SBSusan A. J. Birch

Susan A. J. Birch

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

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Susan A. J. Birch has a total of 48 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    The Anxious Mind: Examining the Conflicting Relationships Between Distinct Aspects of Social Anxiety and Social Cognition

    by Shannon M. May Craig, J. Kiley Hamlin, Susan A. J. Birch

    Social anxiety (SA) negatively impacts myriad aspects of an individual’s life. Although research with adults and children highlights an important link between SA and social cognitive abilities (e.g., reasoning about others’ thoughts and emotions), findings are mixed. We hypothesized that these mixed findings stem from the various combinations of social cognitive components of SA under investigation and the different types of measures used. Understanding these relationships in middle-to-late childhood is especially important, given that it is a period of substantial social cognitive development and a common onset age for SA. Seventy-eight children (Mage = 8.15 years, SD = 1.61) and their parents completed measures capturing different components of anxiety (i.e., social worry, fear of negative evaluation, and social avoidance) and social cognition (i.e., emotion recognition, mental state understanding, and social perspective-taking). Measures of social cognition were not significantly correlated. Consistent with our expectations, associations between social cognition and social anxiety were measure-dependent. Self-reported fear of negative evaluation emerged as a positive predictor of accuracy in a behavioral measure of mental state understanding but a negative predictor of parent-reported mental state understanding. In addition, social avoidance accounted for additional variance only when predicting lower self-reported perspective-taking. Together, our findings highlight the multifaceted nature of social cognition and SA and the need for distinguishing these facets in future work. These findings are discussed in the context of measurement limitations in the current study and the related measurement challenges faced in this field.

  • Open Access

    The Anxious Mind: Examining the Conflicting Relationships Between Distinct Aspects of Social Anxiety and Social Cognition

    by Shannon May Craig, J. Kiley Hamlin, Susan A. J. Birch

    Social anxiety (SA) negatively impacts myriad aspects of an individual’s life. Although research with adults and children highlights an important link between SA and social-cognitive abilities (e.g., reasoning about others’ thoughts and emotions), findings are mixed. We hypothesized that these mixed findings stem from the various combinations of social-cognitive components of SA under investigation and the different types of measures used. Understanding these relationships in middle to late childhood is especially important, given that it is a period of substantial social-cognitive development and a common onset age for SA. Seventy-eight children (Mage=8.15 years, SD=1.61) and their parents completed measures capturing different components of anxiety (i.e., social worry, fear of negative evaluation, and social avoidance) and social cognition (i.e. emotion recognition, mental state understanding, and social perspective taking). Contrary to our expectations, measures of social cognition were only weakly correlated. Consistent with our expectations, associations between social cognition and social anxiety were measure-dependent. Self-reported fear of negative evaluation emerged as a positive predictor of accuracy in a behavioral measure of mental state understanding but a negative predictor of parent-reported mental state understanding. In addition, social avoidance accounted for additional variance only when predicting lower self-reported perspective-taking. Together, our findings underscore the multifaceted nature of social cognition and SA and highlight the need for distinguishing these facets in future work.

  • Open Access

    Negativity Bias in Depression and Anxiety: Examining the Psychometric Properties of a Modified Scrambled Sentences Task to Measure Interpretation Bias

    by Kate Rho, Ashali Kataria, Susan A. J. Birch, Joelle LeMoult

    In the Scrambled Sentences Task (SST), a widely used experimental paradigm for measuring negative interpretation bias (IB), participants are shown sets of ‘scrambled’ words that can be rearranged into either negative or positive sentences. The SST is traditionally administered with time limits, cognitive load and negative mood induction. Yet, whether these procedural features are required in all contexts remains uncertain. We tested whether a modified SST (SST-M), lacking time limits, cognitive load and mood induction, can be sufficient to detect associations between IB and current psychopathology by examining validity evidence and reliability of scores. Sixty-six Canadian university students (80.3% Women) completed the SST-M and measures of anxiety, depression, negative affect, and growth mindset. Findings offer preliminary validity evidence supporting the interpretation of SST-M scores as reflecting IB in a student sample. Results yielded excellent internal consistency and expected associations with anxiety, depression, negative affect, and growth mindset. The SST-M also displayed incremental associations above and beyond demographic covariates and negative affect. Our findings suggest that IB can be reliably detected, in at least some samples, without time limits, cognitive load and mood induction. The SST-M is an easy-to-administer measure that lowers data collection barriers, providing the potential to advance research across broader populations.

  • Open Access

    Targeting cognitive biases to improve social cognition and social emotional health

    by Susan A. J. Birch, Charlotte I. Stewardson, Kate Rho, Ashali Kataria, Shannon M. Craig, Minh D. H. Phan, Irene Savi, Kseniia Voronkova, Jenny Lee, Gayatri Choudhary, et al.

    Social cognitive skills are crucial for understanding and navigating human interactions, enabling us to process, interpret, and respond to social information (Arioli et al., 2018). A key component of these skills is theory of mind, which involves inferring and reasoning about one's own and others' mental states, including beliefs, intentions, desires, thoughts, and emotions (Premack & Woodruff, 1978;Wimmer & Perner, 1983). Theory of mind is essential in almost every social interaction, as it helps us understand human actions (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 1995;Frith & Frith, 2005), underpins cultural learning (e.g., Henrich, 2004;Herrmann et al., 2017), and is vital for effective communication and social decision-making (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 1995;Birch et al., 2017;Haddock & Birch, 2024). Theory of mind has also been shown to promote prosocial behavior (e.g., Imuta et al., 2016) and reduce prejudice (Shih et al., 2009).Philosopher Elbert G. Hubbard aptly stated, "If men [sic] could only know each other, they would never idolize nor hate" (Hubbard, 1911, p. 13). We interpret this to mean that a rich understanding of each other's perspectives fosters greater social harmony and social emotional health. More specifically, we believe that by using theory of mind to understand others' perspectives, people can recognize their shared humanity and overcome the tendencies to either idealize or condemn others. This understanding may also help reduce biases and assumptions that lead to flawed social judgments, such as the "black-and-white" thinking in which others are seen as either flawless or completely flawed.Consistent with Hubbard's sentiments, we propose that interventions enhancing social cognitive skills can significantly improve social-emotional health. Furthermore, we predict that the most successful interventions will incorporate strategies to minimize cognitive biases-systematic errors in thinking that affect decision-making and behavior (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; for a review, see Ellis, 2018). We support this view by briefly reviewing research that shows: (a) enhancing social cognition improves various aspects of social-emotional health, (b) cognitive biases play a critical role in the link between social cognition and social-emotional health, and (c) strategies for reducing cognitive biases have tremendous promise for enhancing social cognition and social emotional health.Research has consistently demonstrated that theory of mind abilities are pivotal for developing and maintaining social relationships, particularly during childhood (Dunn and Cutting, 1999;Peterson et al, 2016;Etel & Slaughter, 2019; for reviews see Repacholi &Slaughter, 2003 andHaddock &Birch, 2024). Evidence on the relationship between theory of mind and social competencies in adults, however, has been somewhat more mixed (Bora & Berk, 2016;Davis, 1983;Livingston et al, 2023;Wolgast et al, 2020). Generally speaking, individual differences in theory of mind are present early and continue into adulthood, with more advanced theory of mind predicting several positive outcomes (Dunn and Cutting, 1999;Repacholi and Slaughter, 2004). For example, higher theory of mind scores are associated with greater social understanding, higher levels of empathy, and more prosocial behavior, leading to reduced interpersonal conflicts and increased relationship satisfaction (e.g., Davis, 1983;Repacholi and Slaughter, 2004; for 2 meta-analyses see Imuta et al., 2016 andSlaughter, Imuta, Peterson &Henry, 2015). Similarly, more advanced theory of mind has been associated with increased cooperation (Etel and Slaughter, 2019) as well as increased communication and reduced peer conflict (Dunn and Cutting, 1999;Haddock and Birch, 2024). Studies by Peterson et al. (2015) demonstrated that higher theory of mind is associated with increased self-esteem and higher quality friendships. Peterson and colleagues (2016) also found that children's theory of mind understanding independently predicted social skills above and beyond age, gender, and verbal ability. Furthermore, more advanced theory of mind has also been shown to reduce the risk of social adversity, such as bullying and social exclusion (Bosacki et al., 2020;Smith, 2017). More advanced theory of mind also appears to act as a protective factor against trauma and adversity (e.g., Cadamuro et al., 2016;Hughes and Ensor, 2006;Hughes and Ensor, 2007). Conversely, poor theory of mind skills are associated with greater psychological distress (Wolgast et al., 2020), more emotional symptoms, and increased loneliness (Caputi and Schoenborn, 2018). This latter result is especially noteworthy given longitudinal studies linking loneliness to a variety of negative health outcomes, including poorer sleep quality (Cacioppo et al., 2002), and increased depressive symptoms (Cacioppo et al., 2010). Even in adulthood, theory of mind predicts emotional symptoms such as sadness and depression. A meta-analysis of 18 studies examining the relationship between theory of mind and Major Depressive Disorder in adults revealed that deficits in theory of mind can be a risk factor for depression and accompanying psychosocial impairment, with the level of theory of mind impairment predicting symptom severity (Bora and Berk, 2016).Decades of research across the psychological sciences have shown that cognitive biases play a critical role in shaping our perceptions, decisions, and interactions, influencing nearly every aspect of human interaction (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974;Kahneman, 2011; for a review, see Ellis, 2018). These cognitive biases are normal by-products of how the mind works; nonetheless, individual differences in the magnitude of these biases predict a range of outcomes. Cognitive biases lead to errors in decisionmaking and social judgments, impede communication, contribute to maladaptive behaviors, and even play a role in mental health conditions like depression (Beck, 1979;Kahneman, 2011;Nisbett and Ross, 1980;Tversky...


  • Parental pathological narcissism and child depression: the indirect effects of child attachment and perspective taking

    by Jackson M. A. Hewitt, David Kealy, Paul L. Hewitt, Ariel Ko, Chang Chen, Agostino Brugnera, Sheri Madigan, Susan Birch


  • Open Access

    Children's understanding of when a person's confidence and hesitancy is a cue to their credibility

    by Susan A. J. Birch, Rachel L. Severson, Adam Baimel

    The most readily-observable and influential cue to one’s credibility is their confidence. Although one’s confidence correlates with knowledge, one should not always trust confident sources or disregard hesitant ones. Three experiments (N = 662; 3- to 12-year-olds) examined the developmental trajectory of children’s understanding of ‘calibration’: whether a person’s confidence or hesitancy correlates with their knowledge. Experiments 1 and 2 provide evidence that children use a person’s history of calibration to guide their learning. Experiments 2 and 3 revealed a developmental progression in calibration understanding: Children preferred a well-calibrated over a miscalibrated confident person by around 4 years, whereas even 7- to 8-year-olds were insensitive to calibration in hesitant people. The widespread implications for social learning, impression formation, and social cognition are discussed.


  • Cultural Variations in the Curse of Knowledge: the Curse of Knowledge Bias in Children from a Nomadic Pastoralist Culture in Kenya

    by Siba Ghrear, Maciej Chudek, Klint Fung, Sarah Mathew, Susan A. J. Birch

    We examined the universality of the curse of knowledge (i.e., the tendency to be biased by one’s knowledge when inferring other perspectives) by investigating it in a unique cross-cultural sample; a nomadic Nilo-Saharan pastoralist society in East Africa, the Turkana. Forty Turkana children were asked eight factual questions and asked to predict how widely-known those facts were among their peers. To test the effect of their knowledge, we taught children the answers to half of the questions, while the other half were unknown. Based on findings suggesting the bias’s universality, we predicted that children would estimate that more of their peers would know the answers to the questions that were taught versus the unknown questions. We also predicted that with age children would become less biased by their knowledge. In contrast, we found that only Turkana males were biased by their knowledge when inferring their peers’ perspectives, and the bias did not change with age. We discuss the implications of these findings.


  • Perspectives on Perspective Taking

    by S.A.J. Birch, V. Li, T. Haddock, S.E. Ghrear, P. Brosseau-Liard, A. Baimel, M. Whyte


  • Open Access

    Children Can Learn New Facts Equally Well From Interactive Media Versus Face to Face Instruction

    by Kristine Kwok, Siba Ghrear, Vivian Li, Taeh Haddock, Patrick Coleman, Susan A. J. Birch

    Today’s children have more opportunities than ever before to learn from interactive technology, yet experimental research assessing the efficacy of children’s learning from interactive media in comparison to traditional learning approaches is still quite scarce. Moreover, little work has examined the efficacy of using touch-screen devices for research purposes. The current study compared children’s rate of learning factual information about animals during a face-to-face instruction from an adult female researcher versus an analogous instruction from an interactive device. Eighty-six children ages 4 through 8 years (64% male) completed the learning task in either the Face-to-Face condition (n = 43) or the Interactive Media condition (n = 43). In the Learning Phase of the experiment, which was presented as a game, children were taught novel facts about animals without being told that their memory of the facts would be tested. The facts were taught to the children either by an adult female researcher (Face-to-Face condition) or from a pre-recorded female voice represented by a cartoon Llama (Interactive Media condition). In the Testing Phase of the experiment that immediately followed, children’s memory for the taught facts was tested using a 4-option forced-choice paradigm. Children’s rate of learning was significantly above chance in both conditions and a comparison of the rates of learning across the two conditions revealed no significant differences. Learning significantly improved from age 4 to age 8, however, even the preschool-aged children performed significantly above chance, and their performance did not differ between conditions. These results suggest that, interactive media can be equally as effective as one-on-one instruction, at least under certain conditions. Moreover, these results offer support for the validity of using interactive technology to collect data for research purposes. We discuss the implications of these results for children’s learning from interactive media, parental attitudes about interactive technology, and research methods.