William Roberts Clark
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
William Roberts Clark has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Lúcio Vinhas de Souza
ECARES, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium and Tinbergen Institute, Erasmus University, The Netherlands
1 shared publication - Mark Hallerberg
University of Pittsburgh, USA
1 shared publication Matt Golder
New York University, USA
1 shared publication- Sona Nadenichek Golder
Penn State Univ, Dept Polit Sci, University Pk, PA 16802 USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 June 2002
- Published by SAGE Publications in European Union Politics
- Vol. 3 (2) , 205-230
Fiscal Policy and the Democratic Process in the European Union
The construction of a monetary union with a single currency in Europe raises serious concerns for those who understand the democratic process as one in which social groups compete on different ideological programs. This is because it increasingly constrains national governments of different partisan hues to follow similar fiscal and monetary policies. Recent empirical studies indicate that these concerns might be somewhat misplaced since there is evidence that partisan convergence on macroeconomic policy predates these institutional developments. One problem with these studies, though, is that they fail to include the electoral system as a constraint on partisan behavior. Since electoral systems generate centripetal and centrifugal tendencies, we should expect to find strong evidence for partisan differences only where electoral rules encourage dispersion. We test this argument using data on fiscal policy from European Union countries between 1981 and 1992. We find that there is still no systematic evidence for partisan differences. Given this, it is hard to see how EMU can add to the democratic deficit in the European Union.
- 1 June 2002
- Published by SAGE Publications in European Union Politics
- Vol. 3 (2) , 205-230
Fiscal Policy and the Democratic Process in the European Union
The construction of a monetary union with a single currency in Europe raises serious concerns for those who understand the democratic process as one in which social groups compete on different ideological programs. This is because it increasingly constrains national governments of different partisan hues to follow similar fiscal and monetary policies. Recent empirical studies indicate that these concerns might be somewhat misplaced since there is evidence that partisan convergence on macroeconomic policy predates these institutional developments. One problem with these studies, though, is that they fail to include the electoral system as a constraint on partisan behavior. Since electoral systems generate centripetal and centrifugal tendencies, we should expect to find strong evidence for partisan differences only where electoral rules encourage dispersion. We test this argument using data on fiscal policy from European Union countries between 1981 and 1992. We find that there is still no systematic evidence for partisan differences. Given this, it is hard to see how EMU can add to the democratic deficit in the European Union.
- 1 June 2002
- Published by SAGE Publications in European Union Politics
- Vol. 3 (2) , 231-250
Political Business Cycles in EU Accession Countries
This paper considers whether political business cycles existed in East European accession countries during the period 1990-9. Based on the Mundell-Fleming model expanded in Clark and Hallerberg (2000), we argue that the type of exchange rate regime and the relative independence of the central bank affects the instruments governments use to influence the economy before elections. In our empirical analysis, we find that accession countries with dependent central banks and flexible exchange rates have looser monetary policies in electoral periods than in non-electoral periods. If a country has a fixed exchange rate regime, it manipulates its economy in election years through running larger budgets instead of through looser monetary policy. The presence of such cycles in Eastern Europe has implications for the introduction of the euro in EU accession countries.
- 1 June 2002
- Published by SAGE Publications in European Union Politics
- Vol. 3 (2) , 231-250
Political Business Cycles in EU Accession Countries
This paper considers whether political business cycles existed in East European accession countries during the period 1990-9. Based on the Mundell-Fleming model expanded in Clark and Hallerberg (2000), we argue that the type of exchange rate regime and the relative independence of the central bank affects the instruments governments use to influence the economy before elections. In our empirical analysis, we find that accession countries with dependent central banks and flexible exchange rates have looser monetary policies in electoral periods than in non-electoral periods. If a country has a fixed exchange rate regime, it manipulates its economy in election years through running larger budgets instead of through looser monetary policy. The presence of such cycles in Eastern Europe has implications for the introduction of the euro in EU accession countries.