Rune Jørgen Sørensen
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Rune Jørgen Sørensen has a total of 23 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Jostein Grytten
Department of Community Dentistry University of Oslo Oslo Norway
5 shared publications - Benny Geys
BI Norwegian Business School
4 shared publications - Leif Helland
BI Norwegian Business Sch, Oslo, Norway
3 shared publications Benny Geys
Norwegian Business School (BI), Norway
2 shared publications- Irene Skau
Department of Community Dentistry, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway
2 shared publications - Jon H. Fiva
BI Norwegian Business School
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 29 April 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- p. 1-19
When are politicians incentivized to vote? Evidence from individual-level panel data (2015–2023)
- 29 April 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- p. 1-19
Open AccessWhen are politicians incentivized to vote? Evidence from individual-level panel data (2015–2023)
- Open Access
- 24 April 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Political Science Review
- Vol. 120 (4) , 1386-1405
Vetting for Virtue: Democracy’s Challenge in Excluding Criminals from Office
How effective are democratic systems in preventing individuals with criminal backgrounds from holding political office? We investigate this question for the case of Norway, which has no legal restrictions against felons running for office. We analyze local election candidates from 2003 to 2019, paired with administrative records of criminal offenses. We demonstrate that individuals with criminal records are systematically penalized at every stage of their political careers. Candidates are less likely to have criminal records than the general population, with elected officials less likely to have criminal backgrounds than their unelected peers, and mayors being the most lawful. In Norway’s flexible-list PR system—where parties rank candidates and voters can cast personal votes for preferred candidates—our evidence shows that party gatekeeping accounts for most filtering, while personal votes contribute little at the margin.
- 24 April 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Political Science Review
- Vol. 120 (4) , 1386-1405
Open AccessVetting for Virtue: Democracy’s Challenge in Excluding Criminals from Office
How effective are democratic systems in preventing individuals with criminal backgrounds from holding political office? We investigate this question for the case of Norway, which has no legal restrictions against felons running for office. We analyze local election candidates from 2003 to 2019, paired with administrative records of criminal offenses. We demonstrate that individuals with criminal records are systematically penalized at every stage of their political careers. Candidates are less likely to have criminal records than the general population, with elected officials less likely to have criminal backgrounds than their unelected peers, and mayors being the most lawful. In Norway’s flexible-list PR system—where parties rank candidates and voters can cast personal votes for preferred candidates—our evidence shows that party gatekeeping accounts for most filtering, while personal votes contribute little at the margin.
- Open Access
- 6 February 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in British Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 55, e7
The Causal Effect of Affluence on Voter Turnout: New Evidence from Lottery Winnings
Affluent citizens commonly record higher election turnout than less affluent citizens. Yet, the causal effect of affluence on voter turnout remains poorly understood. In this article, we rely on Norwegian administrative data to estimate the impact of random, exogenous shocks in (unearned) income on individual-level voter turnout. Exploiting the random timing and size of lottery wins for identification, our main findings suggest that a lottery windfall in the years just before an election boosts individuals’ turnout probability by 1.6 to 1.9 percentage points. Crucially, these point estimates reflect only a small share of turnout differences observed across the income distribution. Hence, our findings strongly suggest that most of the commonly observed positive income-turnout associations do not reflect a causal relationship.
- 6 February 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in British Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 55, e7
Open AccessThe Causal Effect of Affluence on Voter Turnout: New Evidence from Lottery Winnings
Affluent citizens commonly record higher election turnout than less affluent citizens. Yet, the causal effect of affluence on voter turnout remains poorly understood. In this article, we rely on Norwegian administrative data to estimate the impact of random, exogenous shocks in (unearned) income on individual-level voter turnout. Exploiting the random timing and size of lottery wins for identification, our main findings suggest that a lottery windfall in the years just before an election boosts individuals’ turnout probability by 1.6 to 1.9 percentage points. Crucially, these point estimates reflect only a small share of turnout differences observed across the income distribution. Hence, our findings strongly suggest that most of the commonly observed positive income-turnout associations do not reflect a causal relationship.
- Open Access
- 21 September 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 227
Are politicians more generous? Evidence from charitable giving
- 21 September 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 227
Open AccessAre politicians more generous? Evidence from charitable giving
- 1 January 2024
- Published by University of Chicago Press in The Journal of Politics
- Vol. 86 (1) , 170-182
Public Employees as Elected Politicians: Assessing Direct and Indirect Substantive Effects of Passive Representation
- 1 January 2024
- Published by University of Chicago Press in The Journal of Politics
- Vol. 86 (1) , 170-182
Public Employees as Elected Politicians: Assessing Direct and Indirect Substantive Effects of Passive Representation
- Open Access
- 7 September 2021
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Political Science Review
- Vol. 116 (1) , 367-373
Public Sector Employment and Voter Turnout
Does working in the public rather than the private sector have a causal effect on electoral participation? Extant evidence using cross-sectional survey data remains unpersuasive due to data limitations and concerns posed by preference-based job selection. We address these challenges using population-wide individual-level register data on voter turnout covering four Norwegian local and national elections between 2013 and 2019. We identify causal effects by tracking the same individuals over time during (a) shifts between private- and public-sector employment, (b) relocations between municipalities, and (c) shifts into retirement. We find that local public-sector employees display 1–3 percentage points higher voter turnout compared with private-sector employees. These effects arise particularly when working in their residential municipality, but they largely dissipate upon retirement.
- 7 September 2021
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Political Science Review
- Vol. 116 (1) , 367-373
Open AccessPublic Sector Employment and Voter Turnout
Does working in the public rather than the private sector have a causal effect on electoral participation? Extant evidence using cross-sectional survey data remains unpersuasive due to data limitations and concerns posed by preference-based job selection. We address these challenges using population-wide individual-level register data on voter turnout covering four Norwegian local and national elections between 2013 and 2019. We identify causal effects by tracking the same individuals over time during (a) shifts between private- and public-sector employment, (b) relocations between municipalities, and (c) shifts into retirement. We find that local public-sector employees display 1–3 percentage points higher voter turnout compared with private-sector employees. These effects arise particularly when working in their residential municipality, but they largely dissipate upon retirement.
- Open Access
- 2 September 2021
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory
- Vol. 32 (2) , 326-341
Political (Over)Representation of Public Sector Employees and the Double-Motive Hypothesis: Evidence from Norwegian Register Data (2007–2019)
Countries have widely diverging regulations regarding the eligibility of public sector employees for political office, and the stringency of such regulations remains fiercely debated. Building on a demand and supply model of political selection, this article contributes to such debates by studying whether and how the incentives of public employees as both consumers and producers of public services (their ‘double motive’) affects their descriptive political representation. Our analysis employs population-wide individual-level register data covering four Norwegian local elections between 2007 and 2019 (N>13 million observations). Using predominantly individual-level panel regression models, we find that public employees are strongly overrepresented on election lists and have a higher probability of election (conditional on running). Looking at underlying mechanisms, we provide evidence consistent with the ‘double motive’ of public employees inducing their self-selection into standing for elected office (at higher-ranked ballot positions). Demand-side effects deriving from party and voter selection receive more limited empirical support. We discuss ensuing concerns about the potential substantive representation of policy self-interests by elected public employees.
- 2 September 2021
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory
- Vol. 32 (2) , 326-341
Open AccessPolitical (Over)Representation of Public Sector Employees and the Double-Motive Hypothesis: Evidence from Norwegian Register Data (2007–2019)
Countries have widely diverging regulations regarding the eligibility of public sector employees for political office, and the stringency of such regulations remains fiercely debated. Building on a demand and supply model of political selection, this article contributes to such debates by studying whether and how the incentives of public employees as both consumers and producers of public services (their ‘double motive’) affects their descriptive political representation. Our analysis employs population-wide individual-level register data covering four Norwegian local elections between 2007 and 2019 (N>13 million observations). Using predominantly individual-level panel regression models, we find that public employees are strongly overrepresented on election lists and have a higher probability of election (conditional on running). Looking at underlying mechanisms, we provide evidence consistent with the ‘double motive’ of public employees inducing their self-selection into standing for elected office (at higher-ranked ballot positions). Demand-side effects deriving from party and voter selection receive more limited empirical support. We discuss ensuing concerns about the potential substantive representation of policy self-interests by elected public employees.
Administrative Delegation of Budgetary Powers and Fiscal Performance
Summary: Does delegation of the budget preparation process to top civil servants improve or worsen fiscal performance? We address this question by analyzing high‐quality data on budgetary procedures and fiscal performance over a 25‐year period in Norwegian local governments. This long time period allows exploiting substantial variation in budgetary procedures across time and space. The results show that administrative delegation decreases fiscal deficits as a share of current revenues. Compared to procedures relying on political coordination or the traditional ‘bottom‐up’ procedure, deficits are approximately 0.3 percentage points lower on average under administrative delegation. Still, this effect is conditional upon the presence of minority governments and fails to materialize when the mayor enjoys majority support in the local council. Our results thus indicate that administrative delegation in budgetary processes may constitute an important tool to alleviate poor fiscal performance arising due to political coordination failures and weak political decision‐making.
Administrative Delegation of Budgetary Powers and Fiscal Performance
Summary: Does delegation of the budget preparation process to top civil servants improve or worsen fiscal performance? We address this question by analyzing high‐quality data on budgetary procedures and fiscal performance over a 25‐year period in Norwegian local governments. This long time period allows exploiting substantial variation in budgetary procedures across time and space. The results show that administrative delegation decreases fiscal deficits as a share of current revenues. Compared to procedures relying on political coordination or the traditional ‘bottom‐up’ procedure, deficits are approximately 0.3 percentage points lower on average under administrative delegation. Still, this effect is conditional upon the presence of minority governments and fails to materialize when the mayor enjoys majority support in the local council. Our results thus indicate that administrative delegation in budgetary processes may constitute an important tool to alleviate poor fiscal performance arising due to political coordination failures and weak political decision‐making.
- Open Access
- 1 September 2017
- Published by Elsevier in Health Policy
- Vol. 121 (9) , 986-993
The impact of the mass media on obstetricians’ behavior in Norway
- 1 September 2017
- Published by Elsevier in Health Policy
- Vol. 121 (9) , 986-993
Open AccessThe impact of the mass media on obstetricians’ behavior in Norway
- 17 January 2017
- Published by Wiley in The Scandinavian Journal of Economics
- Vol. 120 (1) , 3-30
The Power of Parties: Evidence from Close Municipal Elections in Norway
We show that small shifts in representation can affect policy in proportional election systems. Using data from Norway, we find that a larger left‐wing party leads to more property taxation, higher childcare spending, and lower elderly care spending, while local public goods appear to be a non‐partisan issue. These effects are partly due to shifts in bloc majorities, and partly due to changes in the left–right position of the council, keeping the majority constant. The estimates on spending allocations are rather imprecise, but they are consistent with evidence on politicians' fiscal preferences and patterns in media attention.
- 17 January 2017
- Published by Wiley in The Scandinavian Journal of Economics
- Vol. 120 (1) , 3-30
The Power of Parties: Evidence from Close Municipal Elections in Norway
We show that small shifts in representation can affect policy in proportional election systems. Using data from Norway, we find that a larger left‐wing party leads to more property taxation, higher childcare spending, and lower elderly care spending, while local public goods appear to be a non‐partisan issue. These effects are partly due to shifts in bloc majorities, and partly due to changes in the left–right position of the council, keeping the majority constant. The estimates on spending allocations are rather imprecise, but they are consistent with evidence on politicians' fiscal preferences and patterns in media attention.