Steven E. Clark
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Steven E. Clark has a total of 20 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Curt A. Carlson
Texas A&M University–Commerce USA
2 shared publications J. Marie Hicks
Department of Psychology University of California Riverside California
2 shared publicationsScott D. Gronlund
University of Oklahoma, Norman, USA
2 shared publications- Scott D. Gronlund
University of Oklahoma, Norman, USA
2 shared publications Aaron S. Benjamin
University of Illinois, Champaign, USA
1 shared publication- Charles A. Goodsell1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 16 August 2020
- Published by Wiley in Applied Cognitive Psychology
- Vol. 35 (1) , 52-61
Persuasiveness and sensitivity to witnessing conditions depend on how testimony is presented
Summary: The present experiment examined the persuasiveness (measured primarily by proportions of guilty verdicts) of the testimony of a single eyewitness as a function of witnessing conditions and method of presenting the testimony–via a Video or Audio recording or a written Transcript or Summary. Proportions of guilty verdicts showed little variation across presentation methods when witnessing conditions were relatively good, but were higher for Video and Audio presentations than for Transcript and Summary presentations when witnessing conditions were relatively poor. These results combined to show a decrease in sensitivity to witnessing conditions for Video and Audio presentations relative to Transcript and Summary presentations. These results were accounted for by a simple weighted cues model.
- 16 August 2020
- Published by Wiley in Applied Cognitive Psychology
- Vol. 35 (1) , 52-61
Persuasiveness and sensitivity to witnessing conditions depend on how testimony is presented
Summary: The present experiment examined the persuasiveness (measured primarily by proportions of guilty verdicts) of the testimony of a single eyewitness as a function of witnessing conditions and method of presenting the testimony–via a Video or Audio recording or a written Transcript or Summary. Proportions of guilty verdicts showed little variation across presentation methods when witnessing conditions were relatively good, but were higher for Video and Audio presentations than for Transcript and Summary presentations when witnessing conditions were relatively poor. These results combined to show a decrease in sensitivity to witnessing conditions for Video and Audio presentations relative to Transcript and Summary presentations. These results were accounted for by a simple weighted cues model.
- Open Access
- 1 October 2015
- Published by SAGE Publications in Policy Insights from the Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 2 (1) , 175-186
Eyewitness Identification and the Accuracy of the Criminal Justice System
This article addresses the problem of eyewitness identification errors that can lead to false convictions of the innocent and false acquittals of the guilty. At the heart of our analysis based on signal detection theory is the separation of diagnostic accuracy—the ability to discriminate between those who are guilty versus those who are innocent—from the consideration of the relative costs associated with different kinds of errors. Application of this theory suggests that current recommendations for reforms have conflated diagnostic accuracy with the evaluation of costs in such a way as to reduce the accuracy of identification evidence and the accuracy of adjudicative outcomes. Our framework points to a revision in recommended procedures and a framework for policy analysis.
- 1 October 2015
- Published by SAGE Publications in Policy Insights from the Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 2 (1) , 175-186
Open AccessEyewitness Identification and the Accuracy of the Criminal Justice System
This article addresses the problem of eyewitness identification errors that can lead to false convictions of the innocent and false acquittals of the guilty. At the heart of our analysis based on signal detection theory is the separation of diagnostic accuracy—the ability to discriminate between those who are guilty versus those who are innocent—from the consideration of the relative costs associated with different kinds of errors. Application of this theory suggests that current recommendations for reforms have conflated diagnostic accuracy with the evaluation of costs in such a way as to reduce the accuracy of identification evidence and the accuracy of adjudicative outcomes. Our framework points to a revision in recommended procedures and a framework for policy analysis.
- 1 January 2014
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA)
Contagious memory: Changes in recall accuracy following discussion
- 1 January 2014
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA)
Contagious memory: Changes in recall accuracy following discussion
- 21 November 2013
- Published by Springer Nature in Psychonomic Bulletin & Review
- Vol. 21 (2) , 251-267
Evolution of the empirical and theoretical foundations of eyewitness identification reform
Scientists in many disciplines have begun to raise questions about the evolution of research findings over time (Ioannidis in Epidemiology, 19, 640–648, 2008; Jennions & Møller in Proceedings of the Royal Society, Biological Sciences, 269, 43–48, 2002; Mullen, Muellerleile, & Bryan in Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 27, 1450–1462, 2001; Schooler in Nature, 470, 437, 2011), since many phenomena exhibit decline effects—reductions in the magnitudes of effect sizes as empirical evidence accumulates. The present article examines empirical and theoretical evolution in eyewitness identification research. For decades, the field has held that there are identification procedures that, if implemented by law enforcement, would increase eyewitness accuracy, either by reducing false identifications, with little or no change in correct identifications, or by increasing correct identifications, with little or no change in false identifications. Despite the durability of this no-cost view, it is unambiguously contradicted by data (Clark in Perspectives on Psychological Science, 7, 238–259, 2012a; Clark & Godfrey in Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 16, 22–42, 2009; Clark, Moreland, & Rush, 2013; Palmer & Brewer in Law and Human Behavior, 36, 247–255, 2012), raising questions as to how the no-cost view became well-accepted and endured for so long. Our analyses suggest that (1) seminal studies produced, or were interpreted as having produced, the no-cost pattern of results; (2) a compelling theory was developed that appeared to account for the no-cost pattern; (3) empirical results changed over the years, and subsequent studies did not reliably replicate the no-cost pattern; and (4) the no-cost view survived despite the accumulation of contradictory empirical evidence. Theories of memory that were ruled out by early data now appear to be supported by data, and the theory developed to account for early data now appears to be incorrect.
- 21 November 2013
- Published by Springer Nature in Psychonomic Bulletin & Review
- Vol. 21 (2) , 251-267
Evolution of the empirical and theoretical foundations of eyewitness identification reform
Scientists in many disciplines have begun to raise questions about the evolution of research findings over time (Ioannidis in Epidemiology, 19, 640–648, 2008; Jennions & Møller in Proceedings of the Royal Society, Biological Sciences, 269, 43–48, 2002; Mullen, Muellerleile, & Bryan in Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 27, 1450–1462, 2001; Schooler in Nature, 470, 437, 2011), since many phenomena exhibit decline effects—reductions in the magnitudes of effect sizes as empirical evidence accumulates. The present article examines empirical and theoretical evolution in eyewitness identification research. For decades, the field has held that there are identification procedures that, if implemented by law enforcement, would increase eyewitness accuracy, either by reducing false identifications, with little or no change in correct identifications, or by increasing correct identifications, with little or no change in false identifications. Despite the durability of this no-cost view, it is unambiguously contradicted by data (Clark in Perspectives on Psychological Science, 7, 238–259, 2012a; Clark & Godfrey in Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 16, 22–42, 2009; Clark, Moreland, & Rush, 2013; Palmer & Brewer in Law and Human Behavior, 36, 247–255, 2012), raising questions as to how the no-cost view became well-accepted and endured for so long. Our analyses suggest that (1) seminal studies produced, or were interpreted as having produced, the no-cost pattern of results; (2) a compelling theory was developed that appeared to account for the no-cost pattern; (3) empirical results changed over the years, and subsequent studies did not reliably replicate the no-cost pattern; and (4) the no-cost view survived despite the accumulation of contradictory empirical evidence. Theories of memory that were ruled out by early data now appear to be supported by data, and the theory developed to account for early data now appears to be incorrect.
- 16 May 2012
- Published by SAGE Publications in Perspectives on Psychological Science
- Vol. 7 (3) , 279-283
Eyewitness Identification Reform
Some commentators view my analyses (Clark, 2012, this issue) as an important step forward in assessing the costs and benefits of eyewitness identification reform. Others suggest that the trade-off between correct identifications lost and false identifications avoided is well-known; that the expected utility model is misspecified; and that the loss of correct identifications due to the use of reformed eyewitness identification procedures is irrelevant to policy decisions, as those correct identifications are the illegitimate product of suggestion and lucky guesses. Contrary to these criticisms, the loss of correct identifications has not been adequately considered in theoretical or policy matters, criticisms regarding the various utilities do not substantively change the nature of the trade-off, and the dismissal of lost correct identifications is based not on data but on an outdated theory of recognition memory.
- 16 May 2012
- Published by SAGE Publications in Perspectives on Psychological Science
- Vol. 7 (3) , 279-283
Eyewitness Identification Reform
Some commentators view my analyses (Clark, 2012, this issue) as an important step forward in assessing the costs and benefits of eyewitness identification reform. Others suggest that the trade-off between correct identifications lost and false identifications avoided is well-known; that the expected utility model is misspecified; and that the loss of correct identifications due to the use of reformed eyewitness identification procedures is irrelevant to policy decisions, as those correct identifications are the illegitimate product of suggestion and lucky guesses. Contrary to these criticisms, the loss of correct identifications has not been adequately considered in theoretical or policy matters, criticisms regarding the various utilities do not substantively change the nature of the trade-off, and the dismissal of lost correct identifications is based not on data but on an outdated theory of recognition memory.
- Top Cited Papers
- 16 May 2012
- Published by SAGE Publications in Perspectives on Psychological Science
- Vol. 7 (3) , 238-259
Costs and Benefits of Eyewitness Identification Reform
Psychological science has come to play an increasingly important role in the legal system by informing the court through expert testimony and by shaping public policy. In recent years, psychological research has driven a movement to reform the procedures that police use to obtain eyewitness identification evidence. This reform movement has been based in part on an argument suggesting that recommended procedures reduce the risk of false identifications with little or no reduction in the rate of correct identifications. A review of the empirical literature, however, challenges this no-cost view. With only one exception, changes in eyewitness identification procedures that reduce the risk of false identification of the innocent also reduce the likelihood of correct identification of the guilty. The implication that criminals may escape prosecution as a result of procedures implemented to protect the innocent makes policy decisions far more complicated than they would otherwise be under the no-cost view. These costs (correct identifications lost) and benefits (false identifications avoided) are discussed in terms of probative value and expected utility.
- 16 May 2012
- Published by SAGE Publications in Perspectives on Psychological Science
- Vol. 7 (3) , 238-259
Top Cited PapersCosts and Benefits of Eyewitness Identification Reform
Psychological science has come to play an increasingly important role in the legal system by informing the court through expert testimony and by shaping public policy. In recent years, psychological research has driven a movement to reform the procedures that police use to obtain eyewitness identification evidence. This reform movement has been based in part on an argument suggesting that recommended procedures reduce the risk of false identifications with little or no reduction in the rate of correct identifications. A review of the empirical literature, however, challenges this no-cost view. With only one exception, changes in eyewitness identification procedures that reduce the risk of false identification of the innocent also reduce the likelihood of correct identification of the guilty. The implication that criminals may escape prosecution as a result of procedures implemented to protect the innocent makes policy decisions far more complicated than they would otherwise be under the no-cost view. These costs (correct identifications lost) and benefits (false identifications avoided) are discussed in terms of probative value and expected utility.
- 1 October 2011
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Law and Human Behavior
- Vol. 35 (5) , 364-380
Probative value of absolute and relative judgments in eyewitness identification.
It is well-accepted that eyewitness identification decisions based on relative judgments are less accurate than identification decisions based on absolute judgments. However, the theoretical foundation for this view has not been established. In this study relative and absolute judgments were compared through simulations of the WITNESS model (Clark, Appl Cogn Psychol 17:629-654, 2003) to address the question: Do suspect identifications based on absolute judgments have higher probative value than suspect identifications based on relative judgments? Simulations of the WITNESS model showed a consistent advantage for absolute judgments over relative judgments for suspect-matched lineups. However, simulations of same-foils lineups showed a complex interaction based on the accuracy of memory and the similarity relationships among lineup members.
- 1 October 2011
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Law and Human Behavior
- Vol. 35 (5) , 364-380
Probative value of absolute and relative judgments in eyewitness identification.
It is well-accepted that eyewitness identification decisions based on relative judgments are less accurate than identification decisions based on absolute judgments. However, the theoretical foundation for this view has not been established. In this study relative and absolute judgments were compared through simulations of the WITNESS model (Clark, Appl Cogn Psychol 17:629-654, 2003) to address the question: Do suspect identifications based on absolute judgments have higher probative value than suspect identifications based on relative judgments? Simulations of the WITNESS model showed a consistent advantage for absolute judgments over relative judgments for suspect-matched lineups. However, simulations of same-foils lineups showed a complex interaction based on the accuracy of memory and the similarity relationships among lineup members.
- 1 January 2011
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA)
Deconstructing the Simultaneous and Sequential Lineup Meta-Analysis
- 1 January 2011
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA)
Deconstructing the Simultaneous and Sequential Lineup Meta-Analysis
- 1 February 2009
- Published by Springer Nature in Psychonomic Bulletin & Review
- Vol. 16 (1) , 22-42
Eyewitness identification evidence and innocence risk
It is well known that the frailties of human memory and vulnerability to suggestion lead to eyewitness identification errors. However, variations in different aspects of the eyewitnessing conditions produce different kinds of errors that are related to wrongful convictions in very different ways. We present a review of the eyewitness identification literature, organized around underlying cognitive mechanisms, memory, similarity, and decision processes, assessing the effects on both correct and mistaken identification. In addition, we calculate a conditional probability we call innocence risk, which is the probability that the suspect is innocent, given that the suspect was identified. Assessment of innocence risk is critical to the theoretical development of eyewitness identification research, as well as to legal decision making and policy evaluation. Our review shows a complex relationship between misidentification and innocence risk, sheds light on some areas of controversy, and suggests that some issues thought to be resolved are in need of additional research.
- 1 February 2009
- Published by Springer Nature in Psychonomic Bulletin & Review
- Vol. 16 (1) , 22-42
Eyewitness identification evidence and innocence risk
It is well known that the frailties of human memory and vulnerability to suggestion lead to eyewitness identification errors. However, variations in different aspects of the eyewitnessing conditions produce different kinds of errors that are related to wrongful convictions in very different ways. We present a review of the eyewitness identification literature, organized around underlying cognitive mechanisms, memory, similarity, and decision processes, assessing the effects on both correct and mistaken identification. In addition, we calculate a conditional probability we call innocence risk, which is the probability that the suspect is innocent, given that the suspect was identified. Assessment of innocence risk is critical to the theoretical development of eyewitness identification research, as well as to legal decision making and policy evaluation. Our review shows a complex relationship between misidentification and innocence risk, sheds light on some areas of controversy, and suggests that some issues thought to be resolved are in need of additional research.