Argelina Figueiredo
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Argelina Figueiredo has a total of 3 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Fernando Limongi
Universidade de São Paulo
3 shared publications - Jose Antonio Cheibub
Universidade de Illinois
1 shared publication - José Antonio Cheibub
Associate professor and Boeschenstein Scholar in Political Economy and Public Policy at the University of Illinois, Urbana—Champaign
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 January 2009
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Latin American Politics and Society
- Vol. 51 (1) , 1-30
Political Parties and Governors as Determinants of Legislative Behavior in Brazil's Chamber of Deputies, 1988–2006
This article examines the relative importance of regional and national forces in shaping the behavior of Brazilian legislators at the national level. A widely held view is that national legislators respond to state pressures in making decisions, rather than pressures from the national government. Governors not only can influence national debates but also can determine outcomes by exerting control over their states' legislative delegations. This article examines a dataset of all roll-call votes in the Chamber of Deputies between 1989 and 2006 to isolate and evaluate the impact of local pressures on legislative voting. Spanning the terms of five presidents and five different congresses, the data show that the local influence is weaker than the national on the voting decisions of individual legislators and the voting cohesion of state delegations. Alternative institutional resources allow the central government to counteract the centrifugal pressures of federalism and other institutional influences.
- 1 January 2009
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Latin American Politics and Society
- Vol. 51 (1) , 1-30
Political Parties and Governors as Determinants of Legislative Behavior in Brazil's Chamber of Deputies, 1988–2006
This article examines the relative importance of regional and national forces in shaping the behavior of Brazilian legislators at the national level. A widely held view is that national legislators respond to state pressures in making decisions, rather than pressures from the national government. Governors not only can influence national debates but also can determine outcomes by exerting control over their states' legislative delegations. This article examines a dataset of all roll-call votes in the Chamber of Deputies between 1989 and 2006 to isolate and evaluate the impact of local pressures on legislative voting. Spanning the terms of five presidents and five different congresses, the data show that the local influence is weaker than the national on the voting decisions of individual legislators and the voting cohesion of state delegations. Alternative institutional resources allow the central government to counteract the centrifugal pressures of federalism and other institutional influences.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2009
- Published by FapUNIFESP (SciELO) in Dados
- Vol. 52 (2) , 263-299
Partidos políticos e governadores como determinantes do comportamento legislativo na câmara dos deputados, 1988-2006
According to a widely held view of Brazilian politics, part of the difficulty Presidents experience in governing the country stems from the fact that national legislators respond to pressures from the States rather than from the national government. Based on the argument, governors use their institutional position not only to influence national debates, but also to determine outcomes via the control they exert over their States' legislative delegations. In this paper we examine an extensive data set composed of all roll-call votes taken in the Chamber of Deputies from 1989 to 2006 in order to separate and evaluate the impact of local pressures on the behavior of national legislators. The data span five Presidencies and four different legislatures and show that, although present, the local influence is weaker than that of the national government in the voting decisions of individual legislators We argue that there are institutional resources that allow the central government to counter the centrifugal pressures exerted by federalism and other aspects of Brazil's current institutional system.Selon l'avis général, dans la politique brésilienne, quelques-unes des difficultés que les présidents rencontrent dans leur travail, viennent de ce que les législateurs nationaux cèdent aux pressions des États qu'ils représentent plutôt qu'à celles du gouvernement central. Vu leur poste dans l'institution, les gouverneurs des États, non seulement influent sur les débats nationaux, mais aussi sur leurs résultats à travers le contrôle qu'ils exercent sur les députés de leurs États. Dans cet article, on examine un large ensemble de données concernant tous les scrutins nominaux de la Chambre des Députés entre 1988 et 2006, afin d'isoler et d'évaluer l'impact des pressions locales sur la conduite des législateurs de Brasilia. Les données, recouvrant cinq exercices présidentiels et quatre Congrès différents, montrent que, malgré sa présense, l'influence locale est moins notable que celle du gouvernement central sur le vote des législateurs individuels. On suggère que des moyens institutionnels internes du processus de décision permettent au gouvernement central d'agir contre les pressions centrifuges exercées par le fédéralisme et d'autres aspects du système institutionnel actuel
- 1 January 2009
- Published by FapUNIFESP (SciELO) in Dados
- Vol. 52 (2) , 263-299
Open AccessPartidos políticos e governadores como determinantes do comportamento legislativo na câmara dos deputados, 1988-2006
According to a widely held view of Brazilian politics, part of the difficulty Presidents experience in governing the country stems from the fact that national legislators respond to pressures from the States rather than from the national government. Based on the argument, governors use their institutional position not only to influence national debates, but also to determine outcomes via the control they exert over their States' legislative delegations. In this paper we examine an extensive data set composed of all roll-call votes taken in the Chamber of Deputies from 1989 to 2006 in order to separate and evaluate the impact of local pressures on the behavior of national legislators. The data span five Presidencies and four different legislatures and show that, although present, the local influence is weaker than that of the national government in the voting decisions of individual legislators We argue that there are institutional resources that allow the central government to counter the centrifugal pressures exerted by federalism and other aspects of Brazil's current institutional system.Selon l'avis général, dans la politique brésilienne, quelques-unes des difficultés que les présidents rencontrent dans leur travail, viennent de ce que les législateurs nationaux cèdent aux pressions des États qu'ils représentent plutôt qu'à celles du gouvernement central. Vu leur poste dans l'institution, les gouverneurs des États, non seulement influent sur les débats nationaux, mais aussi sur leurs résultats à travers le contrôle qu'ils exercent sur les députés de leurs États. Dans cet article, on examine un large ensemble de données concernant tous les scrutins nominaux de la Chambre des Députés entre 1988 et 2006, afin d'isoler et d'évaluer l'impact des pressions locales sur la conduite des législateurs de Brasilia. Les données, recouvrant cinq exercices présidentiels et quatre Congrès différents, montrent que, malgré sa présense, l'influence locale est moins notable que celle du gouvernement central sur le vote des législateurs individuels. On suggère que des moyens institutionnels internes du processus de décision permettent au gouvernement central d'agir contre les pressions centrifuges exercées par le fédéralisme et d'autres aspects du système institutionnel actuel
- 1 January 2008
- Published by FapUNIFESP (SciELO) in Dados
- Vol. 51 (2) , 269-270
Maria D'Alva Gil Kinzo
- Open Access
- 1 December 2005
- Published by FapUNIFESP (SciELO) in Dados
- Vol. 48 (4) , 737-776
Processo orçamentário e comportamento Legislativo: emendas individuais, apoio ao Executivo e programas de governo
The article challenges the contention that individual amendments are crucial for a system of exchanging favors with the Administration by members of Congress interested in distributive policies as a way of guaranteeing their reelection. By analyzing funds allocated through Congressional amendments, their distribution in different government programs, and roll-call votes in the Brazilian House of Representatives from 1996 to 2001, the authors show that: individual amendments are not prioritized either by Congress in the budget's approval or by the Administration in its implementation; there are no differences between the agenda dictated by the Administration and that of the legislators; and party affiliation explains both House floor votes and the implementation of individual amendments and is thus an explanatory variable in the Executive-Legislative relationship.
- 1 December 2005
- Published by FapUNIFESP (SciELO) in Dados
- Vol. 48 (4) , 737-776
Open AccessProcesso orçamentário e comportamento Legislativo: emendas individuais, apoio ao Executivo e programas de governo
The article challenges the contention that individual amendments are crucial for a system of exchanging favors with the Administration by members of Congress interested in distributive policies as a way of guaranteeing their reelection. By analyzing funds allocated through Congressional amendments, their distribution in different government programs, and roll-call votes in the Brazilian House of Representatives from 1996 to 2001, the authors show that: individual amendments are not prioritized either by Congress in the budget's approval or by the Administration in its implementation; there are no differences between the agenda dictated by the Administration and that of the legislators; and party affiliation explains both House floor votes and the implementation of individual amendments and is thus an explanatory variable in the Executive-Legislative relationship.