Sewin Chan
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Sewin Chan has a total of 10 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Andrew F. Haughwout
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
3 shared publications - Ann Huff Stevens
University of California, Davis, 1 Shields Ave., Davis, CA 95616 ( )
2 shared publications Andrew Hayashi
1 shared publication- Brian Elbel
Department of Population Health NYU School of Medicine New York New York USA
1 shared publication - Claudia Sharygin
Urban Institute, Washington, DC, USA
1 shared publication - Ingrid Gould Ellen
Robert F. Wagner Graduate School of Public Service, New York University New York New York USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 15 September 2015
- Published by Wiley in Real Estate Economics
- Vol. 44 (3) , 627-657
Do Homeowners Mark to Market? A Comparison of Self‐Reported and Estimated Market Home Values During the Housing Boom and Bust
This article examines homeowners’ self‐reported values in the American Housing Survey and the Health and Retirement Study from the start of the recent housing price run‐ups through recent price declines. We compare ZIP‐Code‐level market‐based estimates of housing prices to those derived from homeowners’ self‐reported values. We show that there are systematic differences which vary with market conditions and the amount of equity owners hold in their homes. When prices have fallen, homeowners systematically state that their homes are worth more than market estimates suggest, and homeowners with little or no equity in their homes state values above the market estimates to a greater degree. Over time, homeowners appear to adjust their assessments to be more in line with past market trends, but only slowly. Our results suggest that underwater borrowers are likely to understate their losses and either may not be aware that their mortgages are underwater or underestimate the degree to which they are.
- 15 September 2015
- Published by Wiley in Real Estate Economics
- Vol. 44 (3) , 627-657
Do Homeowners Mark to Market? A Comparison of Self‐Reported and Estimated Market Home Values During the Housing Boom and Bust
This article examines homeowners’ self‐reported values in the American Housing Survey and the Health and Retirement Study from the start of the recent housing price run‐ups through recent price declines. We compare ZIP‐Code‐level market‐based estimates of housing prices to those derived from homeowners’ self‐reported values. We show that there are systematic differences which vary with market conditions and the amount of equity owners hold in their homes. When prices have fallen, homeowners systematically state that their homes are worth more than market estimates suggest, and homeowners with little or no equity in their homes state values above the market estimates to a greater degree. Over time, homeowners appear to adjust their assessments to be more in line with past market trends, but only slowly. Our results suggest that underwater borrowers are likely to understate their losses and either may not be aware that their mortgages are underwater or underestimate the degree to which they are.
- Open Access
Determinants of mortgage default and consumer credit use: the effects of foreclosure laws and foreclosure delays
The mortgage default decision is part of a complex household credit management problem. We examine how factors affecting mortgage default spill over to other credit markets. As home equity turns negative, homeowners default on mortgages and HELOCs at higher rates, whereas they prioritize repaying credit cards and auto loans. Larger unused credit card limits intensify the preservation of credit cards over housing debt. Although mortgage non-recourse statutes increase default on all types of housing debt, they reduce credit card defaults. Foreclosure delays increase default rates for both housing and non-housing debts. Our analysis highlights the interconnectedness of debt repayment decisions.
Open AccessDeterminants of mortgage default and consumer credit use: the effects of foreclosure laws and foreclosure delays
The mortgage default decision is part of a complex household credit management problem. We examine how factors affecting mortgage default spill over to other credit markets. As home equity turns negative, homeowners default on mortgages and HELOCs at higher rates, whereas they prioritize repaying credit cards and auto loans. Larger unused credit card limits intensify the preservation of credit cards over housing debt. Although mortgage non-recourse statutes increase default on all types of housing debt, they reduce credit card defaults. Foreclosure delays increase default rates for both housing and non-housing debts. Our analysis highlights the interconnectedness of debt repayment decisions.
- Open Access
How mortgage finance affects the urban landscape
This chapter considers the structure of mortgage finance in the U.S., and its role in shaping patterns of homeownership, the nature of the housing stock, and the organization of residential activity. We start by providing some background on the design features of mortgage contracts that distinguish them from other loans, and that have important implications for issues presented in the rest of the chapter. We then explain how mortgage finance interacts with public policy, particularly tax policy, to influence a household’s decision to own or rent, and how shifts in the demand for owner-occupied housing are translated into housing prices and quantities, given the unusual nature of housing supply. We consider the distribution of mortgage credit in terms of access and price, by race, ethnicity, income, and over the lifecycle, with particular attention to the role of recent innovations such as non-prime mortgage securitization and reverse mortgages. The extent of negative equity has been unprecedented in the past decade, and we discuss its impact on strategic default, housing turnover, and housing investment. We describe spatial patterns in foreclosure and summarize the evidence for foreclosure spillovers in urban neighborhoods. Finally, we offer some thoughts on future innovations in mortgage finance.
Open AccessHow mortgage finance affects the urban landscape
This chapter considers the structure of mortgage finance in the U.S., and its role in shaping patterns of homeownership, the nature of the housing stock, and the organization of residential activity. We start by providing some background on the design features of mortgage contracts that distinguish them from other loans, and that have important implications for issues presented in the rest of the chapter. We then explain how mortgage finance interacts with public policy, particularly tax policy, to influence a household’s decision to own or rent, and how shifts in the demand for owner-occupied housing are translated into housing prices and quantities, given the unusual nature of housing supply. We consider the distribution of mortgage credit in terms of access and price, by race, ethnicity, income, and over the lifecycle, with particular attention to the role of recent innovations such as non-prime mortgage securitization and reverse mortgages. The extent of negative equity has been unprecedented in the past decade, and we discuss its impact on strategic default, housing turnover, and housing investment. We describe spatial patterns in foreclosure and summarize the evidence for foreclosure spillovers in urban neighborhoods. Finally, we offer some thoughts on future innovations in mortgage finance.
- 10 January 2013
- Published by Springer Nature in The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics
- Vol. 48 (2) , 342-379
Pathways After Default: What Happens to Distressed Mortgage Borrowers and Their Homes?
- 10 January 2013
- Published by Springer Nature in The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics
- Vol. 48 (2) , 342-379
Pathways After Default: What Happens to Distressed Mortgage Borrowers and Their Homes?
- 1 August 2012
- Published by Health Affairs Publishing, LLC in Health Affairs
- Vol. 31 (8) , 1847-1854
Low Cognitive Ability And Poor Skill With Numbers May Prevent Many From Enrolling In Medicare Supplemental Coverage
Because traditional Medicare leaves substantial gaps in coverage, many people obtain supplemental coverage to limit their exposure to out-of-pocket costs. However, some Medicare beneficiaries may not be well equipped to navigate the complex supplemental coverage landscape successfully because of their lower cognitive ability or numeracy—that is, the ability to work with numbers. We found that people in the lower third of the cognitive ability and numeracy distributions were at least eleven percentage points less likely than those in the upper third to enroll in a supplemental Medicare insurance plan. This result means that many Medicare beneficiaries do not have the financial protections and other benefits that would be available to them if they were enrolled in a supplemental insurance plan. Our findings suggest that policy makers may want to consider alternatives tailored to these high-need groups, such as enhanced education and enrollment programs, simpler sets of plan choices, or even some type of aut...
- 1 August 2012
- Published by Health Affairs Publishing, LLC in Health Affairs
- Vol. 31 (8) , 1847-1854
Low Cognitive Ability And Poor Skill With Numbers May Prevent Many From Enrolling In Medicare Supplemental Coverage
Because traditional Medicare leaves substantial gaps in coverage, many people obtain supplemental coverage to limit their exposure to out-of-pocket costs. However, some Medicare beneficiaries may not be well equipped to navigate the complex supplemental coverage landscape successfully because of their lower cognitive ability or numeracy—that is, the ability to work with numbers. We found that people in the lower third of the cognitive ability and numeracy distributions were at least eleven percentage points less likely than those in the upper third to enroll in a supplemental Medicare insurance plan. This result means that many Medicare beneficiaries do not have the financial protections and other benefits that would be available to them if they were enrolled in a supplemental insurance plan. Our findings suggest that policy makers may want to consider alternatives tailored to these high-need groups, such as enhanced education and enrollment programs, simpler sets of plan choices, or even some type of aut...
- Open Access
What You Don?t Know Can?t Help You: Pension Knowledge and Retirement Decision Making
This paper provides an answer to an important empirical puzzle in the retirement literature: while most people know little about their own pension plans, retirement behavior is strongly affected by pension incentives. We combine administrative and self-reported pension data to measure the retirement response to actual and perceived financial incentives. While virtually all recent empirical work has relied on administrative- or employer-reported data, we document an important role for self-reported pension data in determining retirement behavior. Well-informed individuals are five times more responsive to pension incentives than the average. In contrast, ill-informed individuals respond to their own misperceptions of the incentives rather than being unresponsive to any measured incentives.
Open AccessWhat You Don?t Know Can?t Help You: Pension Knowledge and Retirement Decision Making
This paper provides an answer to an important empirical puzzle in the retirement literature: while most people know little about their own pension plans, retirement behavior is strongly affected by pension incentives. We combine administrative and self-reported pension data to measure the retirement response to actual and perceived financial incentives. While virtually all recent empirical work has relied on administrative- or employer-reported data, we document an important role for self-reported pension data in determining retirement behavior. Well-informed individuals are five times more responsive to pension incentives than the average. In contrast, ill-informed individuals respond to their own misperceptions of the incentives rather than being unresponsive to any measured incentives.
- 17 February 2004
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Contributions in Economic Analysis & Policy
- Vol. 3 (1) , 1-24
How Does Job Loss Affect the Timing of Retirement?
This paper estimates the extent to which reduced employment following job loss among older workers can be explained as a response to altered pension incentives and earnings opportunities. Using data from the Health and Retirement Study, we first examine how workers’ earnings, assets, pensions and the resulting financial incentive to retire are affected by job loss. We find important effects of job loss on the main financial components of workers’ incentive to retire. We then examine retirement behavior after job loss, controlling for these changed retirement incentives, along with any additional effects of displacement not captured by retirement incentives. We find that the observed increased rates of retirement among displaced workers go far beyond these purely financial considerations. Very little of the reduced employment among older job losers can be explained by changes in wages and pension-related retirement incentives. Other barriers to reemployment may be more important explanations for the low employment rates of recently displaced older workers.
- 17 February 2004
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Contributions in Economic Analysis & Policy
- Vol. 3 (1) , 1-24
How Does Job Loss Affect the Timing of Retirement?
This paper estimates the extent to which reduced employment following job loss among older workers can be explained as a response to altered pension incentives and earnings opportunities. Using data from the Health and Retirement Study, we first examine how workers’ earnings, assets, pensions and the resulting financial incentive to retire are affected by job loss. We find important effects of job loss on the main financial components of workers’ incentive to retire. We then examine retirement behavior after job loss, controlling for these changed retirement incentives, along with any additional effects of displacement not captured by retirement incentives. We find that the observed increased rates of retirement among displaced workers go far beyond these purely financial considerations. Very little of the reduced employment among older job losers can be explained by changes in wages and pension-related retirement incentives. Other barriers to reemployment may be more important explanations for the low employment rates of recently displaced older workers.