Vivek S. Borkar
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Vivek S. Borkar has a total of 2 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Govindan Rangarajan
Department of Mathematics and Centre for Neuroscience, Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore, India
3 shared publications - Sanjay Jain
Department of Physics and Astrophysics, University of Delhi, Delhi 110007, India
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 10 July 1998
- Published by Elsevier in Systems & Control Letters
- Vol. 34 (4) , 185-189
Ergodic control of partially observed Markov chains
- 10 July 1998
- Published by Elsevier in Systems & Control Letters
- Vol. 34 (4) , 185-189
Ergodic control of partially observed Markov chains
- 1 June 1998
- Published by Springer Nature in Resonance
- Vol. 3 (6) , 40-51
There’s no such thing as a free lunch
- 1 June 1998
- Published by Springer Nature in Resonance
- Vol. 3 (6) , 40-51
There’s no such thing as a free lunch
- Open Access
Dynamics of Individual Specialization and Global Diversification in Communities
We discuss a model of an economic community consisting of $N$ interacting agents. The state of each agent at any time is characterized, in general, by a mixed strategy profile drawn from a space of $s$ pure strategies. The community evolves as agents update their strategy profiles in response to payoffs received from other agents. The evolution equation is a generalization of the replicator equation. We argue that when $N$ is sufficiently large and the payoff matrix elements satisfy suitable inequalities, the community evolves to retain the full diversity of available strategies even as individual agents specialize to pure strategies.Open AccessDynamics of Individual Specialization and Global Diversification in Communities
We discuss a model of an economic community consisting of $N$ interacting agents. The state of each agent at any time is characterized, in general, by a mixed strategy profile drawn from a space of $s$ pure strategies. The community evolves as agents update their strategy profiles in response to payoffs received from other agents. The evolution equation is a generalization of the replicator equation. We argue that when $N$ is sufficiently large and the payoff matrix elements satisfy suitable inequalities, the community evolves to retain the full diversity of available strategies even as individual agents specialize to pure strategies. - Open Access
Collective Behaviour and Diversity in Economic Communities: Some Insights from an Evolutionary Game
Many complex adaptive systems contain a large diversity of specialized components. The specialization at the level of the microscopic degrees of freedom, and diversity at the level of the system as a whole are phenomena that appear during the course of evolution of the system. We present a mathematical model to describe these evolutionary phenomena in economic communities. The model is a generalization of the replicator equation. The economic motivation for the model and its relationship with some other game theoretic models applied to ecology and sociobiology is discussed. Some results about the attractors of this dynamical system are described. We argue that while the microscopic variables -- the agents comprising the community -- act locally and independently, time evolution produces a collective behaviour in the system characterized by individual specialization of the agents as well as global diversity in the community. This occurs for generic values of the parameters and initial conditions provided the community is sufficiently large, and can be viewed as a kind of self-organization in the system. The context dependence of acceptable innovations in the community appears naturally in this framework.
Open AccessCollective Behaviour and Diversity in Economic Communities: Some Insights from an Evolutionary Game
Many complex adaptive systems contain a large diversity of specialized components. The specialization at the level of the microscopic degrees of freedom, and diversity at the level of the system as a whole are phenomena that appear during the course of evolution of the system. We present a mathematical model to describe these evolutionary phenomena in economic communities. The model is a generalization of the replicator equation. The economic motivation for the model and its relationship with some other game theoretic models applied to ecology and sociobiology is discussed. Some results about the attractors of this dynamical system are described. We argue that while the microscopic variables -- the agents comprising the community -- act locally and independently, time evolution produces a collective behaviour in the system characterized by individual specialization of the agents as well as global diversity in the community. This occurs for generic values of the parameters and initial conditions provided the community is sufficiently large, and can be viewed as a kind of self-organization in the system. The context dependence of acceptable innovations in the community appears naturally in this framework.
- 1 January 1998
- Published by Wiley in Complexity
- Vol. 3 (3) , 50-56
Dynamics of individual specialization and global diversification in communities
- 1 January 1998
- Published by Wiley in Complexity
- Vol. 3 (3) , 50-56
Dynamics of individual specialization and global diversification in communities
- Open Access
- 1 January 1997
- Published by Institute of Mathematics, Polish Academy of Sciences in Applicationes Mathematicae
- Vol. 24 (2) , 169-188
Recursive self-tuning control of finite Markov chains
A recursive self-tuning control scheme for finite Markov chains is proposed wherein the unknown parameter is estimated by a stochastic approximation scheme for maximizing the log-likelihood function and the control is obtained via a relative value iterati
- 1 January 1997
- Published by Institute of Mathematics, Polish Academy of Sciences in Applicationes Mathematicae
- Vol. 24 (2) , 169-188
Open AccessRecursive self-tuning control of finite Markov chains
A recursive self-tuning control scheme for finite Markov chains is proposed wherein the unknown parameter is estimated by a stochastic approximation scheme for maximizing the log-likelihood function and the control is obtained via a relative value iterati