GGGeoffrey P. Goodwin

Geoffrey P. Goodwin

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Geoffrey P. Goodwin has a total of 7 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • The Truth of Conditional Assertions

    by Geoffrey P. Goodwin, P. N. Johnson‐Laird

    Given a basic conditional of the form, If A then C, individuals usually list three cases as possible: A and C, not‐A and not‐C, not‐A and C. This result corroborates the theory of mental models. By contrast, individuals often judge that the conditional is true only in the case of A and C, and that cases of not‐A are irrelevant to its truth or falsity. This result corroborates other theories of conditionals. To resolve the discrepancy, we devised two new tasks: the “collective” truth task, in which participants judged whether sets of assertions about a specific individual, such as: If A then C, not‐A, C, could all be true at the same time; and one in which participants judged the truth of conditional predictions about specific future events. The results consistently matched the three possibilities, thereby corroborating the model theory. They also showed a massive violation of the probability calculus in estimates of the probabilities of the four cases in the partition of conditionals (A and C, A and not‐C, not‐A and C, and not‐A and not‐C), which summed to over 200%.


  • How does moral objectification lead to correlated interactions?

    by Geoffrey P. Goodwin

    The objectification of moral norms is purported to occur because it enables correlated interactions between individuals who share the same cooperative norms. But how does this process take place? I suggest two mechanisms beyond those Stanford identifies. I also ask whether there is predictable variation in which moral norms engender the strongest coupling between objectification and discomfort with disagreement.

  • Experimental Approaches to Moral Standing

    by Geoffrey P. Goodwin

    Moral patients deserve moral consideration and concern – they have moral standing. What factors drive attributions of moral standing? Understanding these factors is important because it indicates how broadly (or narrowly) individuals conceptualize the moral world, and suggests how they will treat various entities, both human and non‐human. This understanding has recently been advanced by a series of studies conducted by both psychologists and philosophers, which have revealed three main drivers of moral standing: the capacity to suffer (psychological patiency), intelligence or autonomy (agency), and the nature of an entity's disposition (whether it is harmful). These studies have also revealed causal links between moral standing and other variables of interest, namely, mental state attributions and moral behavior. In this review, I consider this recent research, aiming to clarify what the balance of evidence indicates about how moral standing is judged and about its links to mind perception and behavior. I conclude by suggesting open questions for future research on this exciting topic.


  • Moral Character in Person Perception

    by Geoffrey P. Goodwin

    Understanding how people form impressions of others is a key goal of social cognition research. Past theories have posited that two fundamental dimensions—warmth and competence—underlie impression formation. However, these models conflate morality with warmth and fail to capture the full role that moral character plays in impression formation. An emerging perspective separates moral character (or morality) from warmth on both theoretical and empirical grounds. When morality is pitted against warmth, morality is clearly a more important driver of impression formation, as revealed by correlational, experimental, and archival studies. Yet social warmth remains important and conveys distinct information that morality does not. Alongside competence, both factors matter not only for person perception but also for other aspects of social cognition, including group perception. Important unanswered questions remain regarding the perceived structure of moral character and the way it is appraised in everyday life.


  • Judging the Goring Ox: Retribution Directed Toward Animals

    by Geoffrey P. Goodwin, Adam Benforado

    Prior research on the psychology of retribution is complicated by the difficulty of separating retributive and general deterrence motives when studying human offenders (Study 1). We isolate retribution by investigating judgments about punishing animals, which allows us to remove general deterrence from consideration. Studies 2 and 3 document a “victim identity” effect, such that the greater the perceived loss from a violent animal attack, the greater the belief that the culprit deserves to be killed. Study 3 documents a “targeted punishment” effect, such that the responsive killing of the actual “guilty” culprit is seen as more deserved than the killing of an almost identical yet “innocent” animal from the same species. Studies 4 and 5 extend both effects to participants' acceptance of inflicting pain and suffering on the offending animal at the time of its death, and show that both effects are mediated by measures of retributive sentiment, and not by consequentialist concerns.


  • Punishment

    by Geoffrey P. Goodwin, Dena M. Gromet

    Retributivism is a deontological theory of punishment that calls for the deserved punishment of a guilty offender in proportion with his moral blameworthiness for a past offense. It is often referred to as punishment based on ‘just deserts’, and it contrasts with consequentialist theories that ground punishment in its potentially beneficial future consequences. Rich philosophical debate surrounds the appropriateness of retributivism. From a psychological perspective, the key question concerns whether retributivism underlies ordinary individuals' desire for the legal punishment of wrongdoers. Past research in social psychology has answered this question in the affirmative. However, much of this existing evidence requires a new look, because it is premised on a fundamental ambiguity. We review alternative evidence for the existence of retributive motives from lesser‐known correlational studies, and from studies of the punishment of companies and animals. We also explore the links between retributivism and restorative justice—an alternative justice approach that focuses on repairing the harms caused by an offense. Although often cast as diametrically opposed to one another, retributive and restorative justice in fact share more in common than is often supposed. Both are premised on notions of deservingness, and their goals can be achieved by the same action (i.e., retributive punishment can restore victims). In all areas of the research we review, more work is needed to better understand: retributivism directed at human offenders, the commonalities and discontinuities between retributive and restorative justice, and how the notion of desert structures moral life and thought more generally.WIREs Cogn Sci2014, 5:561–572. doi: 10.1002/wcs.1301This article is categorized under: Psychology > Emotion and Motivation Psychology > Reasoning and Decision Making Philosophy > Value


  • The Psychology of Meta-ethics

    by Geoffrey P. Goodwin, John M. Darley

    This chapter focuses on the foundation of ethical principles in relation to how individuals would justify their ethical beliefs in the face of moral disagreements. It tackles the issue of how meta-ethics is being perceived by individuals, of whether or not they classify their moral ideologies as objective or subjective. It presents a study that aims to understand how individuals consider the objectivity of ethical statements in contrast to scientific facts, as well as the factors that determine individual differences in degree of objectivism. The chapter argues that a deeper psychological understanding and empirical examination are necessary to better assess ethical objectivism, and that studying the nature of ethical conducts will lead to an in-depth comprehension of the subject matter.

  • The acquisition of Boolean concepts

    by Geoffrey P. Goodwin, Philip N. Johnson-Laird


  • Mental models of Boolean concepts

    by Geoffrey P. Goodwin, P.N. Johnson-Laird


  • Conceptual illusions

    by Geoffrey P. Goodwin, P.N. Johnson-Laird