Justin Broackes
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Latest Publications
- 15 May 2011
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Philosophy and Psychology
- Vol. 2 (4) , 601-628
Where Do the Unique Hues Come from?
- 15 May 2011
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Philosophy and Psychology
- Vol. 2 (4) , 601-628
Where Do the Unique Hues Come from?
- 25 August 2010
- Published by Springer Nature in Ophthalmic and Physiological Optics
- Vol. 30 (5) , 672-684
Unilateral colour vision defects and the dimensions of dichromat experience
The standard view, that protanopes and deuteranopes see only varieties of yellow and blue, is often taken to be supported by the reports of people with one colour‐blind eye and one normal (or near‐normal) eye. Judd’s survey of 89 years of unilateral cases might seem authoritative: ‘The color perceptions of both protanopic and deuteranopic observers are confined to two hues, yellow and blue’, corresponding to 575 and 470 nm (DB Judd, J Research National Bureau Standards, 41: 247–271, 1948). A critical re‐examination reveals, however, that the cases do not support Judd’s claim: the original publications indicate in most cases substantial (though limited) red‐green discrimination with the dichromatic eye under favourable conditions (e.g. with large fields), and evidence of red/green sensation; in the main case where researchers find sensation only of yellow and blue, it is by using experimental methods that are almost guaranteed not to reveal the full range of the subject’s sensation. More recent reports (from the 1950s and later) show that, if the colour experience space of a dichromat eye collapses to a 2D slice through the 3D space of a normal trichromat, the slice may be not flat but curved (and curved in more than one dimension): there are further reasons to think that dichromat colour experience, whether unilateral or bilateral, may not collapse to a plane at all. The unilateral cases are unclear in many ways, but they certainly give no support to a ‘yellow‐and‐blue’ view of dichromat experience.
- 25 August 2010
- Published by Springer Nature in Ophthalmic and Physiological Optics
- Vol. 30 (5) , 672-684
Unilateral colour vision defects and the dimensions of dichromat experience
The standard view, that protanopes and deuteranopes see only varieties of yellow and blue, is often taken to be supported by the reports of people with one colour‐blind eye and one normal (or near‐normal) eye. Judd’s survey of 89 years of unilateral cases might seem authoritative: ‘The color perceptions of both protanopic and deuteranopic observers are confined to two hues, yellow and blue’, corresponding to 575 and 470 nm (DB Judd, J Research National Bureau Standards, 41: 247–271, 1948). A critical re‐examination reveals, however, that the cases do not support Judd’s claim: the original publications indicate in most cases substantial (though limited) red‐green discrimination with the dichromatic eye under favourable conditions (e.g. with large fields), and evidence of red/green sensation; in the main case where researchers find sensation only of yellow and blue, it is by using experimental methods that are almost guaranteed not to reveal the full range of the subject’s sensation. More recent reports (from the 1950s and later) show that, if the colour experience space of a dichromat eye collapses to a 2D slice through the 3D space of a normal trichromat, the slice may be not flat but curved (and curved in more than one dimension): there are further reasons to think that dichromat colour experience, whether unilateral or bilateral, may not collapse to a plane at all. The unilateral cases are unclear in many ways, but they certainly give no support to a ‘yellow‐and‐blue’ view of dichromat experience.
- 23 April 2009
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in The Classical Quarterly
- Vol. 59 (1) , 46-59
AΥTOΣ KAΘ' AΥTON IN THE CLOUDS: WAS SOCRATES HIMSELF A DEFENDER OF SEPARABLE SOUL AND SEPARATE FORMS?
- 23 April 2009
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in The Classical Quarterly
- Vol. 59 (1) , 46-59
AΥTOΣ KAΘ' AΥTON IN THE CLOUDS: WAS SOCRATES HIMSELF A DEFENDER OF SEPARABLE SOUL AND SEPARATE FORMS?
- 20 February 2007
- Published by Springer Nature in Erkenntnis
- Vol. 66 (1-2) , 27-71
Colour, world and archimedean metaphysics: stroud and the quest for reality
- 20 February 2007
- Published by Springer Nature in Erkenntnis
- Vol. 66 (1-2) , 27-71
Colour, world and archimedean metaphysics: stroud and the quest for reality
- 1 February 2003
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 26 (6) , 786-788
Do opponent process theories help physicalism about color?
Byrne & Hilbert (B&H) give some excellent replies to the objections to realism about color. However, the particular form of realism they propose, based on opponent processing, prompts several challenges. Why characterize a color by its tendency to produce an intermediate brain signal, rather than in terms of the final effect – either a perception or a neural substrate for it? At the level of the retina, and even of the cortex, there are processes that partly parallel the structure of color experience; but the correspondence is not exact. Must we assume that there is any place in the brain where an exact structural correspondence is found? At the level of psychophysical functioning, there is indeed opponency; but it is not clear that this gives us the kind of type-reduction that B&H want.
- 1 February 2003
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 26 (6) , 786-788
Do opponent process theories help physicalism about color?
Byrne & Hilbert (B&H) give some excellent replies to the objections to realism about color. However, the particular form of realism they propose, based on opponent processing, prompts several challenges. Why characterize a color by its tendency to produce an intermediate brain signal, rather than in terms of the final effect – either a perception or a neural substrate for it? At the level of the retina, and even of the cortex, there are processes that partly parallel the structure of color experience; but the correspondence is not exact. Must we assume that there is any place in the brain where an exact structural correspondence is found? At the level of psychophysical functioning, there is indeed opponency; but it is not clear that this gives us the kind of type-reduction that B&H want.
- 1 June 2001
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 24 (5) , 978-979
Experience, attention, and mental representation
O'Regan & Noë make plausible that perception involves mastery of sensory-motor dependencies. Their rejection of qualia, however, is less persuasive; as is their view that we see only what we are attending to. At times they seem to oppose “internal representation” in general; I argue that they should in fact only be rejecting crude conceptions of brain picturing.
- 1 June 2001
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 24 (5) , 978-979
Experience, attention, and mental representation
O'Regan & Noë make plausible that perception involves mastery of sensory-motor dependencies. Their rejection of qualia, however, is less persuasive; as is their view that we see only what we are attending to. At times they seem to oppose “internal representation” in general; I argue that they should in fact only be rejecting crude conceptions of brain picturing.