Woo-Kyoung Ahn
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Woo-Kyoung Ahn has a total of 2 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Loranel M. Graham
University of Louisville
1 shared publication- Steven A. Sloman
Brown University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 May 1999
- Published by Springer Nature in Memory & Cognition
- Vol. 27 (3) , 526-537
Feature centrality: Naming versus imagining
Being white is central to whether we call an animal a “polar bear,” but it is fairly peripheral to our concept of what apolar bear is. We propose that a feature is central to category naming in proportion to the feature’s category validity—the probability of the feature, given the category. In contrast, a feature is conceptually central in a representation of the object to the extent that the feature is depended on by other features. Further, we propose that naming and conceptual centrality are more likely to disagree for features that hold at more specific levels (such asis white, which holds only for the specific category ofpolar bear) than for features that hold at intermediate levels of abstraction (such ashas claws, which holds for all bears). In support of these hypotheses, we report evidence that increasing the abstractness of category features has a greater effect on judgments of conceptual centrality than on judgments of name centrality and that other category features depend more on intermediate-level category features than on specific ones.
- 1 May 1999
- Published by Springer Nature in Memory & Cognition
- Vol. 27 (3) , 526-537
Feature centrality: Naming versus imagining
Being white is central to whether we call an animal a “polar bear,” but it is fairly peripheral to our concept of what apolar bear is. We propose that a feature is central to category naming in proportion to the feature’s category validity—the probability of the feature, given the category. In contrast, a feature is conceptually central in a representation of the object to the extent that the feature is depended on by other features. Further, we propose that naming and conceptual centrality are more likely to disagree for features that hold at more specific levels (such asis white, which holds only for the specific category ofpolar bear) than for features that hold at intermediate levels of abstraction (such ashas claws, which holds for all bears). In support of these hypotheses, we report evidence that increasing the abstractness of category features has a greater effect on judgments of conceptual centrality than on judgments of name centrality and that other category features depend more on intermediate-level category features than on specific ones.
- 1 May 1999
- Published by SAGE Publications in Psychological Science
- Vol. 10 (3) , 237-242
The Impact of Necessity and Sufficiency in the Wason Four-Card Selection Task
Performance in the Wason card selection task is often improved given thematic content. Such content effects have been considered evidence against human rationality. We propose that the role of content lies in specifying premises underlying “if P, then Q” rules. Unlike thematic rules, abstract conditional rules do not explicitly provide material interpretation ( P is a sufficient but not necessarily a necessary condition for Q), resulting in nonnormative responses. When necessity-sufficiency relations were explicated, normative responses were elicited and effects of other logically irrelevant components disappeared. The results suggest that content effects are compatible with human rationality.
- 1 May 1999
- Published by SAGE Publications in Psychological Science
- Vol. 10 (3) , 237-242
The Impact of Necessity and Sufficiency in the Wason Four-Card Selection Task
Performance in the Wason card selection task is often improved given thematic content. Such content effects have been considered evidence against human rationality. We propose that the role of content lies in specifying premises underlying “if P, then Q” rules. Unlike thematic rules, abstract conditional rules do not explicitly provide material interpretation ( P is a sufficient but not necessarily a necessary condition for Q), resulting in nonnormative responses. When necessity-sufficiency relations were explicated, normative responses were elicited and effects of other logically irrelevant components disappeared. The results suggest that content effects are compatible with human rationality.