SMSusan M. Miller

Susan M. Miller

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years


Susan M. Miller has a total of 2 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Holding agencies accountable: Exploring the effect of oversight on citizens’ approval of members of Congress

    by Susan M. Miller, Alexander I. Ruder

    We seek to understand the incentives facing Congress members to hold executive agencies accountable. Specifically, we explore whether Congress members are rewarded for taking politically costly oversight actions. We evaluate the effect of oversight activities on citizens’ evaluations of Congress members, taking into account the member’s partisanship, the citizen’s partisanship and agency ideology. Using a survey experiment, we find evidence that citizens’ evaluations of members are affected by the members’ oversight activity, with both copartisan and cross-party members rewarded for oversight efforts. Politically costly actions against ally agencies, however, do not appear to be rewarded to a greater extent by copartisans. These results provide insight into the way in which citizens interpret oversight activities by Congress members, suggesting that while good governance actions hold value for citizens, costly oversight actions aimed at ally agencies are not rewarded by copartisan citizens more than politically expedient oversight actions.


  • State Governments as Entrepreneurs in Securing Federal Benefits for Their Citizens

    by Susan M. Miller, Lael R. Keiser

    Cooperative federalism provides state governments the ability to shape federal policy in line with subgovernment interests. Although a large literature explores how states promote their goals using federal grants-in-aid, little attention has been paid to how states use their self-assigned application assistance role for federal programs to advance their own agendas. Using data from the Veterans’ Disability Compensation program, we find evidence that state governments’ efforts to provide application assistance affect state veterans’ access to federal benefits in ways that generate state tax revenue. Our findings highlight the importance of state governments as actors in federal programs that are, at first glance, completely federalized, and have implications for scholarship on federalism, state politics, and social welfare policy.