Romain Wacziarg
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Romain Wacziarg has a total of 53 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Enrico Spolaore
20 shared publications- Klaus Desmet
Southern Methodist University
5 shared publications Alberto Alesina
4 shared publications- Bruno Pellegrino
University of Maryland - Robert H. Smith School of Business
3 shared publications - Ignacio Ortuño-Ortín
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Department of Economics
3 shared publications - William R. Hauk
University of South Carolina
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Electoral Margins and Political Competition
In this paper, we argue that recent trends in party seat margins and election vote margins result from structural changes in the nature of US political competition. We assemble a comprehensive database of electoral results for the House, Senate and presidential contests, from the 19th century until today. Seat margins declined in the recent period, so the margins of control of the House, Senate, and Electoral College by either party have become smaller. However, this was not accompanied by a decline in the margins of victory at the constituency level. We propose a model of electoral competition with multiple districts that can rationalize these trends. We show theoretically that an increase in politicians’ information about voter preferences, together with the growing nationalization of politics, can account for the decrease in seat margins and the concurrent stability in vote margins. As implied by the model, we document that campaign contributions received by House and Senate candidates are increasingly concentrated in a dwindling set of swing constituencies.Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessElectoral Margins and Political Competition
In this paper, we argue that recent trends in party seat margins and election vote margins result from structural changes in the nature of US political competition. We assemble a comprehensive database of electoral results for the House, Senate and presidential contests, from the 19th century until today. Seat margins declined in the recent period, so the margins of control of the House, Senate, and Electoral College by either party have become smaller. However, this was not accompanied by a decline in the margins of victory at the constituency level. We propose a model of electoral competition with multiple districts that can rationalize these trends. We show theoretically that an increase in politicians’ information about voter preferences, together with the growing nationalization of politics, can account for the decrease in seat margins and the concurrent stability in vote margins. As implied by the model, we document that campaign contributions received by House and Senate candidates are increasingly concentrated in a dwindling set of swing constituencies.Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.
- Open Access
Cultural Remittances and Modern Fertility
We argue that migrants played a significant role in the diffusion of the demographic transition from France to the rest of Europe in the late 19 th century. Employing novel data on French immigration from other European regions from 1850 to 1930, we find that higher immigration to France translated into lower fertility in the region of origin after a few decades -both in crossregion regressions for various periods, and in a panel setting with region fixed effects. These results are robust to the inclusion of a variety of controls, and across multiple specifications. We also find that immigrants who themselves became French citizens achieved lower fertility, particularly those who moved to French regions with the lowest fertility levels. We interpret these findings in terms of cultural remittances, consistently with insights from a theoretical framework where migrants act as vectors of cultural diffusion, spreading new information, social norms and preferences pertaining to modern fertility to their regions of origin.
Open AccessCultural Remittances and Modern Fertility
We argue that migrants played a significant role in the diffusion of the demographic transition from France to the rest of Europe in the late 19 th century. Employing novel data on French immigration from other European regions from 1850 to 1930, we find that higher immigration to France translated into lower fertility in the region of origin after a few decades -both in crossregion regressions for various periods, and in a panel setting with region fixed effects. These results are robust to the inclusion of a variety of controls, and across multiple specifications. We also find that immigrants who themselves became French citizens achieved lower fertility, particularly those who moved to French regions with the lowest fertility levels. We interpret these findings in terms of cultural remittances, consistently with insights from a theoretical framework where migrants act as vectors of cultural diffusion, spreading new information, social norms and preferences pertaining to modern fertility to their regions of origin.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Barriers to Global Capital Allocation
Observed international investment positions and crosscountry heterogeneity in rates of return to capital are hard to reconcile with frictionless capital markets. In this paper, we develop a theory of international capital allocation: a multi-country dynamic spatial general equilibrium model in which the entire network of cross-border investment is endogenously determined. Our model features crosscountry heterogeneity in fundamental risk, a demand system for international assets, and frictions that cause segmentation in international capital markets. We measure frictions affecting international investment and apply our model to data from nearly 100 countries, using a new dataset of international capital taxes and cultural, geographic and linguistic distances between countries (geopoliticaldistance.org). Our model performs well in reproducing the composition of international portfolios, the cross-section of home bias and rates of return to capital, and other key features of international capital markets. Finally, we carry out counterfactual exercises: we show that barriers to international investment reduce world output by almost 7% and account for nearly half of the observed crosscountry differences in capital stock per employee.
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessBarriers to Global Capital Allocation
Observed international investment positions and crosscountry heterogeneity in rates of return to capital are hard to reconcile with frictionless capital markets. In this paper, we develop a theory of international capital allocation: a multi-country dynamic spatial general equilibrium model in which the entire network of cross-border investment is endogenously determined. Our model features crosscountry heterogeneity in fundamental risk, a demand system for international assets, and frictions that cause segmentation in international capital markets. We measure frictions affecting international investment and apply our model to data from nearly 100 countries, using a new dataset of international capital taxes and cultural, geographic and linguistic distances between countries (geopoliticaldistance.org). Our model performs well in reproducing the composition of international portfolios, the cross-section of home bias and rates of return to capital, and other key features of international capital markets. Finally, we carry out counterfactual exercises: we show that barriers to international investment reduce world output by almost 7% and account for nearly half of the observed crosscountry differences in capital stock per employee.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Cultural Remittances and Modern Fertility
We argue that migrants played a significant role in the diffusion of the demographic transition from France to the rest of Europe in the late 19th century. Employing novel data on French immigration from other European regions from 1850 to 1930, we find that higher immigration to France translated into lower fertility in the region of origin after a few decades - both in cross-region regressions for various periods, and in a panel setting with region fixed effects. These results are robust to the inclusion of a variety of controls, and across multiple specifications. We also find that immigrants who themselves became French citizens achieved lower fertility, particularly those who moved to French regions with the lowest fertility levels. We interpret these findings in terms of cultural remittances, consistently with insights from a theoretical framework where migrants act as vectors of cultural diffusion, spreading new information, social norms and preferences pertaining to modern fertility to their regions of origin.
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessCultural Remittances and Modern Fertility
We argue that migrants played a significant role in the diffusion of the demographic transition from France to the rest of Europe in the late 19th century. Employing novel data on French immigration from other European regions from 1850 to 1930, we find that higher immigration to France translated into lower fertility in the region of origin after a few decades - both in cross-region regressions for various periods, and in a panel setting with region fixed effects. These results are robust to the inclusion of a variety of controls, and across multiple specifications. We also find that immigrants who themselves became French citizens achieved lower fertility, particularly those who moved to French regions with the lowest fertility levels. We interpret these findings in terms of cultural remittances, consistently with insights from a theoretical framework where migrants act as vectors of cultural diffusion, spreading new information, social norms and preferences pertaining to modern fertility to their regions of origin.
- 12 August 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of the European Economic Association
- Vol. 21 (5) , e1-e33
Reflecting on the First 20 Years of the Journal of the European Economic Association
Romain Wacziarg; Reflecting on the First 20 Years of the Journal of the European Economic Association, Journal of the European Economic Association, , jvad045,
- 12 August 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of the European Economic Association
- Vol. 21 (5) , e1-e33
Reflecting on the First 20 Years of the Journal of the European Economic Association
Romain Wacziarg; Reflecting on the First 20 Years of the Journal of the European Economic Association, Journal of the European Economic Association, , jvad045,
- Open Access
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Does Anger Drive Populism?
We study whether anger fuels the rise of populism. Anger as an emotion tends to act as a call to action against individuals or groups that are blamed for negative situations, making it conducive to voting for populist politicians. Using a unique dataset tracking emotions for a large sample of respondents from 2008 to 2017, we explore the relationship between anger and the populist vote share across U.S. counties. More angry counties displayed stronger preferences for populist candidates during the 2016 presidential primaries and elections. However, once we control for other negative emotions and life satisfaction, anger no longer operates as a separate channel in driving the populist vote share. Instead, our results indicate that a more complex sense of malaise and gloom, rather than anger per se, drives the rise in populism. Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessDoes Anger Drive Populism?
We study whether anger fuels the rise of populism. Anger as an emotion tends to act as a call to action against individuals or groups that are blamed for negative situations, making it conducive to voting for populist politicians. Using a unique dataset tracking emotions for a large sample of respondents from 2008 to 2017, we explore the relationship between anger and the populist vote share across U.S. counties. More angry counties displayed stronger preferences for populist candidates during the 2016 presidential primaries and elections. However, once we control for other negative emotions and life satisfaction, anger no longer operates as a separate channel in driving the populist vote share. Instead, our results indicate that a more complex sense of malaise and gloom, rather than anger per se, drives the rise in populism. Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 24 June 2022
- Published by American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) in Science Advances
- Vol. 8 (25) , eabn3517
Disentangling the evolutionary drivers of social complexity: A comprehensive test of hypotheses
During the Holocene, the scale and complexity of human societies increased markedly. Generations of scholars have proposed different theories explaining this expansion, which range from broadly functionalist explanations, focusing on the provision of public goods, to conflict theories, emphasizing the role of class struggle or warfare. To quantitatively test these theories, we develop a general dynamical model based on the theoretical framework of cultural macroevolution. Using this model and Seshat: Global History Databank, we test 17 potential predictor variables proxying mechanisms suggested by major theories of sociopolitical complexity (and >100,000 combinations of these predictors). The best-supported model indicates a strong causal role played by a combination of increasing agricultural productivity and invention/adoption of military technologies (most notably, iron weapons and cavalry in the first millennium BCE).
- 24 June 2022
- Published by American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) in Science Advances
- Vol. 8 (25) , eabn3517
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessDisentangling the evolutionary drivers of social complexity: A comprehensive test of hypotheses
During the Holocene, the scale and complexity of human societies increased markedly. Generations of scholars have proposed different theories explaining this expansion, which range from broadly functionalist explanations, focusing on the provision of public goods, to conflict theories, emphasizing the role of class struggle or warfare. To quantitatively test these theories, we develop a general dynamical model based on the theoretical framework of cultural macroevolution. Using this model and Seshat: Global History Databank, we test 17 potential predictor variables proxying mechanisms suggested by major theories of sociopolitical complexity (and >100,000 combinations of these predictors). The best-supported model indicates a strong causal role played by a combination of increasing agricultural productivity and invention/adoption of military technologies (most notably, iron weapons and cavalry in the first millennium BCE).
- Top Cited Papers
- 25 August 2021
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Economic Journal
- Vol. 132 (642) , 796-833
Fertility and Modernity
We investigate the determinants of the fertility decline in Europe from 1830 to 1970 using a newly constructed data set of linguistic distances between European regions. The decline resulted from the gradual diffusion of new fertility behaviour from French-speaking regions to the rest of Europe. Societies with higher education, lower infant mortality, higher urbanisation and higher population density had lower levels of fertility during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. However, the fertility decline took place earlier in communities that were culturally closer to the French, while the fertility transition spread only later to societies that were more distant from the frontier. This is consistent with a process of social influence, whereby societies that were culturally closer to the French faced lower barriers to learning new information and adopting novel attitudes regarding fertility control.
- 25 August 2021
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Economic Journal
- Vol. 132 (642) , 796-833
Top Cited PapersFertility and Modernity
We investigate the determinants of the fertility decline in Europe from 1830 to 1970 using a newly constructed data set of linguistic distances between European regions. The decline resulted from the gradual diffusion of new fertility behaviour from French-speaking regions to the rest of Europe. Societies with higher education, lower infant mortality, higher urbanisation and higher population density had lower levels of fertility during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. However, the fertility decline took place earlier in communities that were culturally closer to the French, while the fertility transition spread only later to societies that were more distant from the frontier. This is consistent with a process of social influence, whereby societies that were culturally closer to the French faced lower barriers to learning new information and adopting novel attitudes regarding fertility control.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2021
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Barriers to Global Capital Allocation
We quantify the impact of barriers to international investment, using a novel multi-country dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous investors and imperfect capital mobility. Our model yields a gravity equation for bilateral foreign asset positions. We estimate this gravity equation using recently developed foreign investment data that have been restated to account for offshore investment and financing vehicles. We show that a parsimonious implementation of the model with four barriers (geographic distance, cultural distance, foreign investment taxation, and political risk) accounts for a large share of the observed variation in bilateral foreign investment positions. Our model predicts (out of sample) a significant home bias, higher rates of return on capital in emerging markets, as well as “upstream” capital flows. In our benchmark calibration, we estimate that the capital misallocation induced by these barriers reduces World GDP by 7%, compared to a situation without barriers. We also find that barriers to global capital allocation contribute significantly to cross-country inequality: the standard deviation of log capital per employee is 80% higher than it would be in a world without barriers to international investment, while the dispersion in output per employee is 42% higher.
- 1 January 2021
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessBarriers to Global Capital Allocation
We quantify the impact of barriers to international investment, using a novel multi-country dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous investors and imperfect capital mobility. Our model yields a gravity equation for bilateral foreign asset positions. We estimate this gravity equation using recently developed foreign investment data that have been restated to account for offshore investment and financing vehicles. We show that a parsimonious implementation of the model with four barriers (geographic distance, cultural distance, foreign investment taxation, and political risk) accounts for a large share of the observed variation in bilateral foreign investment positions. Our model predicts (out of sample) a significant home bias, higher rates of return on capital in emerging markets, as well as “upstream” capital flows. In our benchmark calibration, we estimate that the capital misallocation induced by these barriers reduces World GDP by 7%, compared to a situation without barriers. We also find that barriers to global capital allocation contribute significantly to cross-country inequality: the standard deviation of log capital per employee is 80% higher than it would be in a world without barriers to international investment, while the dispersion in output per employee is 42% higher.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2021
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Barriers to Global Capital Allocation
Observed international investment positions and cross-country heterogeneity in rates of return to capital are hard to reconcile with frictionless capital markets. In this paper, we develop a theory of international capital allocation: a multi-country dynamic spatial general equilibrium model in which the entire network of cross-border investment is endogenously determined. Our model features cross-country heterogeneity in fundamental risk, a demand system for international assets, and frictions that cause segmentation in international capital markets. We measure frictions affecting international investment and apply our model to data from nearly 100 countries, using a new dataset of international capital taxes and cultural, geographic and linguistic distances between countries (geopoliticaldistance.org). Our model performs well in reproducing the composition of international portfolios, the cross-section of home bias and rates of return to capital, and other key features of international capital markets. Finally, we carry out counterfactual exercises: we show that barriers to international investment reduce world output by almost 7% and account for nearly half of the observed cross-country differences in capital stock per employee.
- 1 January 2021
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessBarriers to Global Capital Allocation
Observed international investment positions and cross-country heterogeneity in rates of return to capital are hard to reconcile with frictionless capital markets. In this paper, we develop a theory of international capital allocation: a multi-country dynamic spatial general equilibrium model in which the entire network of cross-border investment is endogenously determined. Our model features cross-country heterogeneity in fundamental risk, a demand system for international assets, and frictions that cause segmentation in international capital markets. We measure frictions affecting international investment and apply our model to data from nearly 100 countries, using a new dataset of international capital taxes and cultural, geographic and linguistic distances between countries (geopoliticaldistance.org). Our model performs well in reproducing the composition of international portfolios, the cross-section of home bias and rates of return to capital, and other key features of international capital markets. Finally, we carry out counterfactual exercises: we show that barriers to international investment reduce world output by almost 7% and account for nearly half of the observed cross-country differences in capital stock per employee.