DCDavid A. Coleman

David A. Coleman

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


David A. Coleman has a total of 1 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • The fertility of ethnic minorities in the UK, 1960s–2006

    by D. A. Coleman, S. Dubuc

    This paper presents estimates of the level and trend of the fertility of different ethnic minorities in the UK from the 1960s up to 2006. The fertility estimates are derived primarily from the Labour Force Survey using the Own-Child method, with additional information from the General Household Survey and vital registration data. Comparisons are made between the level of fertility of UK-born and immigrant mothers from minority groups, and the fertility of the populations in the country of origin. Total fertility in all groups has fallen from levels that were initially relatively high. That of some UK ethnic groups has already fallen to about the level of the UK national average (e.g., black Caribbean) or below it (e.g., Indian and Chinese). Only among Pakistani and Bangladeshi women does total fertility remain substantially above the national average despite a continuous decrease over the last 20 years.


  • The demographic effects of international migration in Europe

    by David Coleman

    International migration is now the dominant factor determining the size, rate of change, and composition of most European countries. Migration is driving quite rapid population growth in some north-western countries, slowing or arresting decline in the South, accelerating decline in the East. Migration is difficult to analyse: the process is complex, the data poor, and the theory unsatisfactory. Its many factors include unpredictable policy change. But some conclusions can be reached. While immigration usually reduces the average age of the recipient populations, it cannot ‘solve’ population ageing except through very high and exponentially increasing inflows. Already it is changing the face of European countries. According to available projections, the proportion of the population of foreign origin in some European countries will increase from 5–15 per cent of the total today, to 15–30 per cent by mid-century. Such projections depend primarily on the assumptions about the level of international migration.


  • Populations of the industrial world — a convergent demographic community?

    by D. A. Coleman

    Europe's populations have emerged from a long period of demographic transition. The old demographic anciens regimes no longer exist. The end‐point of demographic transition is often assumed to be convergence to a new stable post‐transitional regime. Convergence in demographic characteristics among all European countries might be expected to follow their acquisition of common economic and social structures. Remaining differences would then merely reflect different positions on the same trajectory to a common statistical destination. However, socio‐economic convergence remains incomplete and cannot be assumed to bring uniform demographic responses in its wake. This paper measures demographic convergence in industrial societies to see if they are acquiring a common pattern. Despite some clear upper limits to demographic variables, for example fertility, in proportional terms international demographic variation remains high and is declining only slowly, if at all. Either the expectation of convergence is wrong, or we are looking for it too soon. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.


  • Open Access

    Replacement migration, or why everyone is going to have to live in Korea: a fable for our times from the United Nations

    by D. A. Coleman

    This paper considers international migration in the context of population ageing. In many Western countries, the search for appropriate responses to manage future population ageing and population decline has directed attention to international migration. It seems reasonable to believe that international migrants, mostly of young working age, can supply population deficits created by low birth rates, protect European society and economy from the economic costs of elderly dependency, and provide a workforce to care for the elderly. Particular prominence has been given to this option through the publicity attendant on a report from the UN Population Division in 2000 on ‘replacement migration’, which has been widely reported and widely misunderstood. Although immigration can prevent population decline, it is already well known that it can only prevent population ageing at unprecedented, unsustainable and increasing levels of inflow, which would generate rapid population growth and eventually displace the original population from its majority position. This paper reviews these arguments in the context of the causes and inevitability of population ageing, with examples mostly based on UK data. It discusses various options available in response to population ageing through workforce, productivity, pensions reform and other means. It concludes that there can be no ‘solution’ to population ageing, which is to a considerable degree unavoidable. However, if the demographic regime of the United Kingdom continues to be relatively benign, future population ageing can be managed with tolerable inconvenience without recourse to increased immigration for ‘demographic’ purposes. At present (2001), net immigration to the United Kingdom is already running at record levels and is now the main engine behind UK population and household growth. By itself, population stabilization, or even mild reduction, is probably to be welcomed in the United Kingdom, although the issue has attracted little attention since the 1970s.


  • UK immigration policy: ‘Firm but fair’, and failing?

    by David A. Coleman

    This paper investigates the effectiveness of the UK immigration policy. For over two decades UK immigration policy has had clearly stated aims; to limit immigration for permanent settlement to a minimum, subject to the needs of the labour market and to obligations to dependents, genuine refugees and other exceptions. Government sources routinely describe it as firm but fair’. ‘Primary immigration’ is claimed, both by the Home Office and by the Commission for Racial Equality and by immigrant organizations, almost to have ended. The phrasing of the UK immigration policy incorporates certain ‘escape clauses’. Nonetheless if it is intended to reduce, or at least to prevent the increase of immigration defined demographically, then it has not been dramatically successful since its inception and has clearly been failing in that purpose since the mid‐1980s. This is partly because of the increase in asylum claiming since that time, and the failure to remove rejected claimants with no entitlement to remain in the UK. Although outside the ‘immigration policy’ in the strict sense, the 1993 legislation which was intended to curb asylum claiming has demonstrable not succeeded. The more general failure primarily concerns immigrants from the New Commonwealth, most of whom have entered the UK since the imposition of controls, and asylum claimants from the New Commonwealth and from the rest of the Third World.