Susan M. Miller
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Susan M. Miller has a total of 2 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Alexander Ruder
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, USA
1 shared publication - Lael R. Keiser
University of Missouri
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 19 June 2019
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Public Policy
- Vol. 40 (4) , 672-693
Holding agencies accountable: Exploring the effect of oversight on citizens’ approval of members of Congress
We seek to understand the incentives facing Congress members to hold executive agencies accountable. Specifically, we explore whether Congress members are rewarded for taking politically costly oversight actions. We evaluate the effect of oversight activities on citizens’ evaluations of Congress members, taking into account the member’s partisanship, the citizen’s partisanship and agency ideology. Using a survey experiment, we find evidence that citizens’ evaluations of members are affected by the members’ oversight activity, with both copartisan and cross-party members rewarded for oversight efforts. Politically costly actions against ally agencies, however, do not appear to be rewarded to a greater extent by copartisans. These results provide insight into the way in which citizens interpret oversight activities by Congress members, suggesting that while good governance actions hold value for citizens, costly oversight actions aimed at ally agencies are not rewarded by copartisan citizens more than politically expedient oversight actions.
- 19 June 2019
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Public Policy
- Vol. 40 (4) , 672-693
Holding agencies accountable: Exploring the effect of oversight on citizens’ approval of members of Congress
We seek to understand the incentives facing Congress members to hold executive agencies accountable. Specifically, we explore whether Congress members are rewarded for taking politically costly oversight actions. We evaluate the effect of oversight activities on citizens’ evaluations of Congress members, taking into account the member’s partisanship, the citizen’s partisanship and agency ideology. Using a survey experiment, we find evidence that citizens’ evaluations of members are affected by the members’ oversight activity, with both copartisan and cross-party members rewarded for oversight efforts. Politically costly actions against ally agencies, however, do not appear to be rewarded to a greater extent by copartisans. These results provide insight into the way in which citizens interpret oversight activities by Congress members, suggesting that while good governance actions hold value for citizens, costly oversight actions aimed at ally agencies are not rewarded by copartisan citizens more than politically expedient oversight actions.
- 3 October 2012
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Publius: The Journal of Federalism
- Vol. 43 (4) , 497-526
State Governments as Entrepreneurs in Securing Federal Benefits for Their Citizens
Cooperative federalism provides state governments the ability to shape federal policy in line with subgovernment interests. Although a large literature explores how states promote their goals using federal grants-in-aid, little attention has been paid to how states use their self-assigned application assistance role for federal programs to advance their own agendas. Using data from the Veterans’ Disability Compensation program, we find evidence that state governments’ efforts to provide application assistance affect state veterans’ access to federal benefits in ways that generate state tax revenue. Our findings highlight the importance of state governments as actors in federal programs that are, at first glance, completely federalized, and have implications for scholarship on federalism, state politics, and social welfare policy.
- 3 October 2012
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Publius: The Journal of Federalism
- Vol. 43 (4) , 497-526
State Governments as Entrepreneurs in Securing Federal Benefits for Their Citizens
Cooperative federalism provides state governments the ability to shape federal policy in line with subgovernment interests. Although a large literature explores how states promote their goals using federal grants-in-aid, little attention has been paid to how states use their self-assigned application assistance role for federal programs to advance their own agendas. Using data from the Veterans’ Disability Compensation program, we find evidence that state governments’ efforts to provide application assistance affect state veterans’ access to federal benefits in ways that generate state tax revenue. Our findings highlight the importance of state governments as actors in federal programs that are, at first glance, completely federalized, and have implications for scholarship on federalism, state politics, and social welfare policy.