OBOmri Ben-Shahar

Omri Ben-Shahar

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Omri Ben-Shahar has a total of 2 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Personalized Law and the Problem of Misinformation

    by Omri Ben-Shahar, Ariel Porat

    A fundamental axiom in the law of a liberal society is its uniformity across people: every member in society lives by the same rules. In 2021, we published a book that challenged this premise. We argued that personalized law—i.e., different rules for different people—could advance important goals of the law. Personalization—a data-fueled paradigm that has been widely and successfully embraced in other areas of human activity—may be ready for the law. If medicine, education, or even parenting can treat, teach, or nurture better when personalized, the law too may be a candidate for a radical transformation, and reap the benefits of personalization. Only a small portion of our book, however, was dedicated to showing the benefits of personalized law. Precision is a value that needs no defense, only a blueprint. More pressing was to discuss the perils and downsides of such radical new legal ordering. Accordingly, we devoted much of the book to every possible downside we were able to imagine. Does personalized law violate the basic commitment to equality? Would it conflict with foundational principles of nondiscrimination in constitutional law? Could it reliably identify differences between people? How would people know the rules that govern them? Would it undermine social coordination? And more.

  • Open Access

    Privacy Protection, At What Cost? Exploring the Regulatory Resistance to Data Technology in Auto Insurance

    by Omri Ben-Shahar

    Regulatory and sociological resistance to new market-driven technologies, particularly to those that rely on collection and analysis of personal data, is prevalent even in cases where the technology creates large social value and saves lives. This article is a case study of such tragic technology resistance, focusing on tracking devices in cars which allow auto insurers to monitor how policyholders drive and adjust the premiums accordingly. Growing empirical work reveals that such “usage-based insurance” induces safer driving, reducing fatal accidents by almost one third, and resulting in more affordable and fair premiums. Yet, California prohibits this technology and other states limit its effectiveness, largely in the interest of privacy protection. The article evaluates the justifications fueling the restrictive regulation vis-à-vis the loss of lives resulting from this regulation. It concludes that the social benefits of the tracking technology dramatically outweigh the privacy and related costs.


  • Open Access

    Data Pollution

    by Omri Ben-Shahar

    Digital information is the fuel of the new economy. But like the old economy’s carbon fuel, it also pollutes. Harmful “data emissions” are leaked into the digital ecosystem, disrupting social institutions and public interests. This article develops a novel framework—data pollution—to rethink the harms the data economy creates and the way they have to be regulated. It argues that social intervention should focus on the external harms from collection and misuse of personal data. The article challenges the hegemony of the prevailing view—that the injuries from digital data enterprise are exclusively private. That view has led lawmakers to focus solely on privacy protection as the regulatory objective. The article claims, instead, that a central problem in the digital economy has been largely ignored: how the information given by people affects others, and how it undermines and degrades public goods and interests. The data pollution concept offers a novel perspective why existing regulatory tools—torts, contracts, and disclosure law—are ineffective, mirroring their historical futility in curbing the harms from industrial pollution. The data pollution framework also opens up a rich roadmap for new regulatory devices—“an environmental law for data protection”—which focuses on controlling these external effects. The article examines how the tools used to control industrial pollution—production restrictions, carbon tax, and emissions liability—could be adapted to govern data pollution.


  • Reversible Rewards

    by Omri Ben-Shahar, Anu Bradford

    This article offers a new mechanism of private enforcement, combining sanctions and rewards into a scheme of “reversible rewards.” The enforcing party sets up a pre-committed fund and offers it as reward to another party to refrain from violation. If the violator turns down the reward, the enforcer can use the money in the fund for one purpose only—to pay for punishment of the violator. The article shows that this scheme doubles the effect of funds invested in enforcement and allows the enforcer to stop violations that would otherwise be too costly to deter. It argues that reversible rewards could be used to bolster the enforcement of rights in selective areas of private and international law and could also be applied strategically in litigation in contexts where compliance incentives are otherwise weak.


  • The Myth of the ‘Opportunity to Read’ in Contract Law

    by Omri Ben-Shahar

    Standard form contracts in consumer transactions are usually not read by consumers. This ‘unreadness’ of contracts creates opportunities for drafters to engage in unfair trade practices. Various doctrines of contracts and consumer protection law address this concern. One of the prominent solutions coming out of recent proposals for reform is to give individuals a more substantial opportunity to read the contract before manifesting assent. With the greater opportunity to read, more transactors will actually read the terms and assent to the boilerplate will be more ‘robust’. This Essay argues that solutions that focus on providing consumers an opportunity to read are useless, and can potentially be harmful. Most likely, greater opportunity to read would not produce greater readership of contracts – not the type that can help people make informed decisions – and the purpose of this solution would not be achieved, and could have unintended consequences. Even if the compliance with the requirement of opportunity-to-read is fairly cheap (eg, giving consumers access to the boilerplate in advance), making this a central feature of the legal regulation of standard form contracts makes little sense. The paper ends by proposing non-legal approaches to making the contract terms more transparent, by building on market devices such as ratings and labeling. Résumé Les contrats-types proposés aux consommateurs ne sont généralement pas lus par ces derniers. Cette “non-lecture” des contrats crée des opportunités pour leurs rédacteurs d'y insérer des dispositions abusives. Les auteurs s'intéressant au droit des contrats et à la protection des consommateurs abordent en général cette question. Une des principales solutions qui émerge de récentes propositions de réforme consiste à donner aux individus une opportunité plus réelle de lire leur contrat avant de donner leur consentement. En accroissant une telle opportunité, davantage de contractants liraient effectivement les clauses et leur consentement au modèle standard de contrat serait plus “robuste”. Cet article soutient que les solutions qui se concentrent sur la nécessité de donner aux consommateurs une telle opportunité de lire leur contrat sont en réalité inutiles, et peuvent même potentiellement être nuisibles. Il apparaît plus probable qu'une plus grande opportunité de lire ne produira pas en pratique davantage de lecture effective des contrats – pas en tous les cas du type qui pourrait aider les gens à prendre des décisions éclairées – et l'objectif de cette solution ne sera pas atteint, outre que celle-ci pourra avoir des conséquences non désirées. Même si la promotion de l'opportunité de lire est peu onéreuse (par exemple en donnant aux consommateurs accès au modèle standard à l'avance), en faire un point nodal de la régulation juridique des contrats-types n'a pas beaucoup de sens. Cet article conclut par des propositions d'approches non juridiques afin de rendre les clauses contractuelles plus transparentes, en développant des outils tels que des évaluations et des étiquetages. Kurzfassung Standardverträge werden normalerweise von den Verbrauchern nicht gelesen. Dieses „Nichtlesen” von Verträgen schafft für die Vertragsgestalter die Gelegenheit, sich unfairer Handelspraktiken zu bedienen. Verschiedene Theorien im Vertrags- und Verbraucherschutzrecht befasse sich mit diesem Problem. Eine der herausstechenden Lösungen, die aus Reformvorschlägen stammt, sieht vor, dem Einzelnen eine bessere Chance einzuräumen, den Vertrag wirklich zu lesen, bevor er seine Zustimmung manifestiert. Hierdurch warden mehr Transakteure die Bedingungen tatsächlich lesen und die Zustimmung zu Standardklauseln wird somit auf eine solidere Grundlage gestellt. Dieser Beitrag begründet, dass Lösungen, die sich darauf konzentrieren, den Verbrauchern Kenntnisnahmemöglichkeiten einzuräumen, nicht nur nutzlos, sondern potentiell schädlich sind. Mit hoher Wahrscheinlichkeit würde eine erhöhte Chance zur Kenntnisnahme nicht dazu führen, dass die Verbraucher auch tatsächlich diese Möglichkeit nutzen und jedenfalls nicht dazu führen, dass Hilfestellung für eine informierte Entscheidung bereitgestellt wird. Damit würde das Ziel dieser Lösung aber verfehlt und könnte ungewollte Konsequenzen haben. Selbst dann, wenn es relativ günstig ist, das Erfordernis, Kenntnisnahme zu ermöglichen, einzuhalten (indem etwa den Verbrauchern im Voraus Zugang zu den Standartklauseln gewährt wird), ist es doch wenig sinnvoll, dies zu einem zentralen Aspekt der Regulierung von Standardverträgen zu erheben. Dieser Beitrag endet damit, außergesetzliche Ansätze vorzuschlagen, mit denen die Vertragsklauseln transparenter gestaltet warden, indem man auf Marktmechanismen, etwa Rating und Labeling, setzt.