JMJeremy J. Marcel

Jeremy J. Marcel

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Jeremy J. Marcel has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Are Disruptive CEO Successions Viewed as a Governance Lapse? Evidence From Board Turnover

    by Jeremy J. Marcel, Amanda P. Cowen, Gary A. Ballinger

    A wealth of governance research has examined CEO successions and the negative organizational consequences that arise when boards are unable to effect smooth leadership transitions. Despite those findings, empirical and anecdotal evidence indicates that disruptive successions are still very common. In this article, we investigate whether disruptive CEO successions are viewed as a governance lapse by the board. We focus specifically on succession processes that involve the use of an interim leader. We leverage established research that shows that the pattern of board turnover observed in the wake of negative events is indicative of whether board behaviors are—in practice—viewed as normative violations. We theorize that audiences will disapprove of boards’ use of interim CEOs and, therefore, expect that these successions will prompt higher rates of board turnover than those observed following noninterim successions. However, we also anticipate that this relationship will be moderated by situational characteristics (e.g., surprise CEO departure, dynamic industry environment) that complicate succession planning and make audiences more accepting of a board’s decision to rely on an interim CEO. Our analysis of 438 successions at publicly traded U.S. firms provides support for these arguments. We discuss the implications of our findings for successions and corporate governance.


  • Cleaning house or jumping ship? Understanding board upheaval following financial fraud

    by Jeremy J. Marcel, Amanda P. Cowen

    Boards experience elevated levels of turnover among outside directors following financial fraud. Scholars have proposed two mechanisms that may drive this turnover. The first views turnover as part of a board's efforts to repair organizational legitimacy and avert resource withdrawal. The second argues that turnover is a byproduct of individual directors' efforts to safeguard their own reputations and mitigate professional devaluation. We use data on director departures following 63 fraud events to explore the relative importance of these two mechanisms. The results clarify our understanding of responses to governance failures and the challenges of reconstituting board membership following financial improprieties . Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.


  • The influence of executive cognition on competitive dynamics

    by Jeremy J. Marcel, Pamela S. Barr, Irene M. Duhaime

    Prior competitive dynamics research has drawn on theories of information processing to model the subjective antecedents of executives' retaliation choices. This prior work has made great progress in developing our understanding of the retaliation choices most firms will make to a given type of attack. What the information processing perspective has not been able to do is explain firm‐specific behavior to predict which competitive moves individual firms will challenge, or explain why individual firms differ in the types of actions that they are most likely to challenge. The goal of this paper is to sharpen the theoretical and empirical focus on predicting firm‐level retaliation proclivities. We leverage managerial cognition research to examine the relationship between firm‐level differences in the cognitive frameworks that executives possess, and firm‐level differences in whether and how quickly firms challenge a market move. Results from a longitudinal study of the airline industry suggest that the addition of a cognitive perspective provides important insights into competitive retaliation. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.


  • Why top management team characteristics matter when employing a chief operating officer: a strategic contingency perspective

    by Jeremy J. Marcel

    Critics of the CEO/COO duo have stressed that this arrangement burdens the firm with increased costs and decreases the CEO's effectiveness. This study adopts an upper echelon perspective to argue that the presence of a COO may also create TMT‐level information‐processing benefits that can improve firm performance in certain conditions. Data from a sample of 153 firms in five industries highlight a strong positive relationship between the presence of a COO and two established measures of firm performance: return on assets and market‐to‐book ratio. The data also suggest that those relationships are contingent on the broader characteristics of the TMT. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.


  • COGNITION AND COMPETITIVE DYNAMICS: THE INFLUENCE OF SUBJECTIVE BELIEFS ON A FIRM'S LIKELIHOOD OF COMPETITIVE RESPONSE.

    by Jeremy J. Marcel, Pamela S. Barr, Irene M. Duhaime

    Much of competitive dynamics research has focused on modeling firm behavior by examining the influence of various decision making cues that are presumed to systematically give rise to predictable and highly similar cognitive interpretations amongst strategists at all firms. Such an approach is valuable because it outlines a central behavioral tendency of competitive response, or the way that most firms respond given a wide set of measurable situational constructs. We suggest, however, that such an approach also renders a necessarily simplified and incomplete explanation of competitive response because it cannot explain the unique, idiosyncratic and often inertial competitive behaviors of individual firms. We leverage research that suggests that subjective beliefs, because they vary widely across decision makers, are a likely source of variation in competitive behavior across firms, which is not being adequately modeled by current competitive dynamics research. To address this gap, we develop and test a straightforward but theoretically grounded model of the competitive response behavior of individual firms that simultaneously considers the effect of subjective beliefs, the implied cognitive biases associated with social and institutional cues, and the interactions between subjective beliefs and cues. We test hypotheses using a matched set of cognition and competitive interaction data for ten large firms over a seven year period. The results imply that strategists' subjective beliefs are not only strong determinants of competitive behavior, but that they are relatively inflexible in the face of either validating or invalidating information that may arise with the presence of strong social and institutional cues.