Da Zhou
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Da Zhou has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Bin Wu
1 shared publication- Bin Wu
Center for Systems and Control, State Key Laboratory for Turbulence and Complex Systems, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing, China
1 shared publication Hao Ge
1 shared publication- Long Wang
Center for Systems and Control, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing, China
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 21 October 2011
- Published by American Physical Society (APS) in Physical Review E
- Vol. 84 (4) , 046111
Evolutionary dynamics on stochastic evolving networks for multiple-strategy games
Evolutionary game theory on dynamical networks has received much attention. Most of the work has been focused on 2\ifmmode\times\else\texttimes\fi{}2 games such as prisoner's dilemma and snowdrift, with general n\ifmmode\times\else\texttimes\fi{}n games seldom addressed. In particular, analytical methods are still lacking. Here we generalize the stochastic linking dynamics proposed by Wu, Zhou, Fu, Luo, Wang, and Traulsen [PLoS ONE 5, e11187 (2010)] to n\ifmmode\times\else\texttimes\fi{}n games. We analytically obtain that the fast linking dynamics results in the replicator dynamics with a rescaled payoff matrix. In the rescaled matrix, intuitively, each entry is the product of the original entry and the average duration time of the corresponding link. This result is shown to be robust to a wide class of imitation processes. As applications, we show both analytically and numerically that the biodiversity, modeled as the stability of a zero-sum rock-paper-scissors game, cannot be altered by the fast linking dynamics. In addition, we show that the fast linking dynamics can stabilize tit-for-tat as an evolutionary stable strategy in the repeated prisoner's dilemma game provided the interaction between the identical strategies happens sufficiently often. Our method paves the way for an analytical study of the multiple-strategy coevolutionary dynamics.
- 21 October 2011
- Published by American Physical Society (APS) in Physical Review E
- Vol. 84 (4) , 046111
Evolutionary dynamics on stochastic evolving networks for multiple-strategy games
Evolutionary game theory on dynamical networks has received much attention. Most of the work has been focused on 2\ifmmode\times\else\texttimes\fi{}2 games such as prisoner's dilemma and snowdrift, with general n\ifmmode\times\else\texttimes\fi{}n games seldom addressed. In particular, analytical methods are still lacking. Here we generalize the stochastic linking dynamics proposed by Wu, Zhou, Fu, Luo, Wang, and Traulsen [PLoS ONE 5, e11187 (2010)] to n\ifmmode\times\else\texttimes\fi{}n games. We analytically obtain that the fast linking dynamics results in the replicator dynamics with a rescaled payoff matrix. In the rescaled matrix, intuitively, each entry is the product of the original entry and the average duration time of the corresponding link. This result is shown to be robust to a wide class of imitation processes. As applications, we show both analytically and numerically that the biodiversity, modeled as the stability of a zero-sum rock-paper-scissors game, cannot be altered by the fast linking dynamics. In addition, we show that the fast linking dynamics can stabilize tit-for-tat as an evolutionary stable strategy in the repeated prisoner's dilemma game provided the interaction between the identical strategies happens sufficiently often. Our method paves the way for an analytical study of the multiple-strategy coevolutionary dynamics.
- 1 June 2010
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Theoretical Biology
- Vol. 264 (3) , 874-881
Evolutionary stability and quasi-stationary strategy in stochastic evolutionary game dynamics
- 1 June 2010
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Theoretical Biology
- Vol. 264 (3) , 874-881
Evolutionary stability and quasi-stationary strategy in stochastic evolutionary game dynamics