MCMichael H. Connors

Michael H. Connors

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

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Michael H. Connors has a total of 18 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Beliefs about hearing voices

    by Michael H. Connors, Serje Robidoux, Robyn Langdon, Max Coltheart


  • Hypnotic models of mirrored-self misidentification delusion: A review and an evaluation.

    by Michael H. Connors, Amanda J. Barnier, Robyn Langdon, Max Coltheart

    Hypnotic suggestions can be used to model the symptoms of clinical disorders. In recent work, we applied this approach to study mirrored-self misidentification delusion, the belief that one’s reflection in the mirror is not oneself. Across eight experiments, we used specific suggestions that either directly specified the delusional belief or were designed to recreate deficits hypothesized to underpin the clinical condition, including impaired face processing and mirror agnosia. In both cases, we were able to recreate the delusion in healthy volunteers and create a viable laboratory model. In this article, we review the program of research as a whole. We discuss themes that emerged across studies, such as ways in which participants responded to the “stranger,” and the implications of our findings for understanding both hypnotic modeling and clinical delusions. We also discuss limitations to our work and suggest a number of directions for future research.22 page(s


  • Open Access

    A cognitive account of belief: a tentative road map

    by Michael H. Connors, Peter W. Halligan

    Over the past decades, delusions have become the subject of growing and productive research spanning clinical and cognitive neurosciences. Despite this, the nature of belief, which underpins the construct of delusions, has received little formal investigation. No account of delusions, however, would be complete without a cognitive level analysis of belief per se. One reason for this neglect is the assumption that, unlike more established and accessible modular psychological process (e.g. vision, audition, face-recognition, language-processing, and motor-control systems), beliefs comprise more distributed and therefore less accessible central cognitive processes. In this paper, we suggest some defining characteristics and functions of beliefs. Working back from cognitive accounts of delusions, we consider potential candidate cognitive processes that may be involved in normal belief formation. Finally, we advance a multistage account of the belief process that could provide the basis for a more comprehensive model of belief.


  • Open Access

    Theory of mind and neurocognition in early psychosis: a quasi-experimental study

    by Robyn Langdon, Michael H Connors, Megan Still, Philip B Ward, Stanley Catts

    People with chronic psychosis often display theory of mind impairments that are not fully accounted for by other, more general neurocognitive deficits. In these patients, both theory of mind and neurocognitive deficits contribute to poor functioning, independently of psychotic symptoms. In young people with recent-onset psychosis, however, it is unclear the extent to which theory of mind impairment is independent of neurocognitive deficits. The primary aim of this study was to examine the evidence for specific theory of mind impairments in early psychosis. A secondary aim was to explore the relations between theory of mind, neurocognition, symptom severity, and functional outcomes. Twenty-three patients who were within two years of their first psychotic episode and 19 healthy controls completed theory of mind and neurocognitive batteries. Social functioning, quality of life, and symptom severity were also assessed in patients. Patients demonstrated deficits in tasks assessing theory of mind and neurocognition relative to controls. Patients’ deficits in theory of mind were evident even after adjusting for their deficits in neurocognition. Neither theory of mind nor neurocognition predicted social functioning or quality of life in this early psychosis sample. Severity of negative symptoms, however, was a significant predictor of both outcomes. While a specific theory of mind impairment was evident in this early psychosis sample, severity of negative symptoms emerged as the best predictor of poor functional outcome. Further early psychosis research is needed to examine the longitudinal progression of theory of mind impairments – independent of neurocognitive deficits – and their impact on psychosocial function.


  • Open Access

    Social cognition and social judgment in schizophrenia

    by Robyn Langdon, Michael H. Connors, Emily Connaughton


  • Open Access

    Using hypnosis to disrupt face processing: mirrored-self misidentification delusion and different visual media

    by Michael H. Connors, Amanda J. Barnier, Max Coltheart, Robyn Langdon, Rochelle E. Cox, Davide Rivolta, Peter W. Halligan

    Mirrored-self misidentification delusion is the belief that one’s reflection in the mirror is not oneself. This experiment used hypnotic suggestion to impair normal face processing in healthy participants and recreate key aspects of the delusion in the laboratory. From a pool of 439 participants, 22 high hypnotisable participants (“highs”) and 20 low hypnotisable participants were selected on the basis of their extreme scores on two separately administered measures of hypnotisability. These participants received a hypnotic induction and a suggestion for either impaired (i) self-face recognition or (ii) impaired recognition of all faces. Participants were tested on their ability to recognise themselves in a mirror and other visual media – including a photograph, live video, and handheld mirror – and their ability to recognise other people, including the experimenter and famous faces. Both suggestions produced impaired self-face recognition and recreated key aspects of the delusion in highs. However, only the suggestion for impaired other-face recognition disrupted recognition of other faces, albeit in a minority of highs. The findings confirm that hypnotic suggestion can disrupt face processing and recreate features of mirrored-self misidentification. The variability seen in participants’ responses also corresponds to the heterogeneity seen in clinical patients. An important direction for future research will be to examine sources of this variability within both clinical patients and the hypnotic model.


  • Open Access

    Expertise and the representation of space

    by Michael H. Connors, Guillermo Campitelli

    A commentary on The geometry of expertise by Leone, M. J., Slezak, D. F., Cecchi, G. A., and Sigman, M. (2014). Front. Psychol. 5:47. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00047 Across many domains, experts make decisions based on the spatial relationships of objects within an environment. Firefighters, for example, need to evaluate the fire in front of them, radiologists the medical scan, and chess players the position on the chess board before making a decision. In order to be effective, experts need to assess these spatial relationships quickly and despite possible uncertainty. This ability is facilitated by cognitive processes. According to the so-called chunking and template theories, this expertise is made possible by pattern recognition (Gobet and Simon, 1996; Gobet, 1997). Based on their experience and practice, experts store in their long-term memory meaningful configurations of elements (i.e., patterns—chunks or templates) in their domain of expertise. These patterns are associated with typical decisions and strategies. Thus, when an expert faces a situation in their domain of expertise, they are able to rapidly recognize patterns, which, in turn, prompt them to consider decisions or strategies that have been effective in previous situations. This allows experts to make superior decisions to novices who are limited to a real-time search through a large number of possible options (Feltovich et al., 2006; Gobet and Charness, 2006; Connors et al., 2011). Leone et al.'s (2014) elegant study adds to existing evidence for this account. In particular, Leone et al. demonstrate that experts' representation of space in their domain of expertise is qualitatively different to that of novices. Leone et al. focused on chess. Chess has the advantage of being a constrained task environment with relatively high ecological validity to other domains. Chess also has the advantage of a precise measure of expertise in the form of a numerical rating that is assigned to each player on the basis of their performance against their opponents. For these reasons, a large amount of expertise research has examined chess (Gobet and Charness, 2006). For Leone et al.'s study, chess has the additional advantage of having large amounts of data available: Leone et al. examined well over 175,000 games drawn from an internet chess server. Given experts' pattern recognition ability, Leone et al. predicted that experts should make moves that were best for the position at hand and so not be constrained by the mere physical distance between objects. In contrast, novices would be more likely to make moves based on spatial proximity to previous moves due to their relative lack of pattern recognition and their need to conserve cognitive resources. Leone et al. made four specific hypotheses. First, the authors predicted that novices should make moves that are closer to their or their opponent's previous move. To test this, they developed a novel methodology in which they calculated the distance between a player's move and their previous move, and the distance between a player's move and their opponent's previous move. Second, the authors predicted that novice players would be more likely to move the same piece multiple times. To test this, they examined the frequency with which players moved the same piece more than once on consecutive turns. Third, the authors predicted that novices would be more likely to simplify the position by exchanging pieces (capturing an opponent's piece when the opponent can recapture their own piece), thereby reducing the cognitive load of dealing with large numbers of pieces. To test this, they examined the rate at which pieces were removed from the board according to the number of moves in the game. Finally, the authors predicted that novices would be less likely to keep with general strategic principles (e.g., knights are more effective when centralized) than experts. To test this, they examined the frequency with which pieces were placed in suitable parts of the board (e.g., knights in central regions). Leone et al. found evidence for all four hypotheses. First, novices were more likely to move pieces that were closer to their or their opponent's previous move than experts. Second, novices were more likely to move the same piece on consecutive turns than experts. Third, novices were more likely to simplify positions than experts. Finally, novices were less likely to keep to general strategic principles than experts. Although the relative size of the effects were small, Leone et al. demonstrated the robustness of the effects across very large datasets and across games of different durations. Similar differences between experts and novices were evident regardless of whether players had a total of 3, 5, or 15 min each. Although the authors did not directly assess the quality of the players' decisions, their work provides evidence that experts base their decision on what is most meaningful in a position, rather than being limited by spatial proximity. As Leone et al. note, these findings are consistent with chunking and template models of expertise as the differences between experts and novices exist at very short time limits, when searching through various options is not possible. The findings are also likely to generalize to a wide range of other domains of expertise. In addition to revealing these effects, the work is very important because it develops novel methodologies for assessing spatial relationships in chess positions and across large datasets. Indeed, Leone et al.'s use of big data to test specific hypotheses about cognition is particularly innovative. In future, these methods might provide further insight into how experts interpret and represent space. The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest. Connors, M. H., Burns, B. D., and Campitelli, G. (2011). Expertise in complex decision making: the role of search in chess 70 years after de Groot. Cogn. Sci. 35, 1567–1579. doi: 10.1111/j.1551-6709.2011.01196.x Pubmed Abstract | Pubmed Full Text | CrossRef Full Text Feltovich, P. J., Prietula, M. J., and Ericsson, K. A. (2006). “Studies of expertise from psychological perspectives,” in The Cambridge Handbook of Expertise and Expert Performance, eds K. A. Ericsson, N. Charness, P. J. Feltovich, and R. R. Hoffman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 41–68. doi: 10.1017/CBO9780511816796.004 CrossRef Full Text Gobet, F. (1997). A pattern-recognition theory of search in expert problem solving. Think. Reason. 3, 291–313. doi: 10.1080/135467897394301 CrossRef Full Text Gobet, F., and Charness, N. (2006). “Expertise in chess,” in The Cambridge Handbook of Expertise and Expert Performance, eds K. A. Ericsson, N. Charness, P. J. Feltovich, and R. R. Hoffman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 523–538. doi: 10.1017/CBO9780511816796.030 CrossRef Full Text Gobet, F., and Simon, H. A. (1996). Templates in chess memory: a mechanism for recalling several boards. Cogn. Psychol. 31, 1–40. doi: 10.1006/cogp.1996.0011 Pubmed Abstract | Pubmed Full Text | CrossRef Full Text Leone, M. J., Slezak, D. F., Cecchi, G. A., and Sigman, M. (2014). The geometry of expertise. Front. Psychol. 5:47. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00047 Pubmed Abstract | Pubmed Full Text | CrossRef Full Text Keywords: big data, chess, chess expertise, chunks, expertise, decision making, methodology Citation: Connors MH and Campitelli G (2014) Expertise and the representation of space. Front. Psychol. 5:270. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00270 Received: 26 February 2014; Accepted: 12 March 2014; Published online: 03 April 2014. Edited by: Reviewed by: Copyright © 2014 Connors and Campitelli. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms. *Correspondence: michael.connors@mq.edu.au


  • Hypnotic analogues of delusions: The role of delusion proneness and schizotypy

    by Michael H. Connors, Peter W. Halligan, Amanda J. Barnier, Robyn Langdon, Rochelle E. Cox, Jocelyn Elliott, Vince Polito, Max Coltheart