Richard E. Just
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Richard E. Just has a total of 6 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Rulon D. Pope
Department of Economics, Brigham Young University, Provo, USA
2 shared publications - Ariel Ortiz-Bobea
Cornell University
1 shared publication David R. Just
Cornell University, United States
1 shared publicationJean‐Paul Chavas
Department of Agricultural Economics University of Wisconsin
1 shared publicationRulon Pope
Department of Economics Brigham Young University
1 shared publicationSinaia Netanyahu
Department of Industrial Engineering and Management Ben‐Gurion University of the Negev Beer‐Sheva Israel
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 May 2016
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economics and Business
- Vol. 85, 73-83
Comparison of generic advertising for a competitive industry to a monopolist
- 1 May 2016
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economics and Business
- Vol. 85, 73-83
Comparison of generic advertising for a competitive industry to a monopolist
- 18 April 2016
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Economics and Finance
- Vol. 41 (3) , 421-440
The many conditions under which monopolistic advertising can differ from the social optimum
- 18 April 2016
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Economics and Finance
- Vol. 41 (3) , 421-440
The many conditions under which monopolistic advertising can differ from the social optimum
- 20 June 2012
- Published by Wiley in American Journal of Agricultural Economics
- Vol. 95 (2) , 244-251
Modeling the Structure of Adaptation in Climate Change Impact Assessment
- 20 June 2012
- Published by Wiley in American Journal of Agricultural Economics
- Vol. 95 (2) , 244-251
Modeling the Structure of Adaptation in Climate Change Impact Assessment
- 1 October 2011
- Published by Annual Reviews in Annual Review of Resource Economics
- Vol. 3 (1) , 37-70
Behavior, Robustness, and Sufficient Statistics in Welfare Measurement
The joint implications for welfare measurement of three recent literatures are considered: the behavioral welfare economics literature, the structural versus reduced form debate in econometrics, and the use of sufficient statistics for characterizing behavior. The first permits the revealed preference paradigm to include a wide variety of so-called anomalous behavioral criteria. Sufficient statistics permit aggregation under heterogeneous behavioral criteria, not only heterogeneous characteristics, to facilitate meaningful economic welfare analysis. Atheoretic reduced form econometrics and traditional treatment-effect econometrics do not support welfare analysis, but marginal treatment-effect econometrics is useful for a certain type of policy problems. More generally, estimation of sufficient statistics requires theory-based reduced form econometrics. Sufficient statistics are further suggested for general equilibrium welfare measurement. Under certain assumptions about endogenous government behavior, robust concepts of economic welfare measurement emerge that rationalize the terminology and concepts of traditional welfare economics, although with a much broader conceptual basis.
- 1 October 2011
- Published by Annual Reviews in Annual Review of Resource Economics
- Vol. 3 (1) , 37-70
Behavior, Robustness, and Sufficient Statistics in Welfare Measurement
The joint implications for welfare measurement of three recent literatures are considered: the behavioral welfare economics literature, the structural versus reduced form debate in econometrics, and the use of sufficient statistics for characterizing behavior. The first permits the revealed preference paradigm to include a wide variety of so-called anomalous behavioral criteria. Sufficient statistics permit aggregation under heterogeneous behavioral criteria, not only heterogeneous characteristics, to facilitate meaningful economic welfare analysis. Atheoretic reduced form econometrics and traditional treatment-effect econometrics do not support welfare analysis, but marginal treatment-effect econometrics is useful for a certain type of policy problems. More generally, estimation of sufficient statistics requires theory-based reduced form econometrics. Sufficient statistics are further suggested for general equilibrium welfare measurement. Under certain assumptions about endogenous government behavior, robust concepts of economic welfare measurement emerge that rationalize the terminology and concepts of traditional welfare economics, although with a much broader conceptual basis.
- 12 October 2009
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Econometrics
- Vol. 162 (1) , 6-17
Global identification of risk preferences with revealed preference data
- 12 October 2009
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Econometrics
- Vol. 162 (1) , 6-17
Global identification of risk preferences with revealed preference data
- 6 April 2004
- Published by American Geophysical Union (AGU) in Water Resources Research
- Vol. 40 (5)
Implications of “victim pays” infeasibilities for interconnected games with an illustration for aquifer sharing under unequal access costs
This paper considers application of interconnected game theory to modeling of bilateral agreements for sharing common pool resources under conditions of unequal access. Linking negotiations to issues with reciprocal benefits through interconnected game theory has been proposed in other settings to achieve international cooperation because it can avoid outcomes that are politically unacceptable due to the “victim pays” principle. Previous studies have not considered adequately the critical nature of this political infeasibility, if it exists, in determining advantages of interconnection. This paper investigates how game structure and benefits suggested by interconnected game theory are altered when victim pays strategies are removed from the feasibility set. Linking games is shown to have greater advantages than when the structural implications of eliminating victim pays strategies are not considered. Conversely, a class of cases exists where the full cooperation benefits of interconnection are attainable without linking through isolated component games when victim pays outcomes are feasible.
- 6 April 2004
- Published by American Geophysical Union (AGU) in Water Resources Research
- Vol. 40 (5)
Implications of “victim pays” infeasibilities for interconnected games with an illustration for aquifer sharing under unequal access costs
This paper considers application of interconnected game theory to modeling of bilateral agreements for sharing common pool resources under conditions of unequal access. Linking negotiations to issues with reciprocal benefits through interconnected game theory has been proposed in other settings to achieve international cooperation because it can avoid outcomes that are politically unacceptable due to the “victim pays” principle. Previous studies have not considered adequately the critical nature of this political infeasibility, if it exists, in determining advantages of interconnection. This paper investigates how game structure and benefits suggested by interconnected game theory are altered when victim pays strategies are removed from the feasibility set. Linking games is shown to have greater advantages than when the structural implications of eliminating victim pays strategies are not considered. Conversely, a class of cases exists where the full cooperation benefits of interconnection are attainable without linking through isolated component games when victim pays outcomes are feasible.
- 1 February 1983
- Published by Wiley in American Journal of Agricultural Economics
- Vol. 65 (1) , 98-107
Economic Welfare Evaluations for Producers under Uncertainty
- 1 February 1983
- Published by Wiley in American Journal of Agricultural Economics
- Vol. 65 (1) , 98-107
Economic Welfare Evaluations for Producers under Uncertainty