Jae-Jae Spoon
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Jae-Jae Spoon has a total of 5 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Heike Klüver
Department of Social Sciences, University of Hamburg, Hamburg, Germany
3 shared publicationsKarleen Jones West
Both authors have contributed equally to all work
2 shared publications- Catherine Eunice De Vries
IE University
1 shared publication - Heike Klüver
Department of Social Science and Economics, University of Bamberg, Germany
1 shared publication Sara B. Hobolt
London School of Economics and Political Science European Institute UK
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 22 January 2016
- Published by SAGE Publications in Party Politics
- Vol. 23 (6) , 793-803
Challenges to multiparty governments
How does governing in coalitions affect coalition parties’ responsiveness to voters? In this article, we seek to understand the relationship between political parties’ participation in multiparty governments and their responsiveness to voters. We argue that the extent to which coalition parties respond to policy priorities of voters is influenced by the divisiveness of policy issues within the cabinet and the ministerial responsibility for policies. To test our hypotheses, we combine data on the issue attention of 55 coalition parties from the Comparative Manifestos Project with data on government composition and data on the policy priorities of voters from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems and various election studies in 45 elections across 16 European countries from 1972 to 2011. While we find that intra-cabinet divisiveness decreases coalition parties’ responsiveness, we find no effect for portfolio responsibility. Our findings shed light on the relationship between party competition and coalition governments and its implications for political representation.
- 22 January 2016
- Published by SAGE Publications in Party Politics
- Vol. 23 (6) , 793-803
Challenges to multiparty governments
How does governing in coalitions affect coalition parties’ responsiveness to voters? In this article, we seek to understand the relationship between political parties’ participation in multiparty governments and their responsiveness to voters. We argue that the extent to which coalition parties respond to policy priorities of voters is influenced by the divisiveness of policy issues within the cabinet and the ministerial responsibility for policies. To test our hypotheses, we combine data on the issue attention of 55 coalition parties from the Comparative Manifestos Project with data on government composition and data on the policy priorities of voters from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems and various election studies in 45 elections across 16 European countries from 1972 to 2011. While we find that intra-cabinet divisiveness decreases coalition parties’ responsiveness, we find no effect for portfolio responsibility. Our findings shed light on the relationship between party competition and coalition governments and its implications for political representation.
- 26 October 2015
- Published by SAGE Publications in Party Politics
- Vol. 23 (5) , 578-588
Coordination and presidential coattails
Parties often enter pre-election coalitions (PECs) in presidential elections while remaining independent in legislative races. Parties that support a presidential candidate should see legislative gains given the increase in their national electoral profile. Yet fewer presidential candidates often leads to fewer legislative parties, suggesting that participation in PECs reduces parties’ independent legislative representation. In this article, we examine how specific strategies in the presidential race affect parties’ legislative vote share. Using an original dataset of over 2300 party-level observations in 23 democracies across Europe and South America from 1975 to 2010, we show that the benefits of a party’s presidential strategy are conditional on its size. We find that smaller parties benefit from coattails when they run on their own or lead a PEC, while no parties benefit from joining a PEC. Our findings have important implications for understanding how parties’ presidential strategies influence their legislative success and system-level legislative fragmentation.
- 26 October 2015
- Published by SAGE Publications in Party Politics
- Vol. 23 (5) , 578-588
Coordination and presidential coattails
Parties often enter pre-election coalitions (PECs) in presidential elections while remaining independent in legislative races. Parties that support a presidential candidate should see legislative gains given the increase in their national electoral profile. Yet fewer presidential candidates often leads to fewer legislative parties, suggesting that participation in PECs reduces parties’ independent legislative representation. In this article, we examine how specific strategies in the presidential race affect parties’ legislative vote share. Using an original dataset of over 2300 party-level observations in 23 democracies across Europe and South America from 1975 to 2010, we show that the benefits of a party’s presidential strategy are conditional on its size. We find that smaller parties benefit from coattails when they run on their own or lead a PEC, while no parties benefit from joining a PEC. Our findings have important implications for understanding how parties’ presidential strategies influence their legislative success and system-level legislative fragmentation.
- Open Access
- 1 July 2015
- Published by SAGE Publications in Research & Politics
- Vol. 2 (3)
Bottoms up: How subnational elections predict parties’ decisions to run in presidential elections in Europe and Latin America
Do parties’ experiences in subnational elections predict when parties enter national competition and compete for the presidency? Building upon the party nationalization literature, we argue that a party’s presence in elections across subnational units and its subsequent performance in these elections are determining factors for whether it enters the presidential race. To conduct our analysis, we have assembled an original dataset on parties’ presence and performance in subnational elections and presidential entry in 17 countries in Europe and Latin America from 1990 to 2013. We find that a party’s presence and performance in subnational elections are significant predictors of its decision to run for president, even when the party ran in the previous election and when the elections are concurrent. These findings have important implications for understanding how subnational elections relate to national party systems and democratic representation, more generally.
- 1 July 2015
- Published by SAGE Publications in Research & Politics
- Vol. 2 (3)
Open AccessBottoms up: How subnational elections predict parties’ decisions to run in presidential elections in Europe and Latin America
Do parties’ experiences in subnational elections predict when parties enter national competition and compete for the presidency? Building upon the party nationalization literature, we argue that a party’s presence in elections across subnational units and its subsequent performance in these elections are determining factors for whether it enters the presidential race. To conduct our analysis, we have assembled an original dataset on parties’ presence and performance in subnational elections and presidential entry in 17 countries in Europe and Latin America from 1990 to 2013. We find that a party’s presence and performance in subnational elections are significant predictors of its decision to run for president, even when the party ran in the previous election and when the elections are concurrent. These findings have important implications for understanding how subnational elections relate to national party systems and democratic representation, more generally.
- 1 May 2015
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in European Journal of Political Research
- Vol. 54 (2) , 343-362
Voter polarisation and party responsiveness: Why parties emphasise divided issues, but remain silent on unified issues
How does voter polarisation affect party responsiveness? Previous research has shown that political parties emphasise political issues that are important to their voters. However, it is posited in this article that political parties are not equally responsive to citizen demands across all issue areas. The hypothesis is that party responsiveness varies considerably with the preference configuration of the electorate. More specifically, it is argued that party responsiveness increases with the polarisation of issues among voters. To test these theoretical expectations, party responsiveness is analysed across nine West European countries from 1982 until 2013. Data on voter attention and voter preferences with regard to specific policy issues from a variety of national election studies is combined with Comparative Manifestos Project data on parties' emphasis of these issues in their election manifestos. The findings have major implications for understanding party competition and political representation in Europe.
- 1 May 2015
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in European Journal of Political Research
- Vol. 54 (2) , 343-362
Voter polarisation and party responsiveness: Why parties emphasise divided issues, but remain silent on unified issues
How does voter polarisation affect party responsiveness? Previous research has shown that political parties emphasise political issues that are important to their voters. However, it is posited in this article that political parties are not equally responsive to citizen demands across all issue areas. The hypothesis is that party responsiveness varies considerably with the preference configuration of the electorate. More specifically, it is argued that party responsiveness increases with the polarisation of issues among voters. To test these theoretical expectations, party responsiveness is analysed across nine West European countries from 1982 until 2013. Data on voter attention and voter preferences with regard to specific policy issues from a variety of national election studies is combined with Comparative Manifestos Project data on parties' emphasis of these issues in their election manifestos. The findings have major implications for understanding party competition and political representation in Europe.
- Top Cited Papers
- 23 October 2014
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in British Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 46 (3) , 633-654
Who Responds? Voters, Parties and Issue Attention
Do parties listen to their voters? This article addresses this important question by moving beyond position congruence to explore whether parties respond to voters’ issue priorities. It argues that political parties respond to voters in their election manifestos, but that their responsiveness varies across different party types: namely, that large parties are more responsive to voters’ policy priorities, while government parties listen less to voters’ issue demands. The study also posits that niche parties are not generally more responsive to voter demands, but that they are more responsive to the concerns of their supporters in their owned issue areas. To test these theoretical expectations, the study combines data from the Comparative Manifestos Project with data on voters’ policy priorities from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems and various national election studies across eighteen European democracies in sixty-three elections from 1972–2011. Our findings have important implications for understanding political representation and democratic linkage.
- 23 October 2014
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in British Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 46 (3) , 633-654
Top Cited PapersWho Responds? Voters, Parties and Issue Attention
Do parties listen to their voters? This article addresses this important question by moving beyond position congruence to explore whether parties respond to voters’ issue priorities. It argues that political parties respond to voters in their election manifestos, but that their responsiveness varies across different party types: namely, that large parties are more responsive to voters’ policy priorities, while government parties listen less to voters’ issue demands. The study also posits that niche parties are not generally more responsive to voter demands, but that they are more responsive to the concerns of their supporters in their owned issue areas. To test these theoretical expectations, the study combines data from the Comparative Manifestos Project with data on voters’ policy priorities from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems and various national election studies across eighteen European democracies in sixty-three elections from 1972–2011. Our findings have important implications for understanding political representation and democratic linkage.
- Top Cited Papers
- 1 May 2014
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in European Journal of Political Research
- Vol. 53 (2) , 363-380
Going green: Explaining issue competition on the environment
This study addresses the dynamics of the issue space in multiparty systems by examining to what extent, and under what conditions, parties respond to the issue ownership of other parties on the green issue. To understand why some issues become part and parcel of the political agenda in multiparty systems, it is crucial not only to examine the strategies of issue entrepreneurs, but also the responses of other parties. It is argued that the extent to which other parties respond to, rather than ignore, the issue mobilisation of green parties depends on two factors: how much of an electoral threat the green party poses to a specific party; and the extent to which the political and economic context makes the green issue a potential vote winner. To analyse the evolution of the green issue, a time‐series cross‐section analysis is conducted using data from the Comparative Manifestos Project for 19 West European countries from 1980–2010. The findings have important implications for understanding issue evolution in multiparty systems and how and why the dynamics of party competition on the green issue vary across time and space.
- 1 May 2014
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in European Journal of Political Research
- Vol. 53 (2) , 363-380
Top Cited PapersGoing green: Explaining issue competition on the environment
This study addresses the dynamics of the issue space in multiparty systems by examining to what extent, and under what conditions, parties respond to the issue ownership of other parties on the green issue. To understand why some issues become part and parcel of the political agenda in multiparty systems, it is crucial not only to examine the strategies of issue entrepreneurs, but also the responses of other parties. It is argued that the extent to which other parties respond to, rather than ignore, the issue mobilisation of green parties depends on two factors: how much of an electoral threat the green party poses to a specific party; and the extent to which the political and economic context makes the green issue a potential vote winner. To analyse the evolution of the green issue, a time‐series cross‐section analysis is conducted using data from the Comparative Manifestos Project for 19 West European countries from 1980–2010. The findings have important implications for understanding issue evolution in multiparty systems and how and why the dynamics of party competition on the green issue vary across time and space.
- 7 June 2013
- Published by SAGE Publications in Party Politics
- Vol. 21 (4) , 553-564
Bringing salience back in
What explains when Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) defect from their EP party group? While previous research has focused on the policy distance between an MEP’s national party and her party group, it has been overlooked that not all issues are equally important to national parties. As parties prioritize certain issues over others, we argue that it is both the distance and the salience of the issue for the MEP’s national party that explains defection. To test our theoretical claim, we explore more than 400,000 vote decisions across 1,948 different roll-call votes in four issue areas – agriculture, environment, social policy and external trade – from 1979 until 1999. To measure policy salience and distance, we combine roll-call analysis with data from the Euromanifestos Project. Our findings have important implications for understanding the dynamics of party competition and the role that national parties play in the European Parliament.
- 7 June 2013
- Published by SAGE Publications in Party Politics
- Vol. 21 (4) , 553-564
Bringing salience back in
What explains when Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) defect from their EP party group? While previous research has focused on the policy distance between an MEP’s national party and her party group, it has been overlooked that not all issues are equally important to national parties. As parties prioritize certain issues over others, we argue that it is both the distance and the salience of the issue for the MEP’s national party that explains defection. To test our theoretical claim, we explore more than 400,000 vote decisions across 1,948 different roll-call votes in four issue areas – agriculture, environment, social policy and external trade – from 1979 until 1999. To measure policy salience and distance, we combine roll-call analysis with data from the Euromanifestos Project. Our findings have important implications for understanding the dynamics of party competition and the role that national parties play in the European Parliament.