Hannes Rakoczy
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Hannes Rakoczy has a total of 175 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Marina Proft
University of Göttingen, Germany
7 shared publications - Julia Fischer
Georg-August-Universität Göttingen, Johann-Friedrich-Blumenbach Institute, Department for Primate Cognition, Göttingen, Germany
5 shared publications - Charlotte Grosse Wiesmann
Minerva Fast Track Group Milestones of Early Cognitive Development, Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences, Leipzig, Germany
4 shared publications - Helene Meunier
Centre de Primatologie de l’Université de Strasbourg, Chemin du Fort Foch, 67207 Niederhausbergen, France
4 shared publications - Marie Hirel
Georg-August-Universität Göttingen, Johann-Friedrich-Blumenbach Institute, Department for Primate Cognition, Kellnerweg 4, 37077 Göttingen, Germany
4 shared publications - Stefanie Keupp
Georg-August-Universität Göttingen, Johann-Friedrich-Blumenbach Institute, Department for Primate Cognition, Kellnerweg 4, 37077 Göttingen, Germany
4 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 7 October 2026
- Published by Wiley in Cognitive Science
- Vol. 50 (10)
More Evidence for the Standard Account of Theory of Mind Development: A Reply to Fabricius (2026)
Fabricius argues that the results of a recent study of ours speak for a deflationary competence limitation account of Theory of Mind development. According to this account, children do not operate with proper mental state concepts until age 6–7 or older. However, the original findings are, in fact, incompatible with such competence limitation accounts, but compatible with the standard picture of Theory of Mind development: According to this picture, children acquire proper mental state concepts by age 4, but this competence is sometimes masked by performance factors.
- 7 October 2026
- Published by Wiley in Cognitive Science
- Vol. 50 (10)
Open AccessMore Evidence for the Standard Account of Theory of Mind Development: A Reply to Fabricius (2026)
Fabricius argues that the results of a recent study of ours speak for a deflationary competence limitation account of Theory of Mind development. According to this account, children do not operate with proper mental state concepts until age 6–7 or older. However, the original findings are, in fact, incompatible with such competence limitation accounts, but compatible with the standard picture of Theory of Mind development: According to this picture, children acquire proper mental state concepts by age 4, but this competence is sometimes masked by performance factors.
- Open Access
- 1 October 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Why do preschoolers struggle with the 3-cups-task? Further evidence for cognitive asymmetries in representing what and where uncertainty
Prior research on modal thought has yielded conflicting findings regarding children’s ability to represent mutually exclusive possibilities. While some studies suggest that even infants and non-human animals understand possibilities to some degree, older children struggle in experimental paradigms that require them to consider multiple alternatives. In the 3-cups-task, for instance, they fail to systematically prefer a certain reward (in A) over two uncertain options (in B or C). This has been taken as evidence for that children below age 4 lack genuinely modal representations of possibility. However, recent metacognitive research suggests that already three-year-old children can recognize epistemic uncertainty about possible, mutually exclusive object identities (X or Y). So, why do 3-year-olds metacognitively acknowledge their ignorance in some contexts, but obviously fail to do so in trying to solve the 3-cups task? We addressed this question in three preregistered experiments (N = 278 three-year-old children) in which we investigated whether details of the task pragmatics, question format or the contents of the uncertainty judgments pose specific performance factors in the 3-cups-task. There was no clear evidence that task pragmatics or question format per se explain these difficulties. But there was strong evidence that the content of the uncertainty judgments matters: Children found it much more difficult to represent uncertainty where an object is (in cups B or C) than to represent uncertainty which of two objects (X or Y) was in a given box. These results converge with other recent findings to suggest a fundamental where/what asymmetry in children’s early modal reasoning and raise crucial questions about the robustness of early modal competence.
- 1 October 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessWhy do preschoolers struggle with the 3-cups-task? Further evidence for cognitive asymmetries in representing what and where uncertainty
Prior research on modal thought has yielded conflicting findings regarding children’s ability to represent mutually exclusive possibilities. While some studies suggest that even infants and non-human animals understand possibilities to some degree, older children struggle in experimental paradigms that require them to consider multiple alternatives. In the 3-cups-task, for instance, they fail to systematically prefer a certain reward (in A) over two uncertain options (in B or C). This has been taken as evidence for that children below age 4 lack genuinely modal representations of possibility. However, recent metacognitive research suggests that already three-year-old children can recognize epistemic uncertainty about possible, mutually exclusive object identities (X or Y). So, why do 3-year-olds metacognitively acknowledge their ignorance in some contexts, but obviously fail to do so in trying to solve the 3-cups task? We addressed this question in three preregistered experiments (N = 278 three-year-old children) in which we investigated whether details of the task pragmatics, question format or the contents of the uncertainty judgments pose specific performance factors in the 3-cups-task. There was no clear evidence that task pragmatics or question format per se explain these difficulties. But there was strong evidence that the content of the uncertainty judgments matters: Children found it much more difficult to represent uncertainty where an object is (in cups B or C) than to represent uncertainty which of two objects (X or Y) was in a given box. These results converge with other recent findings to suggest a fundamental where/what asymmetry in children’s early modal reasoning and raise crucial questions about the robustness of early modal competence.
- Open Access
- 30 September 2026
- Published by Wiley in Developmental Science
- Vol. 29 (6)
Three‐year‐old Children Make Explicit Metacognitive Judgments – If Asked Appropriately
Metacognition—the capacity to represent and reflect upon our knowledge and its sources—is fundamental for higher cognition and learning. Developmental research suggests that the ability to make explicit metacognitive judgments emerges surprisingly late, not before school age. However, this research has assumed that metacognition is optimized for private reflection and therefore tested children's metacognitive judgments in individual settings. In contrast, recent theoretical approaches propose that explicit metacognition may have a primarily social function and should therefore become most evident in socio‐communicative contexts. We tested this proposal across four pre‐registered studies ( N = 195). First, we conducted two studies in which 3‐ and 5‐year‐old children participated in a social version of a well‐established metacognition task ( partial ignorance task ). Children had to communicate their uncertainty towards a cooperative partner who relied on their advice. Even 3‐year‐olds provided accurate metacognitive judgments under these conditions: They spontaneously and explicitly reported uncertainty when they were partially ignorant, but not when they were knowledgeable. Two control studies yielded mixed evidence regarding the question whether the enhanced metacognitive performance in the first two studies was indeed mainly due to the socio‐communicative context rather than other factors. Overall, the current findings suggest that explicit metacognition manifests earlier in development than previously assumed and may be boosted in some—particularly socio‐communicative—contexts.
- 30 September 2026
- Published by Wiley in Developmental Science
- Vol. 29 (6)
Open AccessThree‐year‐old Children Make Explicit Metacognitive Judgments – If Asked Appropriately
Metacognition—the capacity to represent and reflect upon our knowledge and its sources—is fundamental for higher cognition and learning. Developmental research suggests that the ability to make explicit metacognitive judgments emerges surprisingly late, not before school age. However, this research has assumed that metacognition is optimized for private reflection and therefore tested children's metacognitive judgments in individual settings. In contrast, recent theoretical approaches propose that explicit metacognition may have a primarily social function and should therefore become most evident in socio‐communicative contexts. We tested this proposal across four pre‐registered studies ( N = 195). First, we conducted two studies in which 3‐ and 5‐year‐old children participated in a social version of a well‐established metacognition task ( partial ignorance task ). Children had to communicate their uncertainty towards a cooperative partner who relied on their advice. Even 3‐year‐olds provided accurate metacognitive judgments under these conditions: They spontaneously and explicitly reported uncertainty when they were partially ignorant, but not when they were knowledgeable. Two control studies yielded mixed evidence regarding the question whether the enhanced metacognitive performance in the first two studies was indeed mainly due to the socio‐communicative context rather than other factors. Overall, the current findings suggest that explicit metacognition manifests earlier in development than previously assumed and may be boosted in some—particularly socio‐communicative—contexts.
- Open Access
- 25 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Experimental Child Psychology
- Vol. 272, 106594
Understanding possibility through action: Young children’s modal reasoning in agentive contexts
- 25 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Experimental Child Psychology
- Vol. 272, 106594
Open AccessUnderstanding possibility through action: Young children’s modal reasoning in agentive contexts
- Open Access
- 1 April 2026
- Published by Wiley in Mind & Language
- Vol. 41 (2) , 282-289
Pettit psychologized = Vygotsky?
The main claim of When minds converse is that speaking a language enables new cognitive and practical capacities that radically transform the human mind. The book is a rich source of inspiration for developmental and comparative cognitive science. In this commentary, I discuss some of the questions that the book raises for cognitive scientists and wonder how its armchair genealogy could be psychologized.
- 1 April 2026
- Published by Wiley in Mind & Language
- Vol. 41 (2) , 282-289
Open AccessPettit psychologized = Vygotsky?
The main claim of When minds converse is that speaking a language enables new cognitive and practical capacities that radically transform the human mind. The book is a rich source of inspiration for developmental and comparative cognitive science. In this commentary, I discuss some of the questions that the book raises for cognitive scientists and wonder how its armchair genealogy could be psychologized.
- Open Access
- 14 March 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Developmental Unity of False Belief Understanding Across Cultures
Around age four, children in urban, post-industrial societies begin to understand the subjectivityof beliefs and other mental states: they can be true or false, and they are aspectual, representing situations under specific descriptions. These two insights have been found to emerge in tandem, suggesting a shift towards a metarepresentational Theory of Mind. However, as evidence for this shift comes primarily from formally educated, urban, post-industrial societies, its broader generalizability remains speculative. Moreover, standard pretense-heavy false belief tasks may bias conclusions drawn from existing cross-cultural work. In a preregistered, multi-method study, we assessed two versions of false belief tasks (change of location and aspectual) in children from two rural Namibian communities (Hai||om, N = 65; Khwe, N = 35, ages 3–9) and an urban German community (Leipzig, N = 66, ages 3–6). We compared two task formats that differed in their reliance on pretense (a real agent and objects vs. depictions thereof). Task format did not affect Leipzig or Khwe children's performance, but Hai||om children showed a better belief understanding in the realistic task format. Across cultures and task formats, change of location and aspectual false belief tasks were robustly linked at the individual level. These results show universality without uniformity: besides variation in overall performance and task format sensitivity, children across diverse cultures show closely aligned performance across belief tasks, consistent with accounts proposing a shared metarepresentational basis of Theory of Mind.
- 14 March 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessDevelopmental Unity of False Belief Understanding Across Cultures
Around age four, children in urban, post-industrial societies begin to understand the subjectivityof beliefs and other mental states: they can be true or false, and they are aspectual, representing situations under specific descriptions. These two insights have been found to emerge in tandem, suggesting a shift towards a metarepresentational Theory of Mind. However, as evidence for this shift comes primarily from formally educated, urban, post-industrial societies, its broader generalizability remains speculative. Moreover, standard pretense-heavy false belief tasks may bias conclusions drawn from existing cross-cultural work. In a preregistered, multi-method study, we assessed two versions of false belief tasks (change of location and aspectual) in children from two rural Namibian communities (Hai||om, N = 65; Khwe, N = 35, ages 3–9) and an urban German community (Leipzig, N = 66, ages 3–6). We compared two task formats that differed in their reliance on pretense (a real agent and objects vs. depictions thereof). Task format did not affect Leipzig or Khwe children's performance, but Hai||om children showed a better belief understanding in the realistic task format. Across cultures and task formats, change of location and aspectual false belief tasks were robustly linked at the individual level. These results show universality without uniformity: besides variation in overall performance and task format sensitivity, children across diverse cultures show closely aligned performance across belief tasks, consistent with accounts proposing a shared metarepresentational basis of Theory of Mind.
- Open Access
- 27 August 2025
- Published by The Royal Society in Royal Society Open Science
- Vol. 12 (8) , 250488
Tonkean macaques do not prefer the helper or the hinderer in the hill paradigm
Evaluating others’ prosocial tendencies can benefit individuals by allowing them to interact with prosocial individuals and avoid antisocial ones. The ontogeny of humans’ strong prosocial preference has been widely investigated using the hill paradigm. Infants’ preference for helper over hinderer agents was measured after they watched a scene in which the helper agent pushed a climber up a hill while the hinderer agent pushed the climber down the hill. Bonobos tested with the hill paradigm preferred the hinderer over the helper, contrasting previous findings for other nonhuman primates. In this study, we explored whether another primate species would exhibit a hinderer preference using the same procedure as the one used with bonobos. Tonkean macaques ( Macaca tonkeana ) did not prefer the helper over the hinderer (or vice versa). While the small sample size ( n = 12) and low attentional level observed in our subjects limit interpretation, this finding contributes to a broader critical thinking on the relevance of the hill paradigm to investigate prosocial preferences and on methodological limitations when testing nonhuman animals. Studies using various experimental paradigms with conspecifics or human actors as social agents are needed to further investigate the social evaluation of prosocial behaviours in primates.
- 27 August 2025
- Published by The Royal Society in Royal Society Open Science
- Vol. 12 (8) , 250488
Open AccessTonkean macaques do not prefer the helper or the hinderer in the hill paradigm
Evaluating others’ prosocial tendencies can benefit individuals by allowing them to interact with prosocial individuals and avoid antisocial ones. The ontogeny of humans’ strong prosocial preference has been widely investigated using the hill paradigm. Infants’ preference for helper over hinderer agents was measured after they watched a scene in which the helper agent pushed a climber up a hill while the hinderer agent pushed the climber down the hill. Bonobos tested with the hill paradigm preferred the hinderer over the helper, contrasting previous findings for other nonhuman primates. In this study, we explored whether another primate species would exhibit a hinderer preference using the same procedure as the one used with bonobos. Tonkean macaques ( Macaca tonkeana ) did not prefer the helper over the hinderer (or vice versa). While the small sample size ( n = 12) and low attentional level observed in our subjects limit interpretation, this finding contributes to a broader critical thinking on the relevance of the hill paradigm to investigate prosocial preferences and on methodological limitations when testing nonhuman animals. Studies using various experimental paradigms with conspecifics or human actors as social agents are needed to further investigate the social evaluation of prosocial behaviours in primates.
- Open Access
- 11 June 2025
- Published by The Royal Society in Royal Society Open Science
- Vol. 12 (6) , 241960
Do Theory of Mind and Mental Time Travel abilities build on joint cognitive foundations?
Higher cognition is special in that it goes beyond representing the here and now. Two relevant forms of such thinking are Theory of Mind (ToM) that enables us to represent others’ perspectives, and Mental Time Travel (MTT) that enables us to represent other points in time. The present studies investigate how these capacities are related in development. Do they build on the same cognitive foundations and thus emerge together? Do higher-order forms of the two abilities rely on analogous recursive embedding and thus progress in parallel and coordinated ways? We addressed these questions in four studies with 3- to 9-year-old children ( N = 395). ToM was operationalized as first-, second- and third-order false belief understanding. MTT was operationalized as reasoning about future possibilities (first-order), counterfactual reasoning (second-order) and anticipating counterfactual emotions (third-order). Study 1 shows a stepwise development of both ToM and MTT and a moderate consistency of performance patterns. However, across all four studies, we did not find robust correlations between first-, second- and third-order tasks of ToM and MTT, respectively. Overall, these results show stepwise and parallel trajectories in ToM and MTT, but do not provide stringent evidence for a joint cognitive foundation of the two capacities.
- 11 June 2025
- Published by The Royal Society in Royal Society Open Science
- Vol. 12 (6) , 241960
Open AccessDo Theory of Mind and Mental Time Travel abilities build on joint cognitive foundations?
Higher cognition is special in that it goes beyond representing the here and now. Two relevant forms of such thinking are Theory of Mind (ToM) that enables us to represent others’ perspectives, and Mental Time Travel (MTT) that enables us to represent other points in time. The present studies investigate how these capacities are related in development. Do they build on the same cognitive foundations and thus emerge together? Do higher-order forms of the two abilities rely on analogous recursive embedding and thus progress in parallel and coordinated ways? We addressed these questions in four studies with 3- to 9-year-old children ( N = 395). ToM was operationalized as first-, second- and third-order false belief understanding. MTT was operationalized as reasoning about future possibilities (first-order), counterfactual reasoning (second-order) and anticipating counterfactual emotions (third-order). Study 1 shows a stepwise development of both ToM and MTT and a moderate consistency of performance patterns. However, across all four studies, we did not find robust correlations between first-, second- and third-order tasks of ToM and MTT, respectively. Overall, these results show stepwise and parallel trajectories in ToM and MTT, but do not provide stringent evidence for a joint cognitive foundation of the two capacities.
- Open Access
Social evaluation of skilfulness in Tonkean macaques ( Macaca tonkeana ) and brown capuchins ( Sapajus apella )
For optimal decision-making, social animals can benefit from evaluating others’ behaviours. Some species seemingly consider the skills of others when deciding who to interact with in different contexts. Yet, whether and how nonhuman animals form impressions about others’ competence is still unclear. In this study, we investigated whether Tonkean macaques ( Macaca tonkeana ) and brown capuchins ( Sapajus apella ) can evaluate the skilfulness of others. Subjects observed two human actors (one skilful, one unskilled) trying to open several food containers. Only the skilful actor successfully opened the containers and released food so the experimenter could give it to the subjects. Afterwards, subjects did not choose the skilful actor significantly more frequently than the unskilled one. Their choices for the skilful actor did not increase through trials, nor were they based on the outcomes experienced in previous trials. However, when we considered their initial preferences for the human actors, we observed a significant shift in preference for the skilful actor. Our subjects also looked preferentially at the skilful over the unskilled actor when both simultaneously manipulated a container. We observed substantial individual variation and species differences in choice and looking behaviours. While the cognitive mechanisms (impression formation vs outcome-based process) underlying these social decisions are still unclear, our findings indicate that Tonkean macaques and brown capuchins used social information about the actors’ skills to inform their decisions.
Open AccessSocial evaluation of skilfulness in Tonkean macaques ( Macaca tonkeana ) and brown capuchins ( Sapajus apella )
For optimal decision-making, social animals can benefit from evaluating others’ behaviours. Some species seemingly consider the skills of others when deciding who to interact with in different contexts. Yet, whether and how nonhuman animals form impressions about others’ competence is still unclear. In this study, we investigated whether Tonkean macaques ( Macaca tonkeana ) and brown capuchins ( Sapajus apella ) can evaluate the skilfulness of others. Subjects observed two human actors (one skilful, one unskilled) trying to open several food containers. Only the skilful actor successfully opened the containers and released food so the experimenter could give it to the subjects. Afterwards, subjects did not choose the skilful actor significantly more frequently than the unskilled one. Their choices for the skilful actor did not increase through trials, nor were they based on the outcomes experienced in previous trials. However, when we considered their initial preferences for the human actors, we observed a significant shift in preference for the skilful actor. Our subjects also looked preferentially at the skilful over the unskilled actor when both simultaneously manipulated a container. We observed substantial individual variation and species differences in choice and looking behaviours. While the cognitive mechanisms (impression formation vs outcome-based process) underlying these social decisions are still unclear, our findings indicate that Tonkean macaques and brown capuchins used social information about the actors’ skills to inform their decisions.
- Open Access
- 9 May 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Cognitive Development
- Vol. 74
Children's understanding of the subjectivity of intentions – Masked by linguistic task demands?
- 9 May 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Cognitive Development
- Vol. 74
Open AccessChildren's understanding of the subjectivity of intentions – Masked by linguistic task demands?