David Granlund
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
David Granlund has a total of 14 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Magnus Wikström
Department of Economics, Umeå University, SE-901 87 Umeå,Sweden
2 shared publications- Niklas Rudholm
HUI Research SE‐103 29 Stockholm Sweden
2 shared publications - Aljoscha Janssen
Singapore Management University, Singapore 178903
1 shared publication Ho D. Phuc
Institute of Mathematics
1 shared publicationLars Lindholm
Umeå University
1 shared publication- Mats A. Bergman
Department of Economics, Södertörn University, Stockholm, Sweden
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 15 July 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 213, 1-25
The importance of the first generic substitution: Evidence from Sweden
- 15 July 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 213, 1-25
The importance of the first generic substitution: Evidence from Sweden
- Open Access
- 14 December 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Health Economics Review
- Vol. 12 (1) , 1-3
Correction: Direct and indirect savings from parallel imports in Sweden
- 14 December 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Health Economics Review
- Vol. 12 (1) , 1-3
Open AccessCorrection: Direct and indirect savings from parallel imports in Sweden
- Open Access
- 31 August 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Health Economics Review
- Vol. 12 (1) , 1-14
Direct and indirect savings from parallel imports in Sweden
Background: The aim was: i) to quantify the direct and indirect savings from parallel imports in Sweden during a period when sellers were forbidden from giving discounts to pharmacies, and ii) to study if the effects of competition from parallel imports on list prices became smaller in absolute size when sellers were allowed to give discounts to pharmacies.Methods: We analyzed the monthly prices for 3068 products during 61 months when discounts were forbidden and for 2504 products during 84 months when discounts were allowed. The price effects were estimated using dynamic models that rendered lagged numbers of competitors into valid and strong instruments for the current values.Results: When discounts were forbidden, parallel imports had a market share of 16% and were on average 9% cheaper than locally sourced drugs, which yielded a direct saving of 231 million Swedish kronor (SEK) (24 million EUR) per year. Also, parallel imports reduced the prices of products with the same substance by, on average, 6% in the long-term, which yielded indirect savings of 421 million SEK (44 million EUR) per year. In total, parallel imports reduced the cost for on-patent pharmaceuticals by 4%. When discounts were allowed, the average gap in list price between parallel imports and locally sourced products was reduced to 0.8%, and the list prices of locally sourced products were no longer significantly affected by competition from parallel imports.Conclusion: When discounts were allowed, the savings of parallel imports through lower list prices were replaced by savings of pharmacies through secret discounts.
- 31 August 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Health Economics Review
- Vol. 12 (1) , 1-14
Open AccessDirect and indirect savings from parallel imports in Sweden
Background: The aim was: i) to quantify the direct and indirect savings from parallel imports in Sweden during a period when sellers were forbidden from giving discounts to pharmacies, and ii) to study if the effects of competition from parallel imports on list prices became smaller in absolute size when sellers were allowed to give discounts to pharmacies.Methods: We analyzed the monthly prices for 3068 products during 61 months when discounts were forbidden and for 2504 products during 84 months when discounts were allowed. The price effects were estimated using dynamic models that rendered lagged numbers of competitors into valid and strong instruments for the current values.Results: When discounts were forbidden, parallel imports had a market share of 16% and were on average 9% cheaper than locally sourced drugs, which yielded a direct saving of 231 million Swedish kronor (SEK) (24 million EUR) per year. Also, parallel imports reduced the prices of products with the same substance by, on average, 6% in the long-term, which yielded indirect savings of 421 million SEK (44 million EUR) per year. In total, parallel imports reduced the cost for on-patent pharmaceuticals by 4%. When discounts were allowed, the average gap in list price between parallel imports and locally sourced products was reduced to 0.8%, and the list prices of locally sourced products were no longer significantly affected by competition from parallel imports.Conclusion: When discounts were allowed, the savings of parallel imports through lower list prices were replaced by savings of pharmacies through secret discounts.
- Open Access
- 12 August 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 60 (1) , 63-92
The Price Effects of Competition from Parallel Imports and Therapeutic Alternatives: Using Dynamic Models to Estimate the Causal Effect on the Extensive and Intensive Margins
This paper studies responses to competition with the use of dynamic models that distinguish between short- and long-term price effects. The dynamic models also allow lagged numbers of competitors to become valid and strong instruments for the current numbers, which enables studying the causal effects using flexible specifications. A first parallel trader is found to decrease prices of exchangeable products by 7% in the long term. On the other hand, prices do not respond to the first competitor that sells therapeutic alternatives; but competition from four or more competitors that sell on-patent therapeutic alternatives decreases prices by about 10% in the long term.
- 12 August 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 60 (1) , 63-92
Open AccessThe Price Effects of Competition from Parallel Imports and Therapeutic Alternatives: Using Dynamic Models to Estimate the Causal Effect on the Extensive and Intensive Margins
This paper studies responses to competition with the use of dynamic models that distinguish between short- and long-term price effects. The dynamic models also allow lagged numbers of competitors to become valid and strong instruments for the current numbers, which enables studying the causal effects using flexible specifications. A first parallel trader is found to decrease prices of exchangeable products by 7% in the long term. On the other hand, prices do not respond to the first competitor that sells therapeutic alternatives; but competition from four or more competitors that sell on-patent therapeutic alternatives decreases prices by about 10% in the long term.
- Open Access
- 1 June 2021
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Industrial Economics
- Vol. 69 (2) , 443-483
A New Approach to Estimating State Dependence in Consumers’ Brand Choices Applied to 762 Pharmaceutical Markets*
This article shows how state dependence effects can be estimated for many markets and with few assumptions by using data on how the shares of consumers buying specific products differ between those who bought the same product on their latest purchase occasion and those who did not. Using information regarding which product was cheapest when consumers made their last purchases as instrument, I estimate that state dependence increases the probability that consumers will buy the product they bought the last time by eight percentage points. This effect is larger for women and the elderly than for men and younger consumers.
- 1 June 2021
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Industrial Economics
- Vol. 69 (2) , 443-483
Open AccessA New Approach to Estimating State Dependence in Consumers’ Brand Choices Applied to 762 Pharmaceutical Markets*
This article shows how state dependence effects can be estimated for many markets and with few assumptions by using data on how the shares of consumers buying specific products differ between those who bought the same product on their latest purchase occasion and those who did not. Using information regarding which product was cheapest when consumers made their last purchases as instrument, I estimate that state dependence increases the probability that consumers will buy the product they bought the last time by eight percentage points. This effect is larger for women and the elderly than for men and younger consumers.
- 1 September 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Health Economics
- Vol. 61, 1-12
Price competition in pharmaceuticals – Evidence from 1303 Swedish markets
- 1 September 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Health Economics
- Vol. 61, 1-12
Price competition in pharmaceuticals – Evidence from 1303 Swedish markets
- 5 April 2017
- Published by Wiley in Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics
- Vol. 79 (6) , 969-996
Squeezing the Last Drop Out of Your Suppliers: An Empirical Study of Market‐Based Purchasing Policies for Generic Pharmaceuticals
We study the effect of the degree of exclusivity for the lowest bidder on the average price of generic pharmaceuticals in the short and long terms. Our results indicate that a 1‐percentage‐point gain in market share of the lowest bidder reduces average costs by 0.2% in the short term and 0.8% in the long term, but also reduces the number of firms by 1%. We find that reducing the number of firms has a strong positive (and hence counteracting) effect on average prices, a 1% reduction raising prices by approximately 1%.
- 5 April 2017
- Published by Wiley in Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics
- Vol. 79 (6) , 969-996
Squeezing the Last Drop Out of Your Suppliers: An Empirical Study of Market‐Based Purchasing Policies for Generic Pharmaceuticals
We study the effect of the degree of exclusivity for the lowest bidder on the average price of generic pharmaceuticals in the short and long terms. Our results indicate that a 1‐percentage‐point gain in market share of the lowest bidder reduces average costs by 0.2% in the short term and 0.8% in the long term, but also reduces the number of firms by 1%. We find that reducing the number of firms has a strong positive (and hence counteracting) effect on average prices, a 1% reduction raising prices by approximately 1%.
- 19 May 2016
- Published by Springer Nature in International Tax and Public Finance
- Vol. 24 (3) , 536-545
Federal subsidization of state expenditure to reduce political budget cycles
- 19 May 2016
- Published by Springer Nature in International Tax and Public Finance
- Vol. 24 (3) , 536-545
Federal subsidization of state expenditure to reduce political budget cycles
- 18 November 2015
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy
- Vol. 16 (2) , 1069-1092
EU Enlargement, Parallel Trade and Price Competition in Pharmaceuticals: Has the Price Competition increased?
Given the cost of trade and availability of pharmaceuticals, the driving force for parallel trade is the price difference between the source (exporting) and the destination (importing) country. An increase in the price difference or in the availability of pharmaceuticals for parallel trade should increase price competition in the destination country. Using 2003-2007 data from Sweden we investigated whether EU enlargement in 2004, when new countries with low pharmaceutical prices joined the EU, increased competition from parallel imports. Drugs facing competition from parallel imports are found to have on average 17% to 21% lower prices than they would have had if they had never faced such competition. But, contrary to expectation, EU enlargement is not found to have increased this effect, which might be explained by derogations and changes in consumer perceptions of parallel imports
- 18 November 2015
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy
- Vol. 16 (2) , 1069-1092
EU Enlargement, Parallel Trade and Price Competition in Pharmaceuticals: Has the Price Competition increased?
Given the cost of trade and availability of pharmaceuticals, the driving force for parallel trade is the price difference between the source (exporting) and the destination (importing) country. An increase in the price difference or in the availability of pharmaceuticals for parallel trade should increase price competition in the destination country. Using 2003-2007 data from Sweden we investigated whether EU enlargement in 2004, when new countries with low pharmaceutical prices joined the EU, increased competition from parallel imports. Drugs facing competition from parallel imports are found to have on average 17% to 21% lower prices than they would have had if they had never faced such competition. But, contrary to expectation, EU enlargement is not found to have increased this effect, which might be explained by derogations and changes in consumer perceptions of parallel imports
- Open Access
- 1 June 2015
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
- Vol. 56, 33-39
Gender norms, work hours, and corrective taxation
- 1 June 2015
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
- Vol. 56, 33-39
Open AccessGender norms, work hours, and corrective taxation