Dan W. Brock
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Dan W. Brock has a total of 6 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Daniel Wikler
University of Wisconsin, Madison
4 shared publications Allen Buchanan
University of Arizona
3 shared publicationsNorman Daniels
Tufts University, Massachusetts
3 shared publicationsDaniel Wikler
Department of Global Health and Social Medicine at Harvard Medical School in Boston
1 shared publication- Sarah Marchand1 shared publication
- Tessa Tan-Torres Edejer
Centre de Recherche du Centre Hospitalier de l’Université de Montréal (CRCHUM), Québec, Canada
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 13 February 2014
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy: A Forum for Bioethics and Philosophy of Medicine
- Vol. 39 (2) , 153-160
Reflections on the Patient Preference Predictor Proposal
There are substantial data establishing that surrogates are often mistaken in predicting what treatments incompetent patients would have wanted and that supplements such as advance directives have not resulted in significant improvements. Rid and Wendler’s Patient Preference Predictor (PPP) proposal will attempt to gather data about what similar patients would prefer in a variety of treatment choices. It accepts the usual goal of patient autonomy and the Substituted Judgment principle for surrogate decisions. I provide reasons for questioning sole reliance on autonomy when surrogates, not patients, are deciding and for giving some independent weight to patient well-being. Moreover, that family members, typical surrogates, will know best what the patient if incompetent would have wanted is not the only reason why they are chosen. The more pressing problem is that the PPP would fail to remove the more serious mistakes that empirical psychology over the last few decades has shown to infect such decision making.
- 13 February 2014
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy: A Forum for Bioethics and Philosophy of Medicine
- Vol. 39 (2) , 153-160
Reflections on the Patient Preference Predictor Proposal
There are substantial data establishing that surrogates are often mistaken in predicting what treatments incompetent patients would have wanted and that supplements such as advance directives have not resulted in significant improvements. Rid and Wendler’s Patient Preference Predictor (PPP) proposal will attempt to gather data about what similar patients would prefer in a variety of treatment choices. It accepts the usual goal of patient autonomy and the Substituted Judgment principle for surrogate decisions. I provide reasons for questioning sole reliance on autonomy when surrogates, not patients, are deciding and for giving some independent weight to patient well-being. Moreover, that family members, typical surrogates, will know best what the patient if incompetent would have wanted is not the only reason why they are chosen. The more pressing problem is that the PPP would fail to remove the more serious mistakes that empirical psychology over the last few decades has shown to infect such decision making.
- Open Access
- 1 March 2010
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Oncologist
- Vol. 15 (S1) , 36-42
Ethical and Value Issues in Insurance Coverage for Cancer Treatment
Many new cancer drugs provide only limited benefits, but at very great cost, for example, $200,000–$300,000 per quality-adjusted life year produced. By most standards of value or cost-effectiveness, this does not represent good value. I first review several of the causes of this value failure, including monopoly patents, prohibitions on Medicare's negotiating on drug prices, health insurance protecting patients from costs, and financial incentives of physicians to use these drugs. Besides value or cost-effectiveness, the other principal aim in health care resource allocation should be equity among the population served. I examine several equity considerations—priority to the worse off, aggregation and special priority to life extension, and the rule of rescue—and argue that none justifies greater priority for cancer treatment on the grounds of equity. Finally, I conclude by noting two recent policy changes that are in the wrong direction for achieving value in cancer care, and suggesting some small steps that could take us in the right direction.
- 1 March 2010
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Oncologist
- Vol. 15 (S1) , 36-42
Open AccessEthical and Value Issues in Insurance Coverage for Cancer Treatment
Many new cancer drugs provide only limited benefits, but at very great cost, for example, $200,000–$300,000 per quality-adjusted life year produced. By most standards of value or cost-effectiveness, this does not represent good value. I first review several of the causes of this value failure, including monopoly patents, prohibitions on Medicare's negotiating on drug prices, health insurance protecting patients from costs, and financial incentives of physicians to use these drugs. Besides value or cost-effectiveness, the other principal aim in health care resource allocation should be equity among the population served. I examine several equity considerations—priority to the worse off, aggregation and special priority to life extension, and the rule of rescue—and argue that none justifies greater priority for cancer treatment on the grounds of equity. Finally, I conclude by noting two recent policy changes that are in the wrong direction for achieving value in cancer care, and suggesting some small steps that could take us in the right direction.
- 1 November 2009
- Published by Health Affairs Publishing, LLC in Health Affairs
- Vol. 28 (6) , 1666-1676
Ethical Challenges In Long-Term Funding For HIV/AIDS
The global response to the AIDS pandemic aims for universal access to treatment and for pursuing every possible avenue to prevention. Skeptics, doubting that the huge increases in current funding levels needed for universal treatment will ever happen, would scale back antiretroviral treatment in favor of more cost-effective preventive interventions. Economics, politics, and science figure in this debate. But there is also a question of ethical principle: Is there a moral imperative to emphasize treatment, even if emphasizing prevention would save more lives? The authors examine moral arguments that address this question, and come down on the side of saving the most lives via prevention.
- 1 November 2009
- Published by Health Affairs Publishing, LLC in Health Affairs
- Vol. 28 (6) , 1666-1676
Ethical Challenges In Long-Term Funding For HIV/AIDS
The global response to the AIDS pandemic aims for universal access to treatment and for pursuing every possible avenue to prevention. Skeptics, doubting that the huge increases in current funding levels needed for universal treatment will ever happen, would scale back antiretroviral treatment in favor of more cost-effective preventive interventions. Economics, politics, and science figure in this debate. But there is also a question of ethical principle: Is there a moral imperative to emphasize treatment, even if emphasizing prevention would save more lives? The authors examine moral arguments that address this question, and come down on the side of saving the most lives via prevention.
- 1 June 2008
- Published by Springer Nature in Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics
- Vol. 29 (3) , 187-200
Conscientious refusal by physicians and pharmacists: who is obligated to do what, and why?
Some medical services have long generated deep moral controversy within the medical profession as well as in broader society and have led to conscientious refusals by some physicians to provide those services to their patients. More recently, pharmacists in a number of states have refused on grounds of conscience to fill legal prescriptions for their customers. This paper assesses these controversies. First, I offer a brief account of the basis and limits of the claim to be free to act on one’s conscience. Second, I sketch an account of the basis of the medical and pharmacy professions’ responsibilities and the process by which they are specified and change over time. Third, I then set out and defend what I call the “conventional compromise” as a reasonable accommodation to conflicts between these professions’ responsibilities and the moral integrity of their individual members. Finally, I take up and reject the complicity objection to the conventional compromise. Put together, this provides my answer to the question posed in the title of my paper: “Conscientious refusal by physicians and pharmacists: who is obligated to do what, and why?”.
- 1 June 2008
- Published by Springer Nature in Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics
- Vol. 29 (3) , 187-200
Conscientious refusal by physicians and pharmacists: who is obligated to do what, and why?
Some medical services have long generated deep moral controversy within the medical profession as well as in broader society and have led to conscientious refusals by some physicians to provide those services to their patients. More recently, pharmacists in a number of states have refused on grounds of conscience to fill legal prescriptions for their customers. This paper assesses these controversies. First, I offer a brief account of the basis and limits of the claim to be free to act on one’s conscience. Second, I sketch an account of the basis of the medical and pharmacy professions’ responsibilities and the process by which they are specified and change over time. Third, I then set out and defend what I call the “conventional compromise” as a reasonable accommodation to conflicts between these professions’ responsibilities and the moral integrity of their individual members. Finally, I take up and reject the complicity objection to the conventional compromise. Put together, this provides my answer to the question posed in the title of my paper: “Conscientious refusal by physicians and pharmacists: who is obligated to do what, and why?”.
- 15 June 2006
- Published by Wiley
- p. 563-568
Quantitative Methods for Priority‐Setting in Health: Ethical Issues
- 15 June 2006
- Published by Wiley
- p. 563-568
Quantitative Methods for Priority‐Setting in Health: Ethical Issues
- 22 December 2005
- Published by BMJ in Journal of Medical Ethics
- Vol. 32 (1) , 36-42
Is a consensus possible on stem cell research? Moral and political obstacles
Neither of the two central moral and political obstacles to human embryonic stem cell research survives critical scrutiny
- 22 December 2005
- Published by BMJ in Journal of Medical Ethics
- Vol. 32 (1) , 36-42
Is a consensus possible on stem cell research? Moral and political obstacles
Neither of the two central moral and political obstacles to human embryonic stem cell research survives critical scrutiny
- 24 April 2000
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- p. 1-26
INTRODUCTION