CWCees Withagen

Cees Withagen

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years


Cees Withagen has a total of 22 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    On von Stackelberg Leadership in a Cartel-Fringe-Renewables' Model of Exhaustible Resource Extraction

    by Simon Elgersma, Hassan Benchekroun, Gerard van der Meijden, Cees Withagen

    We characterize the time-consistent solution of a cartel--fringe model of exhaustible resource extraction in which the cartel credibly acts as a von Stackelberg leader and renewable and backstop substitutes are available. For every configuration of initial resource stocks, we identify the equilibrium sequence that arises in the feedback von Stackelberg equilibrium (FBSE). We show that the FBSE exhibits three possible equilibrium extraction paths. Two of them start with a phase of simultaneous supply by the cartel and the fringe, whereas the third one starts with a phase in which the cartel is the sole supplier. We then compare the FBSE with the Nash--Cournot equilibrium (CFNE) and the open-loop von Stackelberg equilibrium (OLSE). A key distinction between the FBSE and the OLSE is that the latter never features an initial phase of simultaneous extraction, whereas such a phase emerges in the FBSE for a range of initial stock configurations. An important departure from the CFNE is that the FBSE allows for an initial phase of cartel-only supply, in which the cartel sets the price so as to keep the fringe at bay.

  • Open Access

    Road Networks and Tropical Deforestation

    by Christian Bogmans, Gerard van der Meijden, Cees Withagen

    We analyze a dynamic spatial model of deforestation in which roads facilitate agricultural expansion. The model's key innovation is that road construction costs decrease with the existing road stock, creating positive network externalities that are specific to infrastructure: each road built serves as a stepping stone for further road construction. Under open access, myopic producers fail to internalize that roads built today facilitate future road construction. As a result, the pace of deforestation is faster under a forward-looking regime of private property than open access, reversing a standard result from resource economics. We calibrate the model to the Brazilian Amazon, where cattle ranching is the primary driver of deforestation, and calculate the international transfer required to incentivize Brazil to implement a carbon tax that completely stops deforestation. We find that Brazil's extensive existing road network increases this required transfer, demonstrating how infrastructure creates ``deforestation lock-in'' that makes conservation progressively more expensive.

  • Open Access

    Do strong oligopolies reverse Green Paradox effects?

    by Gerard van der Meijden, Hassan Benchekroun, Frederick van der Ploeg, Cees Withagen


  • Open Access

    On Simple Rules for the Social Cost of Carbon

    by Cees Withagen

    The objective of this paper is to assess the use of simple rules for the social cost of carbon. It is shown that several interrelated objections may apply. The main issues are the following. First, the underlying theoretical models typically assume that the economy finds itself on a balanced growth path, implying that addressing the issue of designing policies for the short run, which play a role in the actual policy debate, are neglected. Second, for some cases the assumptions made regarding the marginal damages of high temperature or of arge atmospheric $$CO_{2}$$CO2 stocks are shown to be incompatible with other assumptions made. Third, typically the rules follow from an optimal growth model and associate the social cost for a particular year with GDP for that year, but it is not always acknowledged that it should be optimal rather than actual GDP for that year. I also go into the performance of simple rules as compared to first-best.


  • Open Access

    Monopoly, unilateral climate policies and limit pricing

    by Gerard van der Meijden, Cees Withagen


  • Open Access

    Suggestions for a Covid-19 Post-Pandemic Research Agenda in Environmental Economics

    by Robert J. R. Elliott, Ingmar Schumacher, Cees Withagen

    In this article we draw upon early lessons from the 2020 Covid-19 crisis and discuss how these may relate to a future research agenda in environmental economics. In particular, we describe how the events surrounding the Covid-19 crisis may inform environmental research related to globalization and cooperation, the green transition, pricing carbon externalities, as well as the role of uncertainty and timing of policy inventions. We also discuss the implications for future empirical research in this area.


  • Frontiers of Climate Change Economics

    by Gerard van der Meijden, Frederick van der Ploeg, Cees Withagen


  • Global Warming and the Green Paradox: A Review of Adverse Effects of Climate Policies

    by Frederick van der Ploeg, Cees Withagen

    This article examines the possible adverse effects of well-intended climate policies, an outcome known as the Green Paradox. A weak Green Paradox arises if the announcement of a future carbon tax or a sufficiently fast rising carbon tax encourages fossil fuel owners to extract reserves more aggressively, thus exacerbating global warming. We argue that such policies may also encourage more fossil fuel to be locked in the crust of the earth, which can offset the adverse effects of the weak Green Paradox. We show that a subsidy on clean renewables may have similar weak Green Paradox effects. Green welfare (the converse of environmental damages) declines (i.e., the strong Green Paradox) if the beneficial climate effects of locking up more fossil fuel do not outweigh the short-run weak Green Paradox effects. Neither the weak nor the strong Green Paradox occurs for the first-best Pigouvian carbon tax. We also discuss dirty backstops, spatial carbon leakage, and green innovation.


  • Open Access

    Battle for Climate and Scarcity Rents: Beyond the Linear-Quadratic Case

    by Mark Kagan, Frederick van der Ploeg, Cees Withagen

    Industria imports oil, produces final goods and wishes to mitigate global warming. Oilrabia exports oil and buys final goods from the other country. Industria uses the carbon tax to impose an import tariff on oil and steal some of Oilrabia’s scarcity rent. Conversely, Oilrabia has monopoly power and sets the oil price to steal some of Industria’s climate rent. We analyze the relative speeds of oil extraction and carbon accumulation under these strategic interactions for various production function specifications and compare these with the efficient and competitive outcomes. We prove that for the class of HARA production functions, the oil price is initially higher and subsequently lower in the open-loop Nash equilibrium than in the efficient outcome. The oil extraction rate is thus initially too low and in later stages too high. The HARA class includes linear, loglinear and semi-loglinear demand functions as special cases. For non-HARA production functions, Oilrabia may in the open-loop Nash equilibrium initially price oil lower than the efficient level, thus resulting in more oil extraction and climate damages. We also contrast the open-loop Nash and efficient outcomes numerically with the feedback Nash outcomes. We find that the optimal carbon tax path in the feedback Nash equilibrium is flatter than in the open-loop Nash equilibrium. It turns out that for certain demand functions using the carbon tax as an import tariff may hurt consumers’ welfare as the resulting user cost of oil is so high that the fall in welfare wipes out the gain from higher tariff revenues.


  • The climate change, migration and conflict nexus

    by Cees Withagen

    Early this year, Thomas Friedman (2014) reported on a (Wikileaks) cable sent in 2008 from the US Embassy in Damascus concerning the drought Syria had been suffering from since 2006 (and which was going to last for another couple of years). The Syrian UN food and agriculture representative was seeking assistance for among others 15,000 small-holding farmers, who might otherwise seek jobs in Syrian cities (leaving many women and children behind in poverty) and who could arguably add to already existing social and economic tensions in those cities.