Cees Withagen
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Cees Withagen has a total of 22 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Geir B. Asheim
Department of Economics, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway
6 shared publications - Gerard van der Meijden
VU University Amsterdam - Faculty of Economics and Business Administration
4 shared publications - Abay Mulatu
London Metropolitan University
3 shared publications - Frederick van der Ploeg
Department of Economics, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
3 shared publications Wolfgang Buchholz
University of Regensburg
3 shared publicationsAlex Halsema
VU University Amsterdam
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 2 October 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
On von Stackelberg Leadership in a Cartel-Fringe-Renewables' Model of Exhaustible Resource Extraction
We characterize the time-consistent solution of a cartel--fringe model of exhaustible resource extraction in which the cartel credibly acts as a von Stackelberg leader and renewable and backstop substitutes are available. For every configuration of initial resource stocks, we identify the equilibrium sequence that arises in the feedback von Stackelberg equilibrium (FBSE). We show that the FBSE exhibits three possible equilibrium extraction paths. Two of them start with a phase of simultaneous supply by the cartel and the fringe, whereas the third one starts with a phase in which the cartel is the sole supplier. We then compare the FBSE with the Nash--Cournot equilibrium (CFNE) and the open-loop von Stackelberg equilibrium (OLSE). A key distinction between the FBSE and the OLSE is that the latter never features an initial phase of simultaneous extraction, whereas such a phase emerges in the FBSE for a range of initial stock configurations. An important departure from the CFNE is that the FBSE allows for an initial phase of cartel-only supply, in which the cartel sets the price so as to keep the fringe at bay.
- 2 October 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessOn von Stackelberg Leadership in a Cartel-Fringe-Renewables' Model of Exhaustible Resource Extraction
We characterize the time-consistent solution of a cartel--fringe model of exhaustible resource extraction in which the cartel credibly acts as a von Stackelberg leader and renewable and backstop substitutes are available. For every configuration of initial resource stocks, we identify the equilibrium sequence that arises in the feedback von Stackelberg equilibrium (FBSE). We show that the FBSE exhibits three possible equilibrium extraction paths. Two of them start with a phase of simultaneous supply by the cartel and the fringe, whereas the third one starts with a phase in which the cartel is the sole supplier. We then compare the FBSE with the Nash--Cournot equilibrium (CFNE) and the open-loop von Stackelberg equilibrium (OLSE). A key distinction between the FBSE and the OLSE is that the latter never features an initial phase of simultaneous extraction, whereas such a phase emerges in the FBSE for a range of initial stock configurations. An important departure from the CFNE is that the FBSE allows for an initial phase of cartel-only supply, in which the cartel sets the price so as to keep the fringe at bay.
- Open Access
- 1 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Road Networks and Tropical Deforestation
We analyze a dynamic spatial model of deforestation in which roads facilitate agricultural expansion. The model's key innovation is that road construction costs decrease with the existing road stock, creating positive network externalities that are specific to infrastructure: each road built serves as a stepping stone for further road construction. Under open access, myopic producers fail to internalize that roads built today facilitate future road construction. As a result, the pace of deforestation is faster under a forward-looking regime of private property than open access, reversing a standard result from resource economics. We calibrate the model to the Brazilian Amazon, where cattle ranching is the primary driver of deforestation, and calculate the international transfer required to incentivize Brazil to implement a carbon tax that completely stops deforestation. We find that Brazil's extensive existing road network increases this required transfer, demonstrating how infrastructure creates ``deforestation lock-in'' that makes conservation progressively more expensive.
- 1 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessRoad Networks and Tropical Deforestation
We analyze a dynamic spatial model of deforestation in which roads facilitate agricultural expansion. The model's key innovation is that road construction costs decrease with the existing road stock, creating positive network externalities that are specific to infrastructure: each road built serves as a stepping stone for further road construction. Under open access, myopic producers fail to internalize that roads built today facilitate future road construction. As a result, the pace of deforestation is faster under a forward-looking regime of private property than open access, reversing a standard result from resource economics. We calibrate the model to the Brazilian Amazon, where cattle ranching is the primary driver of deforestation, and calculate the international transfer required to incentivize Brazil to implement a carbon tax that completely stops deforestation. We find that Brazil's extensive existing road network increases this required transfer, demonstrating how infrastructure creates ``deforestation lock-in'' that makes conservation progressively more expensive.
- Open Access
- 3 July 2023
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Political Economy
- Vol. 79
Do strong oligopolies reverse Green Paradox effects?
- 3 July 2023
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Political Economy
- Vol. 79
Open AccessDo strong oligopolies reverse Green Paradox effects?
- Open Access
- 9 May 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Environmental and Resource Economics
- Vol. 82 (2) , 461-481
On Simple Rules for the Social Cost of Carbon
The objective of this paper is to assess the use of simple rules for the social cost of carbon. It is shown that several interrelated objections may apply. The main issues are the following. First, the underlying theoretical models typically assume that the economy finds itself on a balanced growth path, implying that addressing the issue of designing policies for the short run, which play a role in the actual policy debate, are neglected. Second, for some cases the assumptions made regarding the marginal damages of high temperature or of arge atmospheric $$CO_{2}$$ stocks are shown to be incompatible with other assumptions made. Third, typically the rules follow from an optimal growth model and associate the social cost for a particular year with GDP for that year, but it is not always acknowledged that it should be optimal rather than actual GDP for that year. I also go into the performance of simple rules as compared to first-best.- 9 May 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Environmental and Resource Economics
- Vol. 82 (2) , 461-481
Open AccessOn Simple Rules for the Social Cost of Carbon
The objective of this paper is to assess the use of simple rules for the social cost of carbon. It is shown that several interrelated objections may apply. The main issues are the following. First, the underlying theoretical models typically assume that the economy finds itself on a balanced growth path, implying that addressing the issue of designing policies for the short run, which play a role in the actual policy debate, are neglected. Second, for some cases the assumptions made regarding the marginal damages of high temperature or of arge atmospheric $$CO_{2}$$ stocks are shown to be incompatible with other assumptions made. Third, typically the rules follow from an optimal growth model and associate the social cost for a particular year with GDP for that year, but it is not always acknowledged that it should be optimal rather than actual GDP for that year. I also go into the performance of simple rules as compared to first-best. - Open Access
- 1 November 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
- Vol. 120, 103995
Monopoly, unilateral climate policies and limit pricing
- 1 November 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
- Vol. 120, 103995
Open AccessMonopoly, unilateral climate policies and limit pricing
- Open Access
- 4 August 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Environmental and Resource Economics
- Vol. 76 (4) , 1187-1213
Suggestions for a Covid-19 Post-Pandemic Research Agenda in Environmental Economics
In this article we draw upon early lessons from the 2020 Covid-19 crisis and discuss how these may relate to a future research agenda in environmental economics. In particular, we describe how the events surrounding the Covid-19 crisis may inform environmental research related to globalization and cooperation, the green transition, pricing carbon externalities, as well as the role of uncertainty and timing of policy inventions. We also discuss the implications for future empirical research in this area.
- 4 August 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Environmental and Resource Economics
- Vol. 76 (4) , 1187-1213
Open AccessSuggestions for a Covid-19 Post-Pandemic Research Agenda in Environmental Economics
In this article we draw upon early lessons from the 2020 Covid-19 crisis and discuss how these may relate to a future research agenda in environmental economics. In particular, we describe how the events surrounding the Covid-19 crisis may inform environmental research related to globalization and cooperation, the green transition, pricing carbon externalities, as well as the role of uncertainty and timing of policy inventions. We also discuss the implications for future empirical research in this area.
- 1 August 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Environmental and Resource Economics
- Vol. 68 (1) , 1-14
Frontiers of Climate Change Economics
- 1 August 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Environmental and Resource Economics
- Vol. 68 (1) , 1-14
Frontiers of Climate Change Economics
- 1 July 2015
- Published by University of Chicago Press in Review of Environmental Economics and Policy
- Vol. 9 (2) , 285-303
Global Warming and the Green Paradox: A Review of Adverse Effects of Climate Policies
This article examines the possible adverse effects of well-intended climate policies, an outcome known as the Green Paradox. A weak Green Paradox arises if the announcement of a future carbon tax or a sufficiently fast rising carbon tax encourages fossil fuel owners to extract reserves more aggressively, thus exacerbating global warming. We argue that such policies may also encourage more fossil fuel to be locked in the crust of the earth, which can offset the adverse effects of the weak Green Paradox. We show that a subsidy on clean renewables may have similar weak Green Paradox effects. Green welfare (the converse of environmental damages) declines (i.e., the strong Green Paradox) if the beneficial climate effects of locking up more fossil fuel do not outweigh the short-run weak Green Paradox effects. Neither the weak nor the strong Green Paradox occurs for the first-best Pigouvian carbon tax. We also discuss dirty backstops, spatial carbon leakage, and green innovation.
- 1 July 2015
- Published by University of Chicago Press in Review of Environmental Economics and Policy
- Vol. 9 (2) , 285-303
Global Warming and the Green Paradox: A Review of Adverse Effects of Climate Policies
This article examines the possible adverse effects of well-intended climate policies, an outcome known as the Green Paradox. A weak Green Paradox arises if the announcement of a future carbon tax or a sufficiently fast rising carbon tax encourages fossil fuel owners to extract reserves more aggressively, thus exacerbating global warming. We argue that such policies may also encourage more fossil fuel to be locked in the crust of the earth, which can offset the adverse effects of the weak Green Paradox. We show that a subsidy on clean renewables may have similar weak Green Paradox effects. Green welfare (the converse of environmental damages) declines (i.e., the strong Green Paradox) if the beneficial climate effects of locking up more fossil fuel do not outweigh the short-run weak Green Paradox effects. Neither the weak nor the strong Green Paradox occurs for the first-best Pigouvian carbon tax. We also discuss dirty backstops, spatial carbon leakage, and green innovation.
- Open Access
- 28 May 2015
- Published by Springer Nature in Dynamic Games and Applications
- Vol. 5 (4) , 493-522
Battle for Climate and Scarcity Rents: Beyond the Linear-Quadratic Case
Industria imports oil, produces final goods and wishes to mitigate global warming. Oilrabia exports oil and buys final goods from the other country. Industria uses the carbon tax to impose an import tariff on oil and steal some of Oilrabia’s scarcity rent. Conversely, Oilrabia has monopoly power and sets the oil price to steal some of Industria’s climate rent. We analyze the relative speeds of oil extraction and carbon accumulation under these strategic interactions for various production function specifications and compare these with the efficient and competitive outcomes. We prove that for the class of HARA production functions, the oil price is initially higher and subsequently lower in the open-loop Nash equilibrium than in the efficient outcome. The oil extraction rate is thus initially too low and in later stages too high. The HARA class includes linear, loglinear and semi-loglinear demand functions as special cases. For non-HARA production functions, Oilrabia may in the open-loop Nash equilibrium initially price oil lower than the efficient level, thus resulting in more oil extraction and climate damages. We also contrast the open-loop Nash and efficient outcomes numerically with the feedback Nash outcomes. We find that the optimal carbon tax path in the feedback Nash equilibrium is flatter than in the open-loop Nash equilibrium. It turns out that for certain demand functions using the carbon tax as an import tariff may hurt consumers’ welfare as the resulting user cost of oil is so high that the fall in welfare wipes out the gain from higher tariff revenues.
- 28 May 2015
- Published by Springer Nature in Dynamic Games and Applications
- Vol. 5 (4) , 493-522
Open AccessBattle for Climate and Scarcity Rents: Beyond the Linear-Quadratic Case
Industria imports oil, produces final goods and wishes to mitigate global warming. Oilrabia exports oil and buys final goods from the other country. Industria uses the carbon tax to impose an import tariff on oil and steal some of Oilrabia’s scarcity rent. Conversely, Oilrabia has monopoly power and sets the oil price to steal some of Industria’s climate rent. We analyze the relative speeds of oil extraction and carbon accumulation under these strategic interactions for various production function specifications and compare these with the efficient and competitive outcomes. We prove that for the class of HARA production functions, the oil price is initially higher and subsequently lower in the open-loop Nash equilibrium than in the efficient outcome. The oil extraction rate is thus initially too low and in later stages too high. The HARA class includes linear, loglinear and semi-loglinear demand functions as special cases. For non-HARA production functions, Oilrabia may in the open-loop Nash equilibrium initially price oil lower than the efficient level, thus resulting in more oil extraction and climate damages. We also contrast the open-loop Nash and efficient outcomes numerically with the feedback Nash outcomes. We find that the optimal carbon tax path in the feedback Nash equilibrium is flatter than in the open-loop Nash equilibrium. It turns out that for certain demand functions using the carbon tax as an import tariff may hurt consumers’ welfare as the resulting user cost of oil is so high that the fall in welfare wipes out the gain from higher tariff revenues.
- 5 June 2014
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Environment and Development Economics
- Vol. 19 (3) , 324-327
The climate change, migration and conflict nexus
Early this year, Thomas Friedman (2014) reported on a (Wikileaks) cable sent in 2008 from the US Embassy in Damascus concerning the drought Syria had been suffering from since 2006 (and which was going to last for another couple of years). The Syrian UN food and agriculture representative was seeking assistance for among others 15,000 small-holding farmers, who might otherwise seek jobs in Syrian cities (leaving many women and children behind in poverty) and who could arguably add to already existing social and economic tensions in those cities.
- 5 June 2014
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Environment and Development Economics
- Vol. 19 (3) , 324-327
The climate change, migration and conflict nexus
Early this year, Thomas Friedman (2014) reported on a (Wikileaks) cable sent in 2008 from the US Embassy in Damascus concerning the drought Syria had been suffering from since 2006 (and which was going to last for another couple of years). The Syrian UN food and agriculture representative was seeking assistance for among others 15,000 small-holding farmers, who might otherwise seek jobs in Syrian cities (leaving many women and children behind in poverty) and who could arguably add to already existing social and economic tensions in those cities.