Lianzhong Zhang

The evolution of human cooperation is an important issue concerning social science. A deep understanding of human bounded rationality is a prerequisite for promoting collective cooperation and solving social dilemmas. Here we construct an asymmetric micro-dynamic based on bounded rationality from a micro perspective by combining behavioral economics and cognitive psychology with evolutionary game theory. Asynchronously updated Monte Carlo simulations were conducted where individuals were located on a square lattice to play a voluntary public goods game. The results showed that “free riding” behaviors can be effectively suppressed in most situations. The cooperation level can be obviously enhanced in a population comprising easily satisfied cooperators and greedy defectors. Moreover, essential conditions for the stability of the system are further discussed at the microscopic level, and altruistic behavior can be explained that an individual with lower expectations for or underestimation of a single game is more likely to cooperate. We argue that, compared to traditional approaches, the integration of interdisciplinary ideas should be taken more seriously.

Complex networks are ubiquitous in real-world systems. In the last decade, the investigation of complex networks has received much attention. Most of this research suggests that the topological properties of networks have an important influence on the evolution of cooperation. In this paper, we used the prisoner’s dilemma game and snowdrift game as models to study the problem of cooperation evolution on heterogeneous random networks. We found that the heterogeneity of the networks plays a more important role in promoting cooperation than the average clustering coefficient and average path length of the networks do. The higher the heterogeneity of the networks is, the more conducive the emergence and spread of cooperation is. In addition, we found that increasing the average degree of networks would be detrimental for cooperation to thrive.

In this work, we introduce a non-fixed investment ratio to the public goods games in which players can determine whether or not to participate and how much money to invest into the common pool, and with it a new mechanism has been established. We explicitly demonstrate a different rockscissors- paper dynamics which is a consequence of this model. Meanwhile, it is shown how the mechanism of non-fixed investment ratio influences the players’ decision. In addition, we found that the length of memory has an important effect on the average payoff of the population by this introduction.

In this paper, we investigated the public goods game (PGG) on evolving random networks by introducing informed cooperators ( IC) who can adjust their local topology of networks according to the...

In this paper, we investigated the cooperative behavior in prisoner’s dilemma when the individual behaviors and interaction structures could coevolve. Here, we study the model that the individuals can imitate the strategy of their neighbors and rewire their social ties throughout evolution, based exclusively on a fitness comparison. We find that the cooperation can be achieved if the time scale of network adaptation is large enough, even when the social dilemma strength is very strong. Detailed investigation shows that the presence or absence of the network adaptation has a profound impact on the collective behavior in the system.

The unsteady flow field past a two-dimensional permeable square cylinder was predicted by an updated CE/SE method. The periodic patterns of streamline and vortex shedding were obtained. The evolution of lift and drag coefficients were analysed. Results of 2D computations were compared with the experimental data. It found that the Reynolds number dominated the magnitude and frequency of the vorticity given porosity and Darcy number. It proved that the CE/SE method was an effective tool for predicting viscous flows in porous media.