Wesley W. Widmaier
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Wesley W. Widmaier has a total of 13 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Andrew Baker
Queen’s University of Belfast
2 shared publications Jacqueline Best
University of Ottawa, Ottawa, Canada
2 shared publications- Luke Glanville
Australian National University, Australia
2 shared publications - Dennis C. Grube
University of Cambridge
1 shared publication John Ravenhill
University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Canada
1 shared publication- Kathryn Henne
Australian National University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 2 August 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 205-229
Susan Sell’s Political Economy: Power, Pragmatism, and the Possibilities for Twenty-First-Century Capitalism
- 2 August 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 205-229
Susan Sell’s Political Economy: Power, Pragmatism, and the Possibilities for Twenty-First-Century Capitalism
- Open Access
- 29 January 2024
- Published by Wiley in Australian Journal of Politics & History
- Vol. 70 (3) , 532-547
Australian Foreign Policy Stability and Instability: Imperial Friendships and Crises from the Great Depression to the Fall of Singapore
Over the past century, crises have enabled the construction of Australian foreign policy orders, or sets of ideas that reduce uncertainty and stabilise interests. However, such ideas have also engendered misplaced certainty and renewed crisis. Developing a constructivist framework, I stress the ways in which ideas can over time impede the use of information and fuel instability and crises. In a staged model, I trace the construction of ties with “great and powerful friends”, their conversion in ways that fuel misplaced certainty, and the construction of crises which advance change. Empirically, I then trace the construction of an early Imperial order, misplaced certainty in UK‐backed austerity and appeasement, and crises in the Great Depression and fall of Singapore.
- 29 January 2024
- Published by Wiley in Australian Journal of Politics & History
- Vol. 70 (3) , 532-547
Open AccessAustralian Foreign Policy Stability and Instability: Imperial Friendships and Crises from the Great Depression to the Fall of Singapore
Over the past century, crises have enabled the construction of Australian foreign policy orders, or sets of ideas that reduce uncertainty and stabilise interests. However, such ideas have also engendered misplaced certainty and renewed crisis. Developing a constructivist framework, I stress the ways in which ideas can over time impede the use of information and fuel instability and crises. In a staged model, I trace the construction of ties with “great and powerful friends”, their conversion in ways that fuel misplaced certainty, and the construction of crises which advance change. Empirically, I then trace the construction of an early Imperial order, misplaced certainty in UK‐backed austerity and appeasement, and crises in the Great Depression and fall of Singapore.
- 7 February 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 50-68
R2P and the benefits of norm ambiguity
Scholars from a variety of perspectives stress the importance of norm clarity and precision for the successful establishment, institutionalization and internalization of norms. Norm ambiguity is commonly thought to be an impediment to norm construction and compliance. In this chapter, we argue that norm ambiguity can actually be crucial for facilitating consensus, flexibility and compliance. We identify conditions under which norm ambiguity can be constructive and suggest that consensus around a norm can sometimes best emerge when the norm is initially articulated in ambiguous and flexible terms and then incrementally adjusted over time through a process that we call the “norm feedback loop.” We then show how ambiguity has facilitated the development of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) norm, tracing Rwanda-era debates over humanitarian intervention, Iraq-era backlash over interventionist abuses and Libya-era norm implementation.
- 7 February 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 50-68
R2P and the benefits of norm ambiguity
Scholars from a variety of perspectives stress the importance of norm clarity and precision for the successful establishment, institutionalization and internalization of norms. Norm ambiguity is commonly thought to be an impediment to norm construction and compliance. In this chapter, we argue that norm ambiguity can actually be crucial for facilitating consensus, flexibility and compliance. We identify conditions under which norm ambiguity can be constructive and suggest that consensus around a norm can sometimes best emerge when the norm is initially articulated in ambiguous and flexible terms and then incrementally adjusted over time through a process that we call the “norm feedback loop.” We then show how ambiguity has facilitated the development of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) norm, tracing Rwanda-era debates over humanitarian intervention, Iraq-era backlash over interventionist abuses and Libya-era norm implementation.
- 22 January 2019
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Australian Journal of International Affairs
- Vol. 73 (2) , 143-159
Australian foreign policy in political time: middle power creativity, misplaced friendships, and crises of leadership
Over the past century, Australian foreign policy orders have been stabilised by the construction of ideas that have reduced uncertainty regarding national interests. Yet, such ideas have often evolved in ways that have engendered misplaced certainty, renewed instability, and crisis. To explain such shifts, I highlight the role of an Australian ‘pragmatic liberal tradition’, one which has enabled alternating tendencies to principled stability or technocratic hubris. In a tripartite model, I trace stages over initial ‘middle power’ efforts to construct ideas that lead states—and particularly great powers—to identify interests in cooperation, misplaced certainty in great power ties which obscures new challenges, and the construction of crises that impede or enable change. Empirically, I apply this framework to the construction, conversion, and crises of the ongoing ‘Reform order’. These span the initial Hawke-era middle power integration of US and regional ties, Howard-era misplaced certainty in US-styled neoconservative bandwagoning and neoliberal macroeconomic accommodation, and evolving constructions of the War on Terror and Global Financial Crisis. In the conclusion, I address theoretical and policy implications, highlighting the initial challenges that crises can pose for middle power leadership, and the subsequent scope for creativity.
- 22 January 2019
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Australian Journal of International Affairs
- Vol. 73 (2) , 143-159
Australian foreign policy in political time: middle power creativity, misplaced friendships, and crises of leadership
Over the past century, Australian foreign policy orders have been stabilised by the construction of ideas that have reduced uncertainty regarding national interests. Yet, such ideas have often evolved in ways that have engendered misplaced certainty, renewed instability, and crisis. To explain such shifts, I highlight the role of an Australian ‘pragmatic liberal tradition’, one which has enabled alternating tendencies to principled stability or technocratic hubris. In a tripartite model, I trace stages over initial ‘middle power’ efforts to construct ideas that lead states—and particularly great powers—to identify interests in cooperation, misplaced certainty in great power ties which obscures new challenges, and the construction of crises that impede or enable change. Empirically, I apply this framework to the construction, conversion, and crises of the ongoing ‘Reform order’. These span the initial Hawke-era middle power integration of US and regional ties, Howard-era misplaced certainty in US-styled neoconservative bandwagoning and neoliberal macroeconomic accommodation, and evolving constructions of the War on Terror and Global Financial Crisis. In the conclusion, I address theoretical and policy implications, highlighting the initial challenges that crises can pose for middle power leadership, and the subsequent scope for creativity.
- 22 December 2017
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
International Organizations and Economic Governance
Global economic governance refers to efforts to organize, structure, and regulate economic interactions. In substantive terms, economic governance deals with a host of policy challenges, including the definition of basic property rights, efforts at monetary and fiscal cooperation, ando concerns for the “macroprudential regulation” of financial markets. The Global Financial Crisis has demonstrated not only the importance of macroeconomic and regulatory cooperation, but also the role of crises in redefining the purposes of economic governance itself. Debates in the fields of international relations (IR) and international political economy (IPE) over global economic governance have revolved around strategic interactions, social psychological forces, and the post-crisis emergence of new agents and international organizations. In applied IPE settings, these debates more explicitly pertain to the systemic importance of hegemonic power, multilateral interactions, or intersubjective interpretations. These views intersect with neorealist, neoliberal, and constructivist assumptions regarding systemic interactions. Over the 1990s, IR and IPE scholars would increasingly seek to move beyond both the structural materialism associated with hegemonic stability theory and the structural idealism associated with “first-generation” Wendtian constructivism. Future research should focus on broader questions of whether the Global Financial Crisis will spark renewed theoretical creativity and contribute to an enhanced policy relevance, or whether IR and IPE will continue to work to mask the role of power in limiting such possibilities.
- 22 December 2017
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
International Organizations and Economic Governance
Global economic governance refers to efforts to organize, structure, and regulate economic interactions. In substantive terms, economic governance deals with a host of policy challenges, including the definition of basic property rights, efforts at monetary and fiscal cooperation, ando concerns for the “macroprudential regulation” of financial markets. The Global Financial Crisis has demonstrated not only the importance of macroeconomic and regulatory cooperation, but also the role of crises in redefining the purposes of economic governance itself. Debates in the fields of international relations (IR) and international political economy (IPE) over global economic governance have revolved around strategic interactions, social psychological forces, and the post-crisis emergence of new agents and international organizations. In applied IPE settings, these debates more explicitly pertain to the systemic importance of hegemonic power, multilateral interactions, or intersubjective interpretations. These views intersect with neorealist, neoliberal, and constructivist assumptions regarding systemic interactions. Over the 1990s, IR and IPE scholars would increasingly seek to move beyond both the structural materialism associated with hegemonic stability theory and the structural idealism associated with “first-generation” Wendtian constructivism. Future research should focus on broader questions of whether the Global Financial Crisis will spark renewed theoretical creativity and contribute to an enhanced policy relevance, or whether IR and IPE will continue to work to mask the role of power in limiting such possibilities.
- 2 October 2017
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH
Presidential Rhetoric from Wilson to Obama: Constructing Crises, Fast and Slow
- 2 October 2017
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH
Presidential Rhetoric from Wilson to Obama: Constructing Crises, Fast and Slow
- Open Access
- 4 March 2017
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Review of International Political Economy
- Vol. 24 (2) , 177-178
International Political Economy meets the unexpected: Brexit, Trump and global populism
(2017). International Political Economy meets the unexpected: Brexit, Trump and global populism. Review of International Political Economy: Vol. 24, No. 2, pp. 177-178.
- 4 March 2017
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Review of International Political Economy
- Vol. 24 (2) , 177-178
Open AccessInternational Political Economy meets the unexpected: Brexit, Trump and global populism
(2017). International Political Economy meets the unexpected: Brexit, Trump and global populism. Review of International Political Economy: Vol. 24, No. 2, pp. 177-178.
- 4 October 2016
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Australian Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 51 (4) , 727-741
Breaking promises and raising taxes: rhetorical path dependence and policy dysfunction in time
Where historical institutionalists have stressed the path-dependent efficiencies that stabilise policy orders, their rationalist assumptions have increasingly obscured the scope for instability. To redress such oversights, I integrate historical institutionalist insights regarding incremental change with discursive institutionalist analyses of interpretive tensions in a way that accords with Daniel Kahneman’s analyses of shifting ‘fast’/principled and ‘slow’/cognitive biases. The resulting framework posits that initial principled constructions of policy ideas are undermined where their subsequent ‘intellectual conversion’ limits flexibility and legitimacy. Empirically, I contrast the practices of George HW Bush and John Howard, as each broke anti-tax promises. Bush’s intellectual justifications undermined his credibility, but Howard’s principled justifications enabled his success. This analysis has implications for theories of institutional agency and dysfunction.
- 4 October 2016
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Australian Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 51 (4) , 727-741
Breaking promises and raising taxes: rhetorical path dependence and policy dysfunction in time
Where historical institutionalists have stressed the path-dependent efficiencies that stabilise policy orders, their rationalist assumptions have increasingly obscured the scope for instability. To redress such oversights, I integrate historical institutionalist insights regarding incremental change with discursive institutionalist analyses of interpretive tensions in a way that accords with Daniel Kahneman’s analyses of shifting ‘fast’/principled and ‘slow’/cognitive biases. The resulting framework posits that initial principled constructions of policy ideas are undermined where their subsequent ‘intellectual conversion’ limits flexibility and legitimacy. Empirically, I contrast the practices of George HW Bush and John Howard, as each broke anti-tax promises. Bush’s intellectual justifications undermined his credibility, but Howard’s principled justifications enabled his success. This analysis has implications for theories of institutional agency and dysfunction.
- 23 December 2015
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Public Policy
- Vol. 23 (3) , 338-356
The power of economic ideas – through, over and in – political time: the construction, conversion and crisis of the neoliberal order in the US and UK
In recent years, scholarly concern for ‘great transformations’ has yielded to a stress on ‘gradual transitions'. In thiscontribution, I offer a discursive institutionalist model of the shifts in ideational power which drive order construction, consolidation and crisis. First, I argue that leaders exercise rhetorical power through ideas, employing communicative appeals to shape principled beliefs. Second, I argue that élites employ epistemic power over ideas to consolidate intellectual consensus. Finally, I posit that as structural power in ideas assumes a life of its own, this breeds overconfidence and crisis. Empirically, I then track the development of the neoliberal order over Reagan's and Thatcher's use of power through ideas in constructing principled restraints on the market power of labour, Clinton- and Blair-era efforts to concentrate power over ideas in central banks, and the structural power of New Keynesian ideas that obscured concentrations of financial power, culminating in the global financial crisis.
- 23 December 2015
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Public Policy
- Vol. 23 (3) , 338-356
The power of economic ideas – through, over and in – political time: the construction, conversion and crisis of the neoliberal order in the US and UK
In recent years, scholarly concern for ‘great transformations’ has yielded to a stress on ‘gradual transitions'. In thiscontribution, I offer a discursive institutionalist model of the shifts in ideational power which drive order construction, consolidation and crisis. First, I argue that leaders exercise rhetorical power through ideas, employing communicative appeals to shape principled beliefs. Second, I argue that élites employ epistemic power over ideas to consolidate intellectual consensus. Finally, I posit that as structural power in ideas assumes a life of its own, this breeds overconfidence and crisis. Empirically, I then track the development of the neoliberal order over Reagan's and Thatcher's use of power through ideas in constructing principled restraints on the market power of labour, Clinton- and Blair-era efforts to concentrate power over ideas in central banks, and the structural power of New Keynesian ideas that obscured concentrations of financial power, culminating in the global financial crisis.
- 29 May 2015
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Politics & Gender
- Vol. 11 (02) , 265-290
Lawyers, Gender, and Money: Consensus, Closure, and Conflict in the Global Financial Crisis
How did the interplay of intellectual overconfidence, gender, and professional socialization limit economic policy debate over the subprime boom and global financial crisis? In this article, I integrate historical institutionalist and feminist institutionalist insights to make sense of the interplay of gender and professional socialization in limiting the scope for precrisis regulation and postcrisis reform. First, drawing on historical institutionalist perspectives, I highlight the scope for inefficiency in the use of information, arguing that policy success over time can engender tendencies to misplace confidence and intellectual closure. Secondly, drawing on feminist institutionalist perspectives, I stress the role of professional and gender socialization in enabling agents to resist such inefficiencies and so limit the scope for intellectual closure. In empirical terms, I then advance three case studies addressing the roles of Commodity Futures Trading Commission Chair Brooksley Born, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Chair Sheila Bair, and Troubled Asset Relief Program Congressional Oversight Panel Chair Elizabeth Warren in challenging the precrisis deregulatory consensus. In the conclusion, I address theoretical and policy implications, stressing the social dynamics that may spur women toward increased professional and intellectual risk taking.
- 29 May 2015
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Politics & Gender
- Vol. 11 (02) , 265-290
Lawyers, Gender, and Money: Consensus, Closure, and Conflict in the Global Financial Crisis
How did the interplay of intellectual overconfidence, gender, and professional socialization limit economic policy debate over the subprime boom and global financial crisis? In this article, I integrate historical institutionalist and feminist institutionalist insights to make sense of the interplay of gender and professional socialization in limiting the scope for precrisis regulation and postcrisis reform. First, drawing on historical institutionalist perspectives, I highlight the scope for inefficiency in the use of information, arguing that policy success over time can engender tendencies to misplace confidence and intellectual closure. Secondly, drawing on feminist institutionalist perspectives, I stress the role of professional and gender socialization in enabling agents to resist such inefficiencies and so limit the scope for intellectual closure. In empirical terms, I then advance three case studies addressing the roles of Commodity Futures Trading Commission Chair Brooksley Born, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Chair Sheila Bair, and Troubled Asset Relief Program Congressional Oversight Panel Chair Elizabeth Warren in challenging the precrisis deregulatory consensus. In the conclusion, I address theoretical and policy implications, stressing the social dynamics that may spur women toward increased professional and intellectual risk taking.