Fabio S. Priuli
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Fabio S. Priuli has a total of 3 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Alberto Bressan
Department of Mathematics, Penn State University, University Park, PA 16802, USA
2 shared publications - Paola Goatin
Université Côte d'Azur Inria CNRS LJAD 2004 route des Lucioles -BP 93 06902 Sophia Antipolis Cedex France
1 shared publication - Rinaldo M. Colombo
INdAM Unit & Department of Information Engineering, University of Brescia, Brescia, Italy
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 June 2007
- Published by Elsevier in Nonlinear Analysis
- Vol. 66 (11) , 2413-2426
Global well posedness of traffic flow models with phase transitions
- 1 June 2007
- Published by Elsevier in Nonlinear Analysis
- Vol. 66 (11) , 2413-2426
Global well posedness of traffic flow models with phase transitions
- 1 August 2006
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Differential Equations
- Vol. 227 (1) , 230-257
Infinite horizon noncooperative differential games
- 1 August 2006
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Differential Equations
- Vol. 227 (1) , 230-257
Infinite horizon noncooperative differential games
- Open Access
Infinite Horizon Noncooperative Differential Games
For a non-cooperative differential game, the value functions of the various players satisfy a system of Hamilton-Jacobi equations. In the present paper, we consider a class of infinite-horizon games with nonlinear costs exponentially discounted in time. By the analysis of the value functions, we establish the existence of Nash equilibrium solutions in feedback form and provide results and counterexamples on their uniqueness and stability.
Open AccessInfinite Horizon Noncooperative Differential Games
For a non-cooperative differential game, the value functions of the various players satisfy a system of Hamilton-Jacobi equations. In the present paper, we consider a class of infinite-horizon games with nonlinear costs exponentially discounted in time. By the analysis of the value functions, we establish the existence of Nash equilibrium solutions in feedback form and provide results and counterexamples on their uniqueness and stability.