Patricia M. Danzon
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Patricia M. Danzon has a total of 19 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Adrian Towse
Office of Health Economics, London, UK
5 shared publicationsMichael F. Furukawa
4 shared publications- Nuno Sousa Pereira
Faculty of Economics (FEP), Porto Business School and CEF.UP, University of Porto, Porto, Portugal
4 shared publications Andrew W. Mulcahy
The Rand Corporation Arlington VA USA
2 shared publicationsAdrian K. Towse
Office of Health Economics London UK
1 shared publicationErin Taylor
The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 13 December 2018
- Published by Springer Nature
- Vol. 213, 153-167
Drug Pricing and Value in Oncology
This paper first reviews the evidence on price levels, price growth, and value for cancer drugs. The available evidence suggests that prices for originator (brand-name) drugs are rising significantly more rapidly than general inflation, but the available data are inadequate for robust comparisons between cancer and other categories of specialty drugs. We then examine the factors contributing to high and rising prices for cancer drugs. This analysis focuses mainly on the USA, which accounts for 46% of global expenditures on cancer drugs. It is the country of first launch for most cancer and other specialty drugs and frequently has the highest prices for drugs.
- 13 December 2018
- Published by Springer Nature
- Vol. 213, 153-167
Drug Pricing and Value in Oncology
This paper first reviews the evidence on price levels, price growth, and value for cancer drugs. The available evidence suggests that prices for originator (brand-name) drugs are rising significantly more rapidly than general inflation, but the available data are inadequate for robust comparisons between cancer and other categories of specialty drugs. We then examine the factors contributing to high and rising prices for cancer drugs. This analysis focuses mainly on the USA, which accounts for 46% of global expenditures on cancer drugs. It is the country of first launch for most cancer and other specialty drugs and frequently has the highest prices for drugs.
- 30 July 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in PharmacoEconomics
- Vol. 36 (12) , 1395-1405
Differential Pricing of Pharmaceuticals: Theory, Evidence and Emerging Issues
Differential pricing—manufacturers varying prices for on-patent pharmaceuticals across markets—can, in theory, lead to increased patient access and improved research and development (R&D) incentives compared with charging a uniform price across markets. Theoretical models of price discrimination and Ramsey pricing support differentials based inversely on price elasticities, which are plausibly related to average per capita income. However, these models do not address absolute price levels and dynamic efficiency. Value-based differential pricing theory incorporates insurance coverage and addresses static and dynamic efficiency. Limited empirical evidence indicates a weak positive relationship between prices and gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. External referencing and parallel trade undermine differential pricing. We discuss previously neglected factors that undermine differential pricing in practice. High price growth relative to GDP in the USA leads to widening differentials between the USA and other countries. Concerns over the effects of confidential rebating challenges acceptance of this approach to implementing price differentials. The growth of branded generics in low- and middle-income countries leads to complex markets with product and price differentiation.
- 30 July 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in PharmacoEconomics
- Vol. 36 (12) , 1395-1405
Differential Pricing of Pharmaceuticals: Theory, Evidence and Emerging Issues
Differential pricing—manufacturers varying prices for on-patent pharmaceuticals across markets—can, in theory, lead to increased patient access and improved research and development (R&D) incentives compared with charging a uniform price across markets. Theoretical models of price discrimination and Ramsey pricing support differentials based inversely on price elasticities, which are plausibly related to average per capita income. However, these models do not address absolute price levels and dynamic efficiency. Value-based differential pricing theory incorporates insurance coverage and addresses static and dynamic efficiency. Limited empirical evidence indicates a weak positive relationship between prices and gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. External referencing and parallel trade undermine differential pricing. We discuss previously neglected factors that undermine differential pricing in practice. High price growth relative to GDP in the USA leads to widening differentials between the USA and other countries. Concerns over the effects of confidential rebating challenges acceptance of this approach to implementing price differentials. The growth of branded generics in low- and middle-income countries leads to complex markets with product and price differentiation.
- 1 March 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Value in Health
- Vol. 21 (3) , 252-257
Affordability Challenges to Value-Based Pricing: Mass Diseases, Orphan Diseases, and Cures
- 1 March 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Value in Health
- Vol. 21 (3) , 252-257
Affordability Challenges to Value-Based Pricing: Mass Diseases, Orphan Diseases, and Cures
- 1 February 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Value in Health
- Vol. 21 (2) , 140-145
Objectives, Budgets, Thresholds, and Opportunity Costs—A Health Economics Approach: An ISPOR Special Task Force Report [4]
- 1 February 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Value in Health
- Vol. 21 (2) , 140-145
Objectives, Budgets, Thresholds, and Opportunity Costs—A Health Economics Approach: An ISPOR Special Task Force Report [4]
- 4 May 2015
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of the Economics of Business
- Vol. 22 (2) , 245-261
Pharmacy Benefit Management: Are Reporting Requirements Pro- or Anticompetitive?
The market-based US healthcare system relies on pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) to control pharmaceutical costs, in contrast to most other countries that regulate drug prices and access. Optimal structuring and regulation of PBM contracts pose significant agency challenges for private and public payers. However, recent reporting requirements for PBMs may be counterproductive and reflect the interests of competitors rather than customers.
- 4 May 2015
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of the Economics of Business
- Vol. 22 (2) , 245-261
Pharmacy Benefit Management: Are Reporting Requirements Pro- or Anticompetitive?
The market-based US healthcare system relies on pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) to control pharmaceutical costs, in contrast to most other countries that regulate drug prices and access. Optimal structuring and regulation of PBM contracts pose significant agency challenges for private and public payers. However, recent reporting requirements for PBMs may be counterproductive and reflect the interests of competitors rather than customers.
- Open Access
- 11 December 2013
- Published by Wiley in Health Economics
- Vol. 24 (3) , 294-301
Value‐Based Differential Pricing: Efficient Prices for Drugs in a Global Context
This paper analyzes pharmaceutical pricing between and within countries to achieve second‐best static and dynamic efficiency. We distinguish countries with and without universal insurance, because insurance undermines patients' price sensitivity, potentially leading to prices above second‐best efficient levels. In countries with universal insurance, if each payer unilaterally sets an incremental cost‐effectiveness ratio (ICER) threshold based on its citizens' willingness‐to‐pay for health; manufacturers price to that ICER threshold; and payers limit reimbursement to patients for whom a drug is cost‐effective at that price and ICER, then the resulting price levels and use within each country and price differentials across countries are roughly consistent with second‐best static and dynamic efficiency. These value‐based prices are expected to differ cross‐nationally with per capita income and be broadly consistent with Ramsey optimal prices. Countries without comprehensive insurance avoid its distorting effects on prices but also lack financial protection and affordability for the poor. Improving pricing efficiency in these self‐pay countries includes improving regulation and consumer information about product quality and enabling firms to price discriminate within and between countries. © 2013 The Authors. Health Economics published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
- 11 December 2013
- Published by Wiley in Health Economics
- Vol. 24 (3) , 294-301
Open AccessValue‐Based Differential Pricing: Efficient Prices for Drugs in a Global Context
This paper analyzes pharmaceutical pricing between and within countries to achieve second‐best static and dynamic efficiency. We distinguish countries with and without universal insurance, because insurance undermines patients' price sensitivity, potentially leading to prices above second‐best efficient levels. In countries with universal insurance, if each payer unilaterally sets an incremental cost‐effectiveness ratio (ICER) threshold based on its citizens' willingness‐to‐pay for health; manufacturers price to that ICER threshold; and payers limit reimbursement to patients for whom a drug is cost‐effective at that price and ICER, then the resulting price levels and use within each country and price differentials across countries are roughly consistent with second‐best static and dynamic efficiency. These value‐based prices are expected to differ cross‐nationally with per capita income and be broadly consistent with Ramsey optimal prices. Countries without comprehensive insurance avoid its distorting effects on prices but also lack financial protection and affordability for the poor. Improving pricing efficiency in these self‐pay countries includes improving regulation and consumer information about product quality and enabling firms to price discriminate within and between countries. © 2013 The Authors. Health Economics published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
- Open Access
- 20 November 2013
- Published by Wiley in Health Economics
- Vol. 24 (2) , 238-252
Pharmaceutical Pricing in Emerging Markets: Effects of Income, Competition, and Procurement
This paper analyzes determinants of ex‐manufacturer prices for originator and generic drugs across countries. We focus on drugs to treat HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria in middle and low‐income countries (MLICs), with robustness checks to other therapeutic categories and the full income range of countries. We examine the effects of per capita income, income dispersion, competition from originator and generic substitutes, and whether the drugs are sold to retail pharmacies versus tendered procurement by non‐government organizations.The cross‐national income elasticity of prices is 0.27 across the full income range of countries but is 0.0–0.10 between MLICs, implying that drugs are least affordable relative to income in the lowest income countries. Within‐country income inequality contributes to relatively high prices in MLICs. Although generics are priced roughly 30% lower than originators on average, the variance is large. Additional generic competitors only weakly affect prices, plausibly because generic quality uncertainty leads to competition on brand rather than price. Tendered procurement that imposes quality standards attracts multinational generic suppliers and significantly reduces prices of originator and generic drugs, compared with their respective prices to retail pharmacies. ©2013 The Authors. Health Economics Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
- 20 November 2013
- Published by Wiley in Health Economics
- Vol. 24 (2) , 238-252
Open AccessPharmaceutical Pricing in Emerging Markets: Effects of Income, Competition, and Procurement
This paper analyzes determinants of ex‐manufacturer prices for originator and generic drugs across countries. We focus on drugs to treat HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria in middle and low‐income countries (MLICs), with robustness checks to other therapeutic categories and the full income range of countries. We examine the effects of per capita income, income dispersion, competition from originator and generic substitutes, and whether the drugs are sold to retail pharmacies versus tendered procurement by non‐government organizations.The cross‐national income elasticity of prices is 0.27 across the full income range of countries but is 0.0–0.10 between MLICs, implying that drugs are least affordable relative to income in the lowest income countries. Within‐country income inequality contributes to relatively high prices in MLICs. Although generics are priced roughly 30% lower than originators on average, the variance is large. Additional generic competitors only weakly affect prices, plausibly because generic quality uncertainty leads to competition on brand rather than price. Tendered procurement that imposes quality standards attracts multinational generic suppliers and significantly reduces prices of originator and generic drugs, compared with their respective prices to retail pharmacies. ©2013 The Authors. Health Economics Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
- 1 August 2011
- Published by Health Affairs Publishing, LLC in Health Affairs
- Vol. 30 (8) , 1529-1538
Setting Cost-Effectiveness Thresholds As A Means To Achieve Appropriate Drug Prices In Rich And Poor Countries
Finding better mechanisms to enable differential pricing that reflects different degrees of willingness to pay across countries with different income levels is an important challenge for drug manufacturers and policy makers. Drug prices must be high enough to meet manufacturers’ needs—covering costs and ensuring adequate investment in research and development, as well as producing a profit—but low enough to allow consumers access to medicines that they need. Examining drug pricing, we found that in rich countries, insurance coverage can make consumers insensitive to price, which means that manufacturers’ prices are largely unrestrained unless payers intervene. In middle- and low-income countries, where most consumers pay for drugs out of pocket, we found that the poorest countries face the highest prices, relative to their mean per capita income. We recommend that countries and payers set their own cost-effectiveness thresholds to reflect how much they are willing to pay for “health gain”—in other words, for a measured improvement in the health of a person or a population. Adopting this approach broadly should lead to appropriate price differences across and within countries, benefiting consumers and manufacturers alike.
- 1 August 2011
- Published by Health Affairs Publishing, LLC in Health Affairs
- Vol. 30 (8) , 1529-1538
Setting Cost-Effectiveness Thresholds As A Means To Achieve Appropriate Drug Prices In Rich And Poor Countries
Finding better mechanisms to enable differential pricing that reflects different degrees of willingness to pay across countries with different income levels is an important challenge for drug manufacturers and policy makers. Drug prices must be high enough to meet manufacturers’ needs—covering costs and ensuring adequate investment in research and development, as well as producing a profit—but low enough to allow consumers access to medicines that they need. Examining drug pricing, we found that in rich countries, insurance coverage can make consumers insensitive to price, which means that manufacturers’ prices are largely unrestrained unless payers intervene. In middle- and low-income countries, where most consumers pay for drugs out of pocket, we found that the poorest countries face the highest prices, relative to their mean per capita income. We recommend that countries and payers set their own cost-effectiveness thresholds to reflect how much they are willing to pay for “health gain”—in other words, for a measured improvement in the health of a person or a population. Adopting this approach broadly should lead to appropriate price differences across and within countries, benefiting consumers and manufacturers alike.
- Open Access
- 1 July 2011
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of the Economics of Business
- Vol. 18 (2) , 239-271
Vaccine Supply: Effects of Regulation and Competition
In US vaccine markets, competing producers with high fixed, sunk costs face relatively concentrated demand. The resulting price and quality competition leads to the exit of all but one or very few producers per vaccine. Our empirical analysis of exits from US vaccine markets supports the hypothesis that high fixed costs and both price and quality competition contribute to vaccine exits. We find no evidence that government purchasing has significant effects, possibly because government purchase tends to increase volume but lower price, with offsetting effects. Evidence from the flu vaccine market confirms that government purchasing is not a necessary condition for exits and the existence of few suppliers per vaccine in the US.
- 1 July 2011
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of the Economics of Business
- Vol. 18 (2) , 239-271
Open AccessVaccine Supply: Effects of Regulation and Competition
In US vaccine markets, competing producers with high fixed, sunk costs face relatively concentrated demand. The resulting price and quality competition leads to the exit of all but one or very few producers per vaccine. Our empirical analysis of exits from US vaccine markets supports the hypothesis that high fixed costs and both price and quality competition contribute to vaccine exits. We find no evidence that government purchasing has significant effects, possibly because government purchase tends to increase volume but lower price, with offsetting effects. Evidence from the flu vaccine market confirms that government purchasing is not a necessary condition for exits and the existence of few suppliers per vaccine in the US.
- 1 April 2011
- Published by Duke University Press in Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law
- Vol. 36 (2) , 295-316
Commercial Importation of Prescription Drugs in the United States: Short-Run Implications
- 1 April 2011
- Published by Duke University Press in Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law
- Vol. 36 (2) , 295-316
Commercial Importation of Prescription Drugs in the United States: Short-Run Implications