Peter T. Leeson
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Peter T. Leeson has a total of 28 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Peter J. Boettke
Department of Economics, George Mason University, Fairfax, USA
4 shared publications - Christopher J. Coyne
George Mason University, USA
3 shared publications - Joshua C. Hall
West Virginia University
2 shared publications Joshua Pierson
George Mason University
2 shared publicationsAlex Nowrasteh
London Sch Econ, Econ Hist Dept, London WC2A 2AE, England
1 shared publication- Andrea M. Dean
West Virginia University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 12 April 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 203 (1-2) , 1
Editorial announcement
- Open Access
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Moscow University Press in Moscow University Economics Bulletin
- Vol. 60 (№4, 2025) , 15-27
Comparative historical political economy: lessons for development
Comparative historical political economy (CHPE) is an analytical approach to understanding social practices. That approach is not development specific, and many applications of it are not motivated by development questions. Despite that, such applications often generate development-pertinent insights. I illustrate CHPE’s approach to understanding social practices using non-development applications that nevertheless furnish lessons relevant for contemporary development.
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Moscow University Press in Moscow University Economics Bulletin
- Vol. 60 (№4, 2025) , 15-27
Open AccessComparative historical political economy: lessons for development
Comparative historical political economy (CHPE) is an analytical approach to understanding social practices. That approach is not development specific, and many applications of it are not motivated by development questions. Despite that, such applications often generate development-pertinent insights. I illustrate CHPE’s approach to understanding social practices using non-development applications that nevertheless furnish lessons relevant for contemporary development.
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 198 (1-2) , 1
Editorial announcement
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 198 (1-2) , 1
Editorial announcement
- 8 September 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 239-244
It Began with Richard Nixon
- 2 April 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Religion, Brain & Behavior
- Vol. 14 (2) , 216-218
The economic – and anthropological? – view of supernatural institutions
Researchers from different disciplines tend to embrace different theoretical frameworks, empirical methods, even scientific outlooks. To expect their views of a given phenomenon to converge is ther...
- 2 April 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Religion, Brain & Behavior
- Vol. 14 (2) , 216-218
The economic – and anthropological? – view of supernatural institutions
Researchers from different disciplines tend to embrace different theoretical frameworks, empirical methods, even scientific outlooks. To expect their views of a given phenomenon to converge is ther...
- 22 February 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 194 (3-4) , 1
Editorial announcement
- 22 February 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 194 (3-4) , 1
Editorial announcement
- 3 January 2022
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Economic Journal
- Vol. 132 (646) , 2325-2338
Hobo Economicus*
The central implication of maximising behaviour amid competition is that rates of return tend toward equality. We test that implication in a market whose participants have the traits that behavioural economics suggests should make it hardest to find evidence of maximisation: the market for panhandling at Metrorail stations in Washington, District of Columbia. We find that stations with more panhandling opportunities attract more panhandlers and that cross-station differences in hourly panhandling receipts are statistically indistinguishable from zero. Panhandling rates of return thus tend toward equality. Extreme ‘behavioural’ traits do not prevent maximisation in this market.
- 3 January 2022
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Economic Journal
- Vol. 132 (646) , 2325-2338
Hobo Economicus*
The central implication of maximising behaviour amid competition is that rates of return tend toward equality. We test that implication in a market whose participants have the traits that behavioural economics suggests should make it hardest to find evidence of maximisation: the market for panhandling at Metrorail stations in Washington, District of Columbia. We find that stations with more panhandling opportunities attract more panhandlers and that cross-station differences in hourly panhandling receipts are statistically indistinguishable from zero. Panhandling rates of return thus tend toward equality. Extreme ‘behavioural’ traits do not prevent maximisation in this market.
- 30 December 2021
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Review of Law & Economics
- Vol. 17 (3) , 615-646
Trading with the Dead
Late medieval Englishmen provided for their wellbeing in the hereafter by purchasing intercession for their souls. They traded valuable landed endowments for the promise of posthumous Masses and prayers whose daily observance contractual counterparties agreed to underwrite for decades, centuries, even eternally. Intercessory foundations so contracted were called chantries. Chantry contracts constituted trades with the dead in the sense that the promisees were deceased when the promisors were supposed to perform. I study the special problems that chantry contract promisees faced in enforcing their rights from the grave and analyze the devices they used for that purpose. Chantry founders wary of their fates in the afterlife showed equal concern for the challenges their contracts would encounter in this life long after they were gone. Founders met those challenges by leveraging the economics of incentives to develop a strategy of chantry contract self-enforcement: profit the living, present and future, for monitoring the contractual performance of promisors and promisors' agents, and for punishing them should they breach. Chantry founders' strategy was successful, enabling trade with the dead.
- 30 December 2021
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Review of Law & Economics
- Vol. 17 (3) , 615-646
Trading with the Dead
Late medieval Englishmen provided for their wellbeing in the hereafter by purchasing intercession for their souls. They traded valuable landed endowments for the promise of posthumous Masses and prayers whose daily observance contractual counterparties agreed to underwrite for decades, centuries, even eternally. Intercessory foundations so contracted were called chantries. Chantry contracts constituted trades with the dead in the sense that the promisees were deceased when the promisors were supposed to perform. I study the special problems that chantry contract promisees faced in enforcing their rights from the grave and analyze the devices they used for that purpose. Chantry founders wary of their fates in the afterlife showed equal concern for the challenges their contracts would encounter in this life long after they were gone. Founders met those challenges by leveraging the economics of incentives to develop a strategy of chantry contract self-enforcement: profit the living, present and future, for monitoring the contractual performance of promisors and promisors' agents, and for punishing them should they breach. Chantry founders' strategy was successful, enabling trade with the dead.
- 22 March 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 195 (1-2) , 5-41
Public choice and public health
Public choice scholars have attended only modestly to issues in public health. We expect that to change rapidly given the Covid-19 pandemic. The time therefore is ripe for taking stock of public-choice relevant scholarship that addresses issues in public health. That is what we do. Our stock-taking highlights three themes: (1) Public health regulations often are driven by private interests, not public ones. (2) The allocation of public health resources often reflects private interests, not public ones. (3) Public health policies may have perverse effects, undermining instead of promoting health-consumer welfare.
- 22 March 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 195 (1-2) , 5-41
Public choice and public health
Public choice scholars have attended only modestly to issues in public health. We expect that to change rapidly given the Covid-19 pandemic. The time therefore is ripe for taking stock of public-choice relevant scholarship that addresses issues in public health. That is what we do. Our stock-taking highlights three themes: (1) Public health regulations often are driven by private interests, not public ones. (2) The allocation of public health resources often reflects private interests, not public ones. (3) Public health policies may have perverse effects, undermining instead of promoting health-consumer welfare.
- Open Access
- 24 February 2021
- Published by Wiley in Southern Economic Journal
- Vol. 87 (4) , 1107-1118
Externality and COVID‐19
Negative infectious disease externalities are less prevalent in the absence of government intervention and less costly to society than is often supposed. That is so for three reasons. (1) Unlike externality‐creating behaviors in many classical externality contexts, such behaviors are often self‐limiting in the context of infectious disease. (2) In market economies, behaviors that may create infectious disease externalities typically occur at sites that are owned privately and visited voluntarily. Owners have powerful incentives to regulate such behaviors at their sites, and visitors face residual infection risk contractually. (3) The social cost of infectious disease externalities is limited by the cheapest method of avoiding externalized infection risk. That cost is modest compared to the one usually imagined: the value of life (or health) lost to the disease if government does not intervene. We elaborate these arguments in the context of the COVID‐19 pandemic.
- 24 February 2021
- Published by Wiley in Southern Economic Journal
- Vol. 87 (4) , 1107-1118
Open AccessExternality and COVID‐19
Negative infectious disease externalities are less prevalent in the absence of government intervention and less costly to society than is often supposed. That is so for three reasons. (1) Unlike externality‐creating behaviors in many classical externality contexts, such behaviors are often self‐limiting in the context of infectious disease. (2) In market economies, behaviors that may create infectious disease externalities typically occur at sites that are owned privately and visited voluntarily. Owners have powerful incentives to regulate such behaviors at their sites, and visitors face residual infection risk contractually. (3) The social cost of infectious disease externalities is limited by the cheapest method of avoiding externalized infection risk. That cost is modest compared to the one usually imagined: the value of life (or health) lost to the disease if government does not intervene. We elaborate these arguments in the context of the COVID‐19 pandemic.