeMeritt has a total of 8 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Top Cited Papers

    Repression Substitution: Shifting Human Rights Violations in Response to UN Naming and Shaming

    by Jacqueline H.R. DeMeritt, Courtenay R. Conrad

    Does the United Nations naming and shaming of specific violations of human rights decrease government repression? In this article, we argue that international shaming of specific human rights violations can weaken the target government, bringing new challenges and making the government cessation of repression less feasible. When international naming and shaming campaigns target specific repressive tactics, they increase the costs of some – but not all – means of repression. Using original data on naming and shaming by the United Nations Human Rights Council (HRC), we show that the shaming of one physical integrity violation is jointly associated with decreases in that violation and increases in other violations of human rights.


  • Political Context and the Consequences of Naming and Shaming for Human Rights Abuse

    by Justin Esarey, Jacqueline H. R. DeMeritt

    Does being named and shamed for human rights abuse influence the amount of foreign aid received by the shamed state? Recent research suggests that the impact of public censure may depend on the political relationship between donor and recipient. We argue that donors deriving a direct political benefit from the aid relationship (such as a military advantage or the satisfaction of a domestic political audience) will ignore or work against condemnation, but donors with little political interest in the recipient (who give aid for symbolic or humanitarian reasons) will punish condemned states. We also argue that the size of prior aid packages can be used as a holistic measure of the donor’s political interest in the aid relationship because mutually beneficial aid packages are subject to a bargaining process that favors recipients with more to offer. We find that condemnation for human rights abuse by the United Nations is associated with lower bilateral aid levels among states that previously received small aid package, and with equal or higher bilateral aid to states already receiving a great deal of aid. The source of shaming also matters: We find that public shaming by human rights NGOs is not associated with decreased aggregate bilateral aid.


  • Female Participation and Civil War Relapse

    by Jacqueline H.R. Demeritt, Angela D. Nichols, Eliza G. Kelly

    A large literature demonstrates that civil war is recurrent: States that have already experienced such conflict tend to relapse back into war. How might this ‘conflict trap’ be escaped? We answer this question with a focus on gender. Women tend to exist at the margins of society, and postwar society often perpetuates prewar values. Yet this continuity is not inevitable. We argue that the end of a civil war opens a window of opportunity through which women may increasingly participate in society, economics, and politics. Given women's preference for peace and aversion to political violence, we expect this increased participation to reduce the risk of relapse to civil war. Large-N analyses support our argument, and in particular suggest that increases in female literacy and parliamentary representation reduce the risk of relapse.


  • Delegating Death

    by Jacqueline H. R. DeMeritt

    Does military intervention affect civilian death tolls? Existing research has focused on international actors’ ability to limit ongoing slaughter but has not examined their ability to prevent the emergence or escalation of such killing. I develop a theory of government killing that accounts not only for the government’s decision to kill civilians but also for the transference of the killing order from leader to perpetrator, and for the perpetrator’s implementation of that order. Focusing on the principal–agent relationship produces new expectations about the effects of military intervention on government killing. I find that international actors are well equipped to limit civilian slaughter: intervention supporting the government decreases the likelihood that a government orders civilians killed. Intervention against the government leads to a decrease in death tolls when killing occurs. Ultimately, supportive intervention is a useful means of preventing government killing, while oppositional intervention limits its escalation once it begins.


  • A political economy of human rights: Oil, natural gas, and state incentives to repress1

    by Jacqueline H.R. DeMeritt, Joseph K Young

    Oil and other natural resources are linked to many undesirable outcomes, such as civil war, autocracy and lack of economic development. Using a state-centered framework for revenue extraction, we identify why oil should also be linked to another undesirable effect: repression. We argue that repression is less costly where states do not rely on their citizenry for generating revenue, so that these states are more likely than others to use indiscriminate violations of personal integrity rights as a policy tool. We test this argument using a cross-national database with a variety of indicators of oil and fuel rents and personal integrity violations. Across all specifications and different indicators, we find a substantive and significant relationship between a state relying on oil and the violation of personal integrity rights.


  • Constrained by the bank and the ballot

    by Courtenay R Conrad, Jacqueline H R DeMeritt

    Why does the discovery of oil lead to increased government repression in some countries and not others? Why is there variance in the extent to which democracy constrains state violations of human rights? We assume that an executive’s propensity to use violence against citizens is a function of the extent to which he is dependent on his citizenry. Executives can be dependent on their citizenry in two ways: (1) at the bank for financial resources, and (2) at the ballot box for political support. We argue that these considerations jointly influence executive decisions to engage in state repression, and consequently, observed human rights abuse. Using a dataset of 146 countries from 1981 to 2011, we find that democratic institutions have a moderating effect on the positive relationship between unearned revenues and human rights violations. Decreased reliance on citizens for revenue does not weaken and may actually strengthen the pacifying effect of democratic institutions on state terror. Our results suggest that pursuing democracy is a useful way to reduce political violence, both directly and indirectly, even in the presence of a resource curse. Furthermore, the discovery of oil and other unearned revenues is unlikely to undermine the positive relationship between democratic institutions and domestic protections for human rights.


  • International Organizations and Government Killing: Does Naming and Shaming Save Lives?

    by Jacqueline H. R. DeMeritt

    Do international organizations affect government killing? Extant work has studied international organizations' effects on a set of human rights, but has not examined the abilities of specific actors to protect specific rights. I analyze naming and shaming by three types of international organizations (human rights nongovernmental organizations [NGOs], the news media, and the United Nations), focusing on their impacts on a single type of abuse: one-sided government killing. I present a principal-agent theory in which the government develops a preference for killing, and then delegates the murderous task to a set of individual perpetrators. The theory reveals new ways for international organizations to make killing costly, and statistical analyses support my expectations: By calling attention to abusive states, human rights NGOs and the United Nations can reduce both the likelihood and severity of state-sponsored murder. I also find that international organizations are better equipped to prevent killing from the beginning than to limit mounting body counts once it has begun.


  • Testing for Interaction in Binary Logit and Probit Models: Is a Product Term Essential?

    by William D. Berry, Jacqueline H. R. DeMeritt, Justin Esarey

    Political scientists presenting binary dependent variable (BDV) models often hypothesize that variables interact to influence the probability of an event, Pr(Y). The current typical approach to testing such hypotheses is (1) estimate a logit or probit model with a product term, (2) test the hypothesis by determining whether the coefficient for this term is statistically significant, and (3) characterize the nature of any interaction detected by describing how the estimated effect of one variable on Pr(Y) varies with the value of another. This approach makes a statistically significant product term necessary to support the interaction hypothesis. We show that a statistically significant product term is neither necessary nor sufficient for variables to interact meaningfully in influencing Pr(Y). Indeed, even when a logit or probit model contains no product term, the effect of one variable on Pr(Y) may be strongly related to the value of another. We present a strategy for testing for interaction in a BDV model, including guidance on when to include a product term.