Gregory K. Leonard
Research Subjects
Gregory K. Leonard has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Jerry A. Hausman
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
2 shared publications - Elizabeth M Bailey
NERA Economic Consulting
1 shared publication - G. Steven Olley
NERA Economic Consulting
1 shared publication Jean Tirole
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 19 February 2011
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of the Economics of Business
- Vol. 18 (1) , 103-107
What Can Be Learned About the Competitive Effects of Mergers from “Natural Experiments”?
(2011). What Can Be Learned About the Competitive Effects of Mergers from “Natural Experiments”? International Journal of the Economics of Business: Vol. 18, Hospital Mergers and Antitrust Policy, pp. 103-107.
- 19 February 2011
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of the Economics of Business
- Vol. 18 (1) , 103-107
What Can Be Learned About the Competitive Effects of Mergers from “Natural Experiments”?
(2011). What Can Be Learned About the Competitive Effects of Mergers from “Natural Experiments”? International Journal of the Economics of Business: Vol. 18, Hospital Mergers and Antitrust Policy, pp. 103-107.
- 12 March 2010
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy
- Vol. 10 (1)
Minimum Resale Price Maintenance: Some Empirical Evidence from Maryland
On October 1, 2009, the State of Maryland enacted a statute that prohibits the use of minimum resale price maintenance (RPM). This was in response to the Supreme Court's 2007 Leegin decision that held that RPM should be evaluated under the rule of reason rather than be considered per se illegal. The Maryland statute provides a natural experiment that can be used to analyze the effect of RPM on retail prices. We analyze the effect of the statute on video game prices in Maryland. Video games were used for this analysis because video game manufacturers have been known to impose RPM. Employing a difference-in-differences approach, we find no effect of the Maryland statute on video game prices.
- 12 March 2010
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy
- Vol. 10 (1)
Minimum Resale Price Maintenance: Some Empirical Evidence from Maryland
On October 1, 2009, the State of Maryland enacted a statute that prohibits the use of minimum resale price maintenance (RPM). This was in response to the Supreme Court's 2007 Leegin decision that held that RPM should be evaluated under the rule of reason rather than be considered per se illegal. The Maryland statute provides a natural experiment that can be used to analyze the effect of RPM on retail prices. We analyze the effect of the statute on video game prices in Maryland. Video games were used for this analysis because video game manufacturers have been known to impose RPM. Employing a difference-in-differences approach, we find no effect of the Maryland statute on video game prices.
- 1 June 2005
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of Competition Law & Economics
- Vol. 1 (2) , 279-301
Competitive analysis using a flexible demand specification
Econometric methods can be helpful when one is trying to understand the nature of competition between products in differentiated products industries, an issue that arises in many competition policy contexts. However, misspecification of the consumer demand system can result in biased econometric results and misleading conclusions. We discuss some considerations that go into choosing a demand system specification and suggest that a ‘flexible functional form’ be used. This approach avoids placing restrictions on the demand elasticities. We identify and discuss other issues that arise in the estimation of demand systems. We conclude with an empirical example concerning the calculation of lost profits damages in a patent infringement case. This example demonstrates how using a flexible functional form leads to a substantially more reliable damages calculation than using the particular restrictive functional form that is commonly used to calculate lost profits damages in patent litigation.
- 1 June 2005
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of Competition Law & Economics
- Vol. 1 (2) , 279-301
Competitive analysis using a flexible demand specification
Econometric methods can be helpful when one is trying to understand the nature of competition between products in differentiated products industries, an issue that arises in many competition policy contexts. However, misspecification of the consumer demand system can result in biased econometric results and misleading conclusions. We discuss some considerations that go into choosing a demand system specification and suggest that a ‘flexible functional form’ be used. This approach avoids placing restrictions on the demand elasticities. We identify and discuss other issues that arise in the estimation of demand systems. We conclude with an empirical example concerning the calculation of lost profits damages in a patent infringement case. This example demonstrates how using a flexible functional form leads to a substantially more reliable damages calculation than using the particular restrictive functional form that is commonly used to calculate lost profits damages in patent litigation.
- 1 January 2003
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 34 (1) , 43
On Nonexclusive Membership in Competing Joint Ventures
- 1 January 2003
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 34 (1) , 43
On Nonexclusive Membership in Competing Joint Ventures