Juha Räikkä
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Juha Räikkä has a total of 9 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Jukka Varelius
University of Turku
1 shared publicationM. Ahteensuu
1 shared publication- Marko Ahteensuu
University of Helsinki
1 shared publication - Mikko Puumala
Department of Philosophy, Contemporary History and Political Science, University of Turku, Turku, Finland
1 shared publication Pia Halme
1 shared publication- Rosa Rantanen
University of Turku
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
Good and Bad Political Compromises
Political compromises are common. Parties that seek to influence society must inevitably make them. Populists often criticize such compromises, as compromising implies that an ideal outcome will not be achieved. In general, political compromises evoke strong emotions, particularly when they are perceived as problematic—morally or otherwise. In this paper, I will examine whether the moral norms that govern compromise are specific to it. I evaluate Fabian Wendt's view that “deontic restrictions”—limits on what we are morally permitted to do—are not specific to the morality of compromise. I offer critical remarks on Wendt's argument, though I do not claim that his position fails. However, I argue that there is a sense in which the rules of compromise are specific. When compromises are regarded as morally bad, certain moral norms play a particularly prominent role. These norms are more frequently invoked than others and, in this respect, function as specific rules that mark the limits of compromise.
Open AccessGood and Bad Political Compromises
Political compromises are common. Parties that seek to influence society must inevitably make them. Populists often criticize such compromises, as compromising implies that an ideal outcome will not be achieved. In general, political compromises evoke strong emotions, particularly when they are perceived as problematic—morally or otherwise. In this paper, I will examine whether the moral norms that govern compromise are specific to it. I evaluate Fabian Wendt's view that “deontic restrictions”—limits on what we are morally permitted to do—are not specific to the morality of compromise. I offer critical remarks on Wendt's argument, though I do not claim that his position fails. However, I argue that there is a sense in which the rules of compromise are specific. When compromises are regarded as morally bad, certain moral norms play a particularly prominent role. These norms are more frequently invoked than others and, in this respect, function as specific rules that mark the limits of compromise.
- Open Access
- 21 September 2025
- Published by Wiley in The Heythrop Journal
- Vol. 66 (6) , 575-586
The Matthew Effect and Ethics
The unequal distribution of goods seems to be a permanent phenomenon both nationally and globally. Although the historical details of the roots of inequality may vary slightly from country to country, one of the main causes is the so‐called ‘Matthew effect’, which refers to the accumulation of advantages. The rich get richer, and the poor get poorer. In this paper, I argue that although the Matthew effect has a bad moral reputation, this effect is inherently neither bad nor good. I introduce four variants of the effect, which represent the most common usages of the term by researchers, and point out that they all have instances that are morally unproblematic. However, I also argue that, in many cases, there are convincing moral reasons to try to reduce the accumulation of advantages. The intuition that the Matthew effect is ethically problematic has good grounds in specific common cases. Therefore, I argue that the Matthew effect deserves its bad reputation.
- 21 September 2025
- Published by Wiley in The Heythrop Journal
- Vol. 66 (6) , 575-586
Open AccessThe Matthew Effect and Ethics
The unequal distribution of goods seems to be a permanent phenomenon both nationally and globally. Although the historical details of the roots of inequality may vary slightly from country to country, one of the main causes is the so‐called ‘Matthew effect’, which refers to the accumulation of advantages. The rich get richer, and the poor get poorer. In this paper, I argue that although the Matthew effect has a bad moral reputation, this effect is inherently neither bad nor good. I introduce four variants of the effect, which represent the most common usages of the term by researchers, and point out that they all have instances that are morally unproblematic. However, I also argue that, in many cases, there are convincing moral reasons to try to reduce the accumulation of advantages. The intuition that the Matthew effect is ethically problematic has good grounds in specific common cases. Therefore, I argue that the Matthew effect deserves its bad reputation.
- 22 April 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 1-3
Agency, Individual
- Open Access
- 29 May 2024
- Published by Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU) Library in Etikk I Praksis - Nordic Journal of Applied Ethics
- Vol. 18 (1) , 21-31
Compromises and Fairness
Many philosophers have pointed out that a compromise that is fair in one sense can be unfair in another. In this paper, I will briefly introduce different ways in which compromises can be “fair” and then analyze them. In particular, I compare the importance of what I call (a) split-the-difference fairness and (b) end-state fairness. I will defend split-the-difference fairness against an important objection—that a person’s false belief about her fair share does not change what her fair share actually is. To allow such a notion would be rather like allowing her false belief to alter what is actually true. Nevertheless, I aim to provide support for the idea that sometimes it may make sense to consider people’s actual beliefs, even if they are false. However, I do not take a strong position on the question of what the most important sense of fairness is with regard to compromises. Keywords: Compromise, fairness, distribution, agreement, false beliefs
- 29 May 2024
- Published by Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU) Library in Etikk I Praksis - Nordic Journal of Applied Ethics
- Vol. 18 (1) , 21-31
Open AccessCompromises and Fairness
Many philosophers have pointed out that a compromise that is fair in one sense can be unfair in another. In this paper, I will briefly introduce different ways in which compromises can be “fair” and then analyze them. In particular, I compare the importance of what I call (a) split-the-difference fairness and (b) end-state fairness. I will defend split-the-difference fairness against an important objection—that a person’s false belief about her fair share does not change what her fair share actually is. To allow such a notion would be rather like allowing her false belief to alter what is actually true. Nevertheless, I aim to provide support for the idea that sometimes it may make sense to consider people’s actual beliefs, even if they are false. However, I do not take a strong position on the question of what the most important sense of fairness is with regard to compromises. Keywords: Compromise, fairness, distribution, agreement, false beliefs
- 22 March 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 87-99
Conspiracy Theories about Space
This chapter discusses conspiracy theories about space, such as the claims that the Earth is actually flat (although we are deceived into believing otherwise), that the Moon landings were faked, and that space exploration is merely a cover that aims to hide the fact that there are secret bases in the nearby orbs. A popular understanding of aerospace conspiracy theories suggests that they are somehow epistemically special, that is, particularly weird or exceptionally interesting. However, it will be argued that, epistemically speaking, conspiracy theories about space do not differ from those relating to other phenomena. The chapter criticizes the specialty thesis, that is, that aerospace conspiracy theories are special in the sense that their epistemic status, as a class, differs from that of other conspiracy theories. The arguments discussed in this chapter do not support this thesis.
- 22 March 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 87-99
Conspiracy Theories about Space
This chapter discusses conspiracy theories about space, such as the claims that the Earth is actually flat (although we are deceived into believing otherwise), that the Moon landings were faked, and that space exploration is merely a cover that aims to hide the fact that there are secret bases in the nearby orbs. A popular understanding of aerospace conspiracy theories suggests that they are somehow epistemically special, that is, particularly weird or exceptionally interesting. However, it will be argued that, epistemically speaking, conspiracy theories about space do not differ from those relating to other phenomena. The chapter criticizes the specialty thesis, that is, that aerospace conspiracy theories are special in the sense that their epistemic status, as a class, differs from that of other conspiracy theories. The arguments discussed in this chapter do not support this thesis.
- 19 April 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 472-485
Conspiracy Theories and Collective Responsibility
At least in principle, conspiracy theories can force epistemic authorities to improve and clarify the received explanations of political events. In history, further investigations have sometimes started in part due to flourishing conspiracy theories and rumors. However, most of us feel that conspiracy theorizing is not morally unproblematic, and in this chapter, I will ask why conspiracy theorists can be held collectively responsible for their activities. I will distinguish between (1) developers and publishers and (2) ordinary believers and disseminators of conspiracy theories and argue that they both are “collectively” responsible.
- 19 April 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 472-485
Conspiracy Theories and Collective Responsibility
At least in principle, conspiracy theories can force epistemic authorities to improve and clarify the received explanations of political events. In history, further investigations have sometimes started in part due to flourishing conspiracy theories and rumors. However, most of us feel that conspiracy theorizing is not morally unproblematic, and in this chapter, I will ask why conspiracy theorists can be held collectively responsible for their activities. I will distinguish between (1) developers and publishers and (2) ordinary believers and disseminators of conspiracy theories and argue that they both are “collectively” responsible.
- Open Access
- 10 May 2019
- Published by Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU) Library in Etikk I Praksis - Nordic Journal of Applied Ethics
- Vol. 13 (1) , 81-88
Moderate Conventionalism and Cultural Appropriation
Cultural appropriation, also called cultural borrowing, has been the topic of much discussion in recent years. Roughly speaking, cultural appropriation happens when someone outside of a cultural or ethnic group takes or uses some object that is characteristic or in some way important to the group without the group’s permission. Individuals who find cultural appropriation (or borrowing) unproblematic have often argued that if we express moral criticism of the use of traditional Sami outfits by non-Sami, then we are logically committed to criticize all kinds of habits that are clearly acceptable –such as using jeans, eating pizza or drinking tea. However, we will argue that in many cases that objection is problematic. We point out that if one social habit or practice is prohibited (or supported) by existing social conventions but another is not, then there is a convention difference between the cases. The convention difference is in turn a morally relevant difference, or so we aim to show. We refer to “moderate conventionalism,” according to which existing social conventions are morally relevant facts that should be taken into account when choosing how to act, whatever the content of the conventions happens to be. The claim is analogous with the traditional view that laws have some moral relevance and binding force independent of their content. Keywords: cultural appropriation, conventionalism, moderate conventionalism, convention difference
- 10 May 2019
- Published by Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU) Library in Etikk I Praksis - Nordic Journal of Applied Ethics
- Vol. 13 (1) , 81-88
Open AccessModerate Conventionalism and Cultural Appropriation
Cultural appropriation, also called cultural borrowing, has been the topic of much discussion in recent years. Roughly speaking, cultural appropriation happens when someone outside of a cultural or ethnic group takes or uses some object that is characteristic or in some way important to the group without the group’s permission. Individuals who find cultural appropriation (or borrowing) unproblematic have often argued that if we express moral criticism of the use of traditional Sami outfits by non-Sami, then we are logically committed to criticize all kinds of habits that are clearly acceptable –such as using jeans, eating pizza or drinking tea. However, we will argue that in many cases that objection is problematic. We point out that if one social habit or practice is prohibited (or supported) by existing social conventions but another is not, then there is a convention difference between the cases. The convention difference is in turn a morally relevant difference, or so we aim to show. We refer to “moderate conventionalism,” according to which existing social conventions are morally relevant facts that should be taken into account when choosing how to act, whatever the content of the conventions happens to be. The claim is analogous with the traditional view that laws have some moral relevance and binding force independent of their content. Keywords: cultural appropriation, conventionalism, moderate conventionalism, convention difference