Christopher Garmon
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Christopher Garmon has a total of 2 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Deborah Haas‐Wilson
Department of Economics , Smith College , Northampton, MA, 01063
2 shared publications Benjamin Chartock
Benjamin Chartock is a research analyst in the Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 January 2017
- Published by Health Affairs Publishing, LLC in Health Affairs
- Vol. 36 (1) , 177-181
One In Five Inpatient Emergency Department Cases May Lead To Surprise Bills
A surprise medical bill is a bill from an out-of-network provider that was not expected by the patient or that came from an out-of-network provider not chosen by the patient. In 2014, 20 percent of hospital inpatient admissions that originated in the emergency department (ED), 14 percent of outpatient visits to the ED, and 9 percent of elective inpatient admissions likely led to a surprise medical bill.
- 1 January 2017
- Published by Health Affairs Publishing, LLC in Health Affairs
- Vol. 36 (1) , 177-181
One In Five Inpatient Emergency Department Cases May Lead To Surprise Bills
A surprise medical bill is a bill from an out-of-network provider that was not expected by the patient or that came from an out-of-network provider not chosen by the patient. In 2014, 20 percent of hospital inpatient admissions that originated in the emergency department (ED), 14 percent of outpatient visits to the ED, and 9 percent of elective inpatient admissions likely led to a surprise medical bill.
- 25 January 2013
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Health Economics, Policy and Law
- Vol. 8 (3) , 365-384
Employer-provided health insurance and hospital mergers
This paper explores the impact of employer-provided health insurance on hospital competition and hospital mergers. Under employer-provided health insurance, employer executives act as agents for their employees in selecting health insurance options for their firm. The paper investigates whether a merger of hospitals favored by executives will result in a larger price increase than a merger of competing hospitals elsewhere. This is found to be the case even when the executive has the same opportunity cost of travel as her employees and even when the executive is the sole owner of the firm, retaining all profits. This is consistent with the Federal Trade Commission's findings in its challenge of Evanston Northwestern Healthcare's acquisition of Highland Park Hospital. Implications of the model are further tested with executive location data and hospital data from Florida and Texas.
- 25 January 2013
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Health Economics, Policy and Law
- Vol. 8 (3) , 365-384
Employer-provided health insurance and hospital mergers
This paper explores the impact of employer-provided health insurance on hospital competition and hospital mergers. Under employer-provided health insurance, employer executives act as agents for their employees in selecting health insurance options for their firm. The paper investigates whether a merger of hospitals favored by executives will result in a larger price increase than a merger of competing hospitals elsewhere. This is found to be the case even when the executive has the same opportunity cost of travel as her employees and even when the executive is the sole owner of the firm, retaining all profits. This is consistent with the Federal Trade Commission's findings in its challenge of Evanston Northwestern Healthcare's acquisition of Highland Park Hospital. Implications of the model are further tested with executive location data and hospital data from Florida and Texas.
- 12 January 2012
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Sports Economics
- Vol. 14 (5) , 451-478
Major League Baseball’s First Year Player Draft
Major League Baseball’s (MLB) Draft is a natural laboratory for the study of bargaining: There are no bonus restrictions, draft picks cannot be traded, and there are no commitment issues (i.e., players “declaring” for the draft). This article tests the implications of bargaining theory using data from the 2003-2010 MLB drafts. In 2007, new draft rules were introduced, but not uniformly across the draft, making it possible to estimate the effect of each change. Although the rule changes were designed to lower bonuses, they had the opposite effect. The rule changes led to $178 million in extra compensation to drafted players.
- 12 January 2012
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Sports Economics
- Vol. 14 (5) , 451-478
Major League Baseball’s First Year Player Draft
Major League Baseball’s (MLB) Draft is a natural laboratory for the study of bargaining: There are no bonus restrictions, draft picks cannot be traded, and there are no commitment issues (i.e., players “declaring” for the draft). This article tests the implications of bargaining theory using data from the 2003-2010 MLB drafts. In 2007, new draft rules were introduced, but not uniformly across the draft, making it possible to estimate the effect of each change. Although the rule changes were designed to lower bonuses, they had the opposite effect. The rule changes led to $178 million in extra compensation to drafted players.
- 19 February 2011
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of the Economics of Business
- Vol. 18 (1) , 41-44
The Use of Multiple Control Groups and Data Sources as Validation in Retrospective Studies of Hospital Mergers
(2011). The Use of Multiple Control Groups and Data Sources as Validation in Retrospective Studies of Hospital Mergers. International Journal of the Economics of Business: Vol. 18, Hospital Mergers and Antitrust Policy, pp. 41-44.
- 19 February 2011
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of the Economics of Business
- Vol. 18 (1) , 41-44
The Use of Multiple Control Groups and Data Sources as Validation in Retrospective Studies of Hospital Mergers
(2011). The Use of Multiple Control Groups and Data Sources as Validation in Retrospective Studies of Hospital Mergers. International Journal of the Economics of Business: Vol. 18, Hospital Mergers and Antitrust Policy, pp. 41-44.
- 19 February 2011
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of the Economics of Business
- Vol. 18 (1) , 17-32
Hospital Mergers and Competitive Effects: Two Retrospective Analyses
We present empirical analyses of the effects of two hospital mergers – both occurring in the northern suburbs of Chicago in 2000 – on the pre‐ and post‐merger prices negotiated with commercial health insurers. Using difference‐in‐differences methodology and data on actual transaction prices, specifically the prices paid by private health insurance companies and patients for inpatient care, we find one of the mergers was anticompetitive. Relative to price increases at other hospitals, the merger between Evanston Northwestern and Highland Park Hospitals led to large and statistically significant post‐merger price increases. Our results are robust across data sources, control groups, and case‐mix adjustment methods.
- 19 February 2011
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of the Economics of Business
- Vol. 18 (1) , 17-32
Hospital Mergers and Competitive Effects: Two Retrospective Analyses
We present empirical analyses of the effects of two hospital mergers – both occurring in the northern suburbs of Chicago in 2000 – on the pre‐ and post‐merger prices negotiated with commercial health insurers. Using difference‐in‐differences methodology and data on actual transaction prices, specifically the prices paid by private health insurance companies and patients for inpatient care, we find one of the mergers was anticompetitive. Relative to price increases at other hospitals, the merger between Evanston Northwestern and Highland Park Hospitals led to large and statistically significant post‐merger price increases. Our results are robust across data sources, control groups, and case‐mix adjustment methods.
- 1 April 2004
- Published by Wiley in Southern Economic Journal
- Vol. 70 (4) , 893-904
Complements Integration and Foreclosure: The Case of Joint Consumption
In some cases, complementary products are sold to different sets of agents to aid in transactions between them. In the context of a simplified model, this article shows that a monopolist has an incentive to integrate into and foreclose other sellers of a complementary product used in fixed proportions with the monopolized product, but which is sold to different consumers. While these latter consumers are made worse off by integration and leverage, output is expanded and the monopolist's original consumers are made better off. The effect of integration and leverage on overall welfare is uncertain. I illustrate this model with an example involving trucking fleet cards (sold to trucking companies) and fuel desk point‐of‐sale systems (sold to truck stops) that are used in conjunction when diesel fuel is purchased.
- 1 April 2004
- Published by Wiley in Southern Economic Journal
- Vol. 70 (4) , 893-904
Complements Integration and Foreclosure: The Case of Joint Consumption
In some cases, complementary products are sold to different sets of agents to aid in transactions between them. In the context of a simplified model, this article shows that a monopolist has an incentive to integrate into and foreclose other sellers of a complementary product used in fixed proportions with the monopolized product, but which is sold to different consumers. While these latter consumers are made worse off by integration and leverage, output is expanded and the monopolist's original consumers are made better off. The effect of integration and leverage on overall welfare is uncertain. I illustrate this model with an example involving trucking fleet cards (sold to trucking companies) and fuel desk point‐of‐sale systems (sold to truck stops) that are used in conjunction when diesel fuel is purchased.