Valentino Larcinese
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Valentino Larcinese has a total of 8 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Cecilia Testa
Royal Holloway University of London, Erasmus University Rotterdam and LdA
3 shared publications- Leonzio Rizzo
Department of Economics and Management, University of Ferrara, Ferrara, Italy
3 shared publications - Cecilia Testa
Royal Holloway Univ London, Dept Econ, London, England
1 shared publication James M. Snyder
London School of Economics and Political Science
1 shared publication- Joachim Wehner
London School of Economics and Political Science
1 shared publication - Rafael Hortala-Vallve
London School of Economics and Political Science
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 27 June 2016
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Political Science Research and Methods
- Vol. 5 (3) , 411-425
The Perverse Consequences of Policy Restrictions in the Presence of Asymmetric Information
Institutions have the power to limit a government’s policy options. Policy restrictions are often used as solutions to coordination failures or time inconsistency problems. However, policy constraints can have significant drawbacks and these disadvantages have, to date, been overlooked in the literature. When institutional constraints tie a government’s hands, citizens will have less incentive to become informed about politics and participate in collective decision-making. This is because policy restrictions lower the private returns of political information. A fiscal policy restriction, for example, may decrease redistribution by lowering a poorer voters’ acquisition of political information. We illustrate our theoretical findings with numerical simulations and find that in one in three cases these policy restrictions make poorer voters worse off.
- 27 June 2016
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Political Science Research and Methods
- Vol. 5 (3) , 411-425
The Perverse Consequences of Policy Restrictions in the Presence of Asymmetric Information
Institutions have the power to limit a government’s policy options. Policy restrictions are often used as solutions to coordination failures or time inconsistency problems. However, policy constraints can have significant drawbacks and these disadvantages have, to date, been overlooked in the literature. When institutional constraints tie a government’s hands, citizens will have less incentive to become informed about politics and participate in collective decision-making. This is because policy restrictions lower the private returns of political information. A fiscal policy restriction, for example, may decrease redistribution by lowering a poorer voters’ acquisition of political information. We illustrate our theoretical findings with numerical simulations and find that in one in three cases these policy restrictions make poorer voters worse off.
- Open Access
A Better Life for All? Democratization and Electrification in Post-Apartheid South Africa
Does democracy affect basic service delivery? If yes, who benefits, and which elements of democracy matter - enfranchisement, the lib-eralization of political organization, or both? In 1994, 19 million South Africans gained the right to vote. The previously banned African National Congress was elected promising “a better life for all”. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we exploit heterogeneity in the share of newly enfranchised voters across municipalities to evaluate how franchise extension affected household electrification. Our unique dataset combines nightlight satellite imagery, geo-referenced census data, and municipal election results from the 1990s. We include covariates, run placebo regressions, and examine contiguous census tracts. We find that enfranchisement increased electrification. In parts of the country where municipalities lacked distribution capacity, the national electricity company prioritized core constituencies of the ANC. The effect of democratization on basic services depends on the national government’s ability to influence distribution at the local level.
Open AccessA Better Life for All? Democratization and Electrification in Post-Apartheid South Africa
Does democracy affect basic service delivery? If yes, who benefits, and which elements of democracy matter - enfranchisement, the lib-eralization of political organization, or both? In 1994, 19 million South Africans gained the right to vote. The previously banned African National Congress was elected promising “a better life for all”. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we exploit heterogeneity in the share of newly enfranchised voters across municipalities to evaluate how franchise extension affected household electrification. Our unique dataset combines nightlight satellite imagery, geo-referenced census data, and municipal election results from the 1990s. We include covariates, run placebo regressions, and examine contiguous census tracts. We find that enfranchisement increased electrification. In parts of the country where municipalities lacked distribution capacity, the national electricity company prioritized core constituencies of the ANC. The effect of democratization on basic services depends on the national government’s ability to influence distribution at the local level.
- Open Access
- 3 June 2013
- Published by Wiley in Economics & Politics
- Vol. 25 (3) , 257-282
Why Do Small States Receive More Federal Money? U.S. Senate Representation and the Allocation of Federal Budget
Empirical research on the geographic distribution of U.S. federal spending shows that small states receive disproportionately more dollars per capita. This evidence, often regarded as the consequence of Senate malapportionment, in reality conflates the effects of state population size with that of state population growth. Analyzing outlays for the period 1978–2002, this study shows that properly controlling for population dynamics provides more reasonable estimates of small‐state advantage and solves a number of puzzling peculiarities of previous research. We also show that states with fast‐growing population loose federal spending to the advantage of slow‐growing ones independently of whether they are large or small. The two population effects vary substantially across spending programs. Small states enjoy some advantage in defense spending, whereas fast‐growing ones are penalized in the allocation of federal grants, particularly those administered by formulas limiting budgetary adjustments. Hence, a large part of the inverse relationship between spending and population appears to be driven by mechanisms of budgetary inertia, which are compatible with incrementalist theories of budget allocation.
- 3 June 2013
- Published by Wiley in Economics & Politics
- Vol. 25 (3) , 257-282
Open AccessWhy Do Small States Receive More Federal Money? U.S. Senate Representation and the Allocation of Federal Budget
Empirical research on the geographic distribution of U.S. federal spending shows that small states receive disproportionately more dollars per capita. This evidence, often regarded as the consequence of Senate malapportionment, in reality conflates the effects of state population size with that of state population growth. Analyzing outlays for the period 1978–2002, this study shows that properly controlling for population dynamics provides more reasonable estimates of small‐state advantage and solves a number of puzzling peculiarities of previous research. We also show that states with fast‐growing population loose federal spending to the advantage of slow‐growing ones independently of whether they are large or small. The two population effects vary substantially across spending programs. Small states enjoy some advantage in defense spending, whereas fast‐growing ones are penalized in the allocation of federal grants, particularly those administered by formulas limiting budgetary adjustments. Hence, a large part of the inverse relationship between spending and population appears to be driven by mechanisms of budgetary inertia, which are compatible with incrementalist theories of budget allocation.
- 1 June 2013
- Published by University of Chicago Press in National Tax Journal
- Vol. 66 (2) , 311-341
CHANGING NEEDS, STICKY BUDGET: EVIDENCE FROM THE GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF U.S. FEDERAL GRANTS
- 1 June 2013
- Published by University of Chicago Press in National Tax Journal
- Vol. 66 (2) , 311-341
CHANGING NEEDS, STICKY BUDGET: EVIDENCE FROM THE GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF U.S. FEDERAL GRANTS
- 14 November 2012
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in British Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 43 (4) , 845-875
Testing Models of Distributive Politics using Exit Polls to Measure Voters’ Preferences and Partisanship
This article tests several hypotheses about distributive politics by studying the distribution of federal spending across US states over the period 1978–2002. It improves on previous work by using survey data to measure the share of voters in each state that are Democrats, Republicans and Independents, or liberals, conservatives and moderates. No evidence is found that the allocation of federal spending to the states is distorted by strategic manipulation to win electoral support. States with many swing voters are not advantaged compared to states with more loyal voters, and ‘battleground states’ are not advantaged compared to other states. Spending appears to have little or no effect on voters’ choices, while partisanship and ideology have large effects.
- 14 November 2012
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in British Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 43 (4) , 845-875
Testing Models of Distributive Politics using Exit Polls to Measure Voters’ Preferences and Partisanship
This article tests several hypotheses about distributive politics by studying the distribution of federal spending across US states over the period 1978–2002. It improves on previous work by using survey data to measure the share of voters in each state that are Democrats, Republicans and Independents, or liberals, conservatives and moderates. No evidence is found that the allocation of federal spending to the states is distorted by strategic manipulation to win electoral support. States with many swing voters are not advantaged compared to states with more loyal voters, and ‘battleground states’ are not advantaged compared to other states. Spending appears to have little or no effect on voters’ choices, while partisanship and ideology have large effects.
- 28 January 2010
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 146 (3-4) , 291-317
Working or shirking? Expenses and attendance in the UK Parliament
- 28 January 2010
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 146 (3-4) , 291-317
Working or shirking? Expenses and attendance in the UK Parliament
- Open Access
Why do small states receive more federal money? Us senate representation and the allocation of federal budget
In this paper we provide new evidence on the importance of the so-called small state advantage for the allocation of the US federal budget. We also provide a new interpretation of the available empirical evidence. Analyzing outlays for the period 1978-2002, we show that not only does the population size of a state matter, but so too does its dynamics. Once population scale and change effects are separated, the impact of population size is substantially reduced, and population change turns out to be an important explanatory variable of current spending patterns. The impact of scale and change effects varies substantially across spending programs. Small states enjoy an advantage in defense spending, whereas fast growing ones are penalized in grants allocations. Our results imply that the interests of the states are not easily aligned around their population size alone. The distortion associated with population dynamics is concentrated on federal grants where formulas play a substantial role in limiting budgetary adjustments. Hence, a large part of the inverse relationship between spending and population appears to be driven by mechanisms of budgetary inertia which are compatible with incrementalist theories of budget allocation.
Open AccessWhy do small states receive more federal money? Us senate representation and the allocation of federal budget
In this paper we provide new evidence on the importance of the so-called small state advantage for the allocation of the US federal budget. We also provide a new interpretation of the available empirical evidence. Analyzing outlays for the period 1978-2002, we show that not only does the population size of a state matter, but so too does its dynamics. Once population scale and change effects are separated, the impact of population size is substantially reduced, and population change turns out to be an important explanatory variable of current spending patterns. The impact of scale and change effects varies substantially across spending programs. Small states enjoy an advantage in defense spending, whereas fast growing ones are penalized in grants allocations. Our results imply that the interests of the states are not easily aligned around their population size alone. The distortion associated with population dynamics is concentrated on federal grants where formulas play a substantial role in limiting budgetary adjustments. Hence, a large part of the inverse relationship between spending and population appears to be driven by mechanisms of budgetary inertia which are compatible with incrementalist theories of budget allocation.
- 1 April 2009
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Theoretical Politics
- Vol. 21 (2) , 237-276
Information Acquisition, Ideology and Turnout: Theory and Evidence From Britain
The amount of political information that voters decide to acquire during an electoral campaign depends, among other things, on prior ideological beliefs about parties and/or candidates. Voters that are ex ante indifferent about the candidates attach little value to information because they perceive that voting itself will have little value. Voters that are ex ante very ideological also attach little value to information because they think that the news will hardly change their opinion. Thus, high incentives to be informed can be found at intermediate levels of partisanship. Moreover, the impact of increased political knowledge on turnout is asymmetric: new information increases the probability of voting of indifferent voters but decreases that of very ideological voters. These results are derived within a decision theoretical model of information acquisition and turnout that combines the Riker—Ordeshook (1968) approach to voting behaviour with the Becker (1965) approach to personal production functions. These predictions are then tested on survey data from the 1997 British Election Study (Heath et al., 1999). Our empirical findings are compatible with all the results of the theoretical exercise.
- 1 April 2009
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Theoretical Politics
- Vol. 21 (2) , 237-276
Information Acquisition, Ideology and Turnout: Theory and Evidence From Britain
The amount of political information that voters decide to acquire during an electoral campaign depends, among other things, on prior ideological beliefs about parties and/or candidates. Voters that are ex ante indifferent about the candidates attach little value to information because they perceive that voting itself will have little value. Voters that are ex ante very ideological also attach little value to information because they think that the news will hardly change their opinion. Thus, high incentives to be informed can be found at intermediate levels of partisanship. Moreover, the impact of increased political knowledge on turnout is asymmetric: new information increases the probability of voting of indifferent voters but decreases that of very ideological voters. These results are derived within a decision theoretical model of information acquisition and turnout that combines the Riker—Ordeshook (1968) approach to voting behaviour with the Becker (1965) approach to personal production functions. These predictions are then tested on survey data from the 1997 British Election Study (Heath et al., 1999). Our empirical findings are compatible with all the results of the theoretical exercise.
- 25 September 2008
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Economics
- Vol. 95 (3) , 271-276
McChesney, R. W.: Communication revolution: critical junctures and the future of media
- 25 September 2008
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Economics
- Vol. 95 (3) , 271-276
McChesney, R. W.: Communication revolution: critical junctures and the future of media
- 29 November 2007
- Published by Springer Nature in Social Indicators Research
- Vol. 88 (3) , 483-496
A Discrepancy Index for the Study of Participation with an Application to the Case of Higher Education in Italy
- 29 November 2007
- Published by Springer Nature in Social Indicators Research
- Vol. 88 (3) , 483-496
A Discrepancy Index for the Study of Participation with an Application to the Case of Higher Education in Italy